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Abstract
Studies and victimization surveys suggest that many, if not most, crimes are not reported
to legal authorities. The overarching aim of this project was to examine the roles of individual
and contextual differences in bystanders’ willingness to report crimes to, and cooperate with,
legal authorities. A sample of 1,434 adults in the U.S. completed a survey in which they read and
responded to crime vignettes and responded to items theoretically measuring individual
differences in legal socialization, perceived legitimacy, the need for cognitive closure, right-wing
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and the general willingness to cooperate.
Bystanders’ relationship to the victim, relationship to the suspected perpetrator, and the crime
severity were experimentally manipulated between vignettes. I used latent variable models to
examine the measurement structure of key concepts and the relationships between individual
differences and the general willingness to cooperate; I used multilevel models to examine how
both individual and situational differences predict the willingness to cooperate in hypothetical
crime scenarios.
Results supported multidimensional measurement models of legal socialization and
perceived legitimacy, showed associations between dimensions of legal socialization and
perceived legitimacy, and robust associations between dimensions of legal socialization,
perceived legitimacy, and the willingness to cooperate. In addition, the need for cognitive
closure, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation explained a substantive
amount of variance in the willingness to cooperate, but the relationships were different
depending on the particular facet of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation and, in some instance, the relationships changed depending on situational factors,
especially the relationship to the victim. The need for cognitive closure, right-wing
iii

authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation were associated with dimensions of both legal
socialization and perceived legitimacy, offering empirical support for theoretical integration.
Further, crime severity and the bystander’s relationship to the perpetrator had the strongest main
effects on the willingness to report across different types of crime and controlling for every
individual difference measure. The relationship to the victim also affected the willingness to
cooperate, but the magnitude and direction of the relationship depended on individual
differences. The findings both support and extend prior theory and studies. I discuss their
implications, as well as limitations of the current study and directions for future research.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
One notable event that engendered academic interest in the behavior of bystanders was
the case of Kitty Genovese. As the story goes, Kitty Genovese was assaulted and murdered in
New York City while dozens of seemingly apathetic bystanders failed to intervene or report the
crime until after she had died (Manning et al., 2007; Rosenthal, 1964/1999). Upon reading that
narrative, it can be easy to blame the bystanders for their seeming ethical failure, but as many
scholars both past and present have proposed, there are a variety of mechanisms that lead
otherwise “good” people to do “bad” things (e.g., Bandura, 2016). The social psychological
explanation for the Kitty Genovese case, proffered not shortly thereafter, was that individual
people do feel responsible to help others, but that responsibility decreases within each individual
when they are in the presence of others (Darley & Latané’, 1968). The context of individual
decisions matters. The Kitty Genovese story is perhaps more myth than fact (see footnote 1), but
it nevertheless motivated attention to trying to understand how people respond when they
witness a crime or other emergency (Manning et al., 2007).
Tyler’s (2006) normative perspective of legitimacy offers an “optimistic” perspective on
people’s willingness to call on legal authority to intervene in a situation. The Kitty Genovese
case evokes the question of why bystanders do not report crimes to legal authorities, but the
normative perspective of legitimacy flips the focus—why people do report crimes to legal
authorities, and more generally, why people cooperate with legal authorities to “fight” crime in
their communities (Tyler & Fagan, 2008). In short, if people have “positive” experiences and
interactions with authorities in specific situations and across situations and domains as they
develop into adulthood, they will have positive orientations towards law and legal authority and
be willing to cooperate with legal authority as adults (cf. Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Kaiser & Reisig,
1

2019; Nagin & Telep, 2020; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler & Trinkner, 2017). The context of an
individual’s decision to cooperate with legal authority matters, but individuals also enter a
situation with a history of experience that has shaped their orientation toward law and legal
authority; individual differences matter.
While much attention has been paid to the role of experiences with legal authorities and
perceptions of law and legal authorities in people’s willing cooperation, scant attention has been
paid to the role of other individual differences. Some psychological theories rooted in a bioevolutionary perspective suggest that individual needs motivate how people think about the
social world (social cognition). For example, people have needs (e.g., the need to manage
uncertainty) that vary individual and situationally, and these needs motivate people to think
about the social world in ways that satisfy those needs (Jost et al., 2003; Roets et al., 2015); in
turn, people’s social beliefs relate to their legal judgments and decisions (e.g., Devine &
Caughlin, 2014). Individual differences in people’s needs and beliefs about society might explain
to some extent why they report crimes and cooperate with legal authority.
In this study, I examine individual and situational predictors of bystanders’ willingness to
report crimes and cooperate with legal authorities. It has long been understood that cooperation
with legal authorities is critical for an effective criminal justice system. Thousands of years ago
Confucius (ca. 500 B.C.E.) noted the confidence of people in their ruler as a requisite of
government. Two centuries ago Sir Robert Peel, the father of Metropolitan policing, argued that
public approval is paramount for police to obtain and maintain respect and successfully
accomplish their duties (Peel, 1829). About a century ago, Roscoe Pound made a similar point
more specifically tailored to the courts in a famous address—as Friedman (2007) summarizes,
“…the efficacy of law requires popular support” and trust in the courts (p. 1208).
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One way I expand on prior research is by operationalizing the willingness to cooperate in
multiple ways. First, I examine how individual differences relate to people’s general willingness
to cooperate, which includes indicators like the willingness to report crime one witnesses and the
willingness to testify at trial if asked (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013). Second, I
examine how individual differences, situational differences, and their interactions relate to
people’s willingness to report crimes and provide a statement to police in hypothetical crime
scenarios. To answer research questions about how individual and situational differences relate
to people’s willingness to cooperate, I conducted a survey of 1,434 adults in the U.S. This survey
incorporated an experimental design in which situational factors in hypothetical crime scenarios
were manipulated.
Along the way to answering the broad question about how individual and situational
differences relate to the willingness to cooperate, I expand on prior literature and answer other
research questions. This study extends prior literature on the public’s willingness to cooperate
with legal authority by examining a novel theoretical model. I refer to this model as the “need for
certainty” model. It generally proposes that people’s willingness to cooperate is directly and
indirectly related to the dispositional need for certainty. To my knowledge, no prior study has
examined such a model. Prior studies have examined in part, however, a “legitimacy” model of
people’s willingness to cooperate. This model generally proposes that people’s experiences and
interactions with authorities prior to adulthood relates to their legal orientation, and in turn, their
willingness to cooperate as adults (cf. Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). This study
makes a second contribution by examining the measurement and relationship between two key
constructs in the model: perceived legitimacy and legal socialization. Moreover, I examine
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correlations between individual differences in the need for certainty model and the legitimacy
model; these potential correlations have not been examined by prior studies.
In Chapter 2, I start by briefly reviewing victim and bystander reporting, conceptualize
bystander reporting as an indicator of cooperation with legal authority, discuss some limitations
of current literature, and describe three situational factors that will be examined in the current
study. Specifically, the bystander’s relationship to the victim, the bystander’s relationship to the
suspected perpetrator, and crime severity. I review prior theory and research that provides a basis
for why these factors affect the willingness to cooperate, and I also describe how this study
expands on that prior research.
Next, I describe the role of individual differences in the willingness to cooperate, and
then turn to the first important concept in the legitimacy model of cooperation, perceived
legitimacy. I provide a background, describe two multidimensional models of perceived
legitimacy, and discuss how I aim to measure perceived legitimacy in this study. After that, I
turn to the next important concept in the legitimacy model, legal socialization. I review the three
domains of legal socialization, discuss how childhood adversity might be a facet of legal
socialization, and the potential direct and indirect relationships between facets of legal
socialization and with the willingness to cooperate.
Subsequently, I describe the need for certainty model. I describe the need for cognitive
closure, how it relates to beliefs like right-wing authoritarianism, and how it might directly and
indirectly relate to the willingness to cooperate. I also lay the theoretical basis for why variables
in the need for certainty model might relate to variables in the legitimacy model. Last, I provide
an overview of the current study and outline research questions and hypotheses.

4

In Chapter 3, I describe the methods used in the current study to answer the research
questions. In short, I conducted a nationwide survey of 1,434 adults in the U.S. The survey
respondents reported basic demographics, read and responded to hypothetical scenarios depicting
a potential crime, and responded to items theoretically measuring a number of individual
differences. I also outline the analytical strategies I used (e.g., multilevel models).
In Chapter 4, I report the results. The results generally offered answers to the research
questions, though not always as expected. The “legitimacy” model was the most robust model of
the willingness to cooperate. It explained a sizeable amount of variance in the willingness to
cooperate, and perceived legitimacy (as measured in this study) was consistently and positively
related to every measure of the willingness to cooperate and it did not interact with situational
differences. The “need for certainty” model also explained a meaningful amount variance in the
willingness to cooperate, but the relationships with the willingness to cooperate tended to vary
depending on situational factors, especially the relationship to the victim. Notably, there were
many medium-to-strong correlations between variables in the legitimacy model and the need for
certainty model, and dimensions of legal socialization and dimensions of perceived legitimacy
were strongly, and in some instances almost perfectly, correlated. Crime severity was the
strongest situational factor that independently affected the willingness to cooperate.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss some theoretical and policy implications of the results.
One broad implication, for instance, is that “family-friendly” policies and programs both within
and outside of the criminal justice system might increase public cooperation and compliance
with law and legal authority in the long term. After that, I discuss limitations and identify some
possible directions for future research.

5

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Bystanders’ Willingness to Report Crimes as a Part of Cooperation
About half of crimes experienced or witnessed are not reported to legal authorities (e.g.,
Jones, 2014; Morgan & Truman, 2020; Whitman & Davis, 2007). On a practical level, this is
problematic for two reasons. First, criminal justice authorities—perhaps most notably, the
police—are unable to address crime they are unaware of, and outside of directly witnessing the
crime, victim or bystander reporting is the primary route by which authorities are made aware of
crimes. Second, people’s willingness to report crimes is an indicator of the public’s willingness
to cooperate with legal authorities (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020; Papp et al., 2019; Sargeant & Kochel,
2018; Tankebe, 2013), and it has long been noted that willing cooperation among the public is
necessary for an effective criminal justice system in democratic societies (Peel, 1829; Tyler,
2006). In this section, I briefly review literature on victim and bystander reporting specifically,
and then turn to discussing how some specific situational factors might affect bystanders’
willingness to cooperate.
A Brief Summary of Victim Reporting
Perhaps the largest focus of recent literature on crime reporting is on victims’ decision to
report or not report crime they experience. One of the major sources of data on victims’ crime
reporting in the U.S. is the annual National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) conducted by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. According to recent estimates, about 41% of violent
victimizations are reported and about 33% of property victimizations are reported (Morgan &
Truman, 2020). Thus, the majority of crime victimization is unreported according to the NCVS,
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though there are exceptions among specific crimes (e.g., about 80% of motor-vehicle thefts are
reported; Morgan & Truman, 2020; see also Jones, 2014).
Although the current study focuses on bystanders, the literature on victim reporting offers
a number of explanations for why people do not report crime. These explanations might be
important to consider for bystanders as well. One reason suggested by Morgan and Truman
(2020), illustrated by the disparate reporting rates between violent and property crime in the
NCVS, is that a victim might deem the crime less serious or a personal matter (Morgan &
Truman, 2020). Indeed, the category of crime with the lowest rate of reporting in 2019 was
“other theft” (~27%), which “includes the taking or attempted unlawful taking of property or
cash without personal contact with the victim” (Morgan & Truman, 2020, p. 8). Second, victims
might not report because they experience a negative reaction upon their first disclosure. For
example, victims of sexual assault or abuse whose disclosure is met with a negative response
(e.g., victim blaming) are generally more likely to engage in self-blame and experience mental
distress (Bonnan-White et al., 2018). Third, victims might also avoid reporting because they fear
retaliation (i.e., “snitches get stitches”; Morgan & Truman, 2020; Whitman & Davis, 2007) or
because they know the offender personally (Tolsma et al., 2011). Finally, victims might not
report because they do not think that criminal justice authorities will effectively “help” (Morgan
& Truman, 2020; see also Kochel et al., 2013; Tolsma et al., 2011), and/or more broadly, victims
have a low level of trust in criminal justice authorities (cf. Tyler, 2006).
Bystander Reporting
Increased academic attention to the role of bystanders was catalyzed largely by the story
surrounding the assault and murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City in the 1960s (Manning
et al., 2007). Namely, the narrative of almost 40, presumably apathetic, bystanders who did not
7

intervene or report the crime to authorities motivated public as well as academic attention to the
issue (Rosenthal, 1964/1999). Darley and Latané (1968) famously begin their article on the
“diffusion of responsibility” (or the “bystander effect”)—the idea that bystanders are less likely
to engage in helping behavior when there are other bystanders because the responsibility to help
is diffused among all of the bystanders—referencing the Genovese case (see also Latané &
Darley, 1970).1 Shortly after Darley and Latané’s (1968; also Latané & Darley, 1970) initial
work on the diffusion of responsibility, many researchers (especially psychologists) began
focusing on the related topic of bystander memory—especially the accuracy thereof (e.g.,
Buckhout, 1980). Albeit an oversimplification, a research question elicited by the story of Kitty
Genovese’s assault and murder revolving around why bystanders fail to report crimes they
witness appeared to become less of a substantive focus among researchers. However, more
recently, bystanders’ willingness to report crimes has received attention perhaps due to what has
been called the “legitimacy turn” in the social sciences since Tyler’s (2006) Chicago study (cf.
Tankebe, 2013). Scholars became increasingly interested in identifying factors that lead people
to willingly cooperate with criminal justice authorities, and bystanders’ willingness to report
potential crimes is now commonly conceptualized and measured as an indicator of the
willingness to cooperate with criminal justice authorities (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020; Papp et al.,
2019; Sargeant & Kochel, 2018; Tankebe, 2013). In general, the factors identified in the
preceding section that related to victims’ willingness to report crimes are also related to
bystanders’ willingness to report crimes. For example, bystanders might not report because they

1

Factual inaccuracies have been identified with that story—for example, there was more than one attack, there were
far fewer actual as well as possible bystanders, and multiple bystanders claimed to report the crimes to police (see
Manning et al., 2007, for review). The bystander effect has nonetheless been supported by empirical studies (Fischer
et al., 2011).
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fear retaliation (Whitman & Davis, 2007; see also Larson, 2015) or because they personally
know the perpetrator (Larson, 2015).
The Role of Situational Differences in Bystander’s Willingness to Cooperate
In this project, I examine the role of a number of situational and individual differences in
bystanders’ willingness to report and more generally cooperate. Regarding individual
differences, past studies show that the extent to which people perceived the law and legal
authorities as legitimate is one of the strongest predictors of bystanders’ willingness to report
crimes in particular and cooperate with legal authorities in general (e.g., Larson, 2015; Lee &
Cho, 2020; Kearns, 2016; Papp et al., 2019; Sargeant & Kochel, 2018; Tankebe, 2013; Tolsma et
al., 2011; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). However, there are a number of other individual differences that
are likely related to bystanders’ willingness to cooperate, such as experiences and interactions
with authorities in childhood and adolescence (cf. Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Nagin & Telep, 2020;
Tyler & Trinkner, 2017). Subsequent sections focus on the limitations and unanswered questions
pertaining to the role of individual differences in the willingness to cooperate. Thus, I first focus
here on the limitations of prior work on some important situational differences in the willingness
to cooperate.
Some Limitations of Prior Studies
Two main situational factors I focus on this study are the bystander’s relationship to the
victim and suspected perpetrator. One limitation of prior studies is that these factors have not
been robustly examined. Larson (2015), for instance, found that whether a bystander personally
knew the offender was related to their willingness to report (see also Tolsma et al, 2011). This is
problematic because there might be important differences depending on the type of relationship
9

(cf. Black, 2010). In this study, I examine whether a bystander’s relationship to the victim or
suspected perpetrator affects their willingness to cooperate with legal authorities using an
experimental design, comparing three types of relationships: friends, family, and strangers. This
is one way the current study expands on prior work.
Another, and related, limitation of prior studies on situational factors is that the role of
crime severity or harm in bystander’s willingness to cooperate has not be robustly examined.
Naturally, crime severity varies between crimes (e.g., murder v. theft) and within crimes (simple
assault v. aggravated assault), but the variation between crimes has been the primary focus of the
limited prior studies on bystanders’ willingness to cooperate (e.g., Kearns, 2016; Larson, 2015).
In this study, I operationalize crime severity as the degree of harm within crimes. This is another
way I expand on prior studies.
A Theoretical Framework for Situational Differences in Bystanders’ Willingness to Cooperate
In this section, I turn to theories that provide a foundation for the hypotheses in this study
predicting how the bystander’s relationship to the victim, the bystander’s relationship to the
suspected perpetrator, and the crime severity will affect the willingness to cooperate. I focus on
three main factors based on prior work. First, I examine the role of the bystander’s relationship to
the suspected perpetrator, and hypothesize that bystanders are less willing to cooperate when the
suspected perpetrator is a friend or family member compared to a stranger (see Larson, 2015;
Tolsma et al., 2011). There are a few multi-disciplinary, theoretical bases from which this
hypothesis can be deduced.
First, Black (2010), who adopted a “pure sociological” perspective, proposed a
relationship between law and relational distance. Among intimate parties, law is unlikely to be
invoked; as the intimacy among involved parties decreases, the law is more likely to be invoked
10

(up to a point—strangers in different countries are unlikely to sue each other, for instance). In
other words, people are less likely to turn to formal mechanisms of social control when they have
intimate relationships with people involved in a criminal event. For example, if a person
witnessed their friend committing a crime, they might try to informally intervene (e.g., stage an
intervention to convince a friend abusing substances to attend a rehabilitation program) or
informally punish them by excluding them from social activities rather than call the police and
provide information that could lead to their friend’s formal apprehension, conviction, and
punishment. Second, social and evolutionary psychologists emphasize the role of fundamental
motives and intuitions tied to caring, protecting, and otherwise being loyal to family members
and other in-group members (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; Ko et al., 2020; see also
Baumeister & Leary, 1995). For instance, people across the world rank taking care of children
and spending time with and helping family members as among the most important goals in their
lives (see Ko et al., 2020, for review). This again suggests that people would turn to informal
mechanisms of social control in order to maintain their relationship with the suspected
perpetrator. Third, tying in with the above theoretical grounds, other social psychological
theories emphasize that people’s sense of self is tied to the groups they feel they belong to, and
thus they are motivated to favor people in their in-group over people in out-groups (Hogg &
Abrams, 1998; Mead, 1934/1962; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see also Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In
this sense, cooperation with legal authorities might feel like a form of “self-incrimination” when
a friend or family member commits a crime. Some refer to social identity as the group within the
individual (Hogg & Abrams, 1998), so self-incrimination is an apt word.
The theoretical perspectives just described also provide basis for my hypothesis that
bystanders are more willing to cooperate when the victim is a friend or family member compared
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to a stranger. For instance, because people have fundamental motives and intuitions tied to
protecting their family and in-group, it makes sense if they cooperate with legal authority in
order to resolve the conflict. For much of human history, what we would now call extrajudicial,
retributive action was the norm when a family and/or in-group member was victimized (see
Pinker, 2012, generally). In the modern U.S. (and many other countries), “crime” in response to
crime is generally still a crime, though there are exceptions and people might nevertheless
sympathize with a Robinhood-esque character. The point is that the law and legal authority is the
primary instrument by which people in the U.S. can take actions to resolve social harms against
themselves and others, and bystanders might be more motivated to take actions to initiate legal
proceedings when they identify and have intimate ties with a victim of a crime (cf. Machackova
et al., 2015).
The third factor I examine is crime severity, and I hypothesize that people are more
willing to cooperate when a crime involves major harm as opposed to minor harm. This too has
some basis in the theoretical perspectives just described, as well as others. For example, one
theory posits that the perceived harm of an action is one of few “drivers” (in addition to norm
violations and negative affect) of moral blameworthiness (Schein & Gray, 2018; see also
Steffensmeier et al., 1998). All else constant, when an action is perceived as very harmful,
people are more likely to condemn it (Schein & Gray, 2018; see also Haidt & Joseph, 2004,
2007). In essence, this is embedded in law and the criminal justice system in the U.S.—the
Model Penal Code, sentencing guidelines, the Constitution, the underlying Enlightenment
philosophy (e.g., Beccaria, 1764), etc. The convergence of what is legally and subjectively
condemnable in a criminal act should lead bystanders to be more willing to cooperate.
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The Role of Individual Differences in the Willingness to Cooperate
A large swath of current literature on people’s willingness to cooperate with legal
authority focuses on the relationship between individual differences, especially perceived
legitimacy, and the general willingness to cooperate (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020; Tyler & Fagan,
2008). This study expands on prior studies on situational differences in the willingness to
cooperate, but also makes contributions to the current literature on individual differences. First, I
examine how individual differences relate to both the general willingness to cooperate and the
willingness to cooperate in specific crime scenarios. Second, I examine how individual
differences and situational differences interact to influence the willingness to cooperate. Third, I
examine two theoretical models. The first I refer to as the “legitimacy” model, a generally
dominant model in the literature on the willingness to cooperate. This model suggests that
people’s experiences and interactions with authorities in childhood and adolescence relate to
perceptions of law and legal authority in adulthood, and in turn those perceptions relate to the
willingness to cooperate (see Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; Tyler & Trinkner,
2017). In examining the legitimacy model, I also contribute to the current debate on how
concepts in the model should be measured (see Trinkner, 2019). The second model I refer to as
the “need for certainty” model, which reflects a novel application of a few social psychological
theories. This model suggests that people with a dispositional need for certainty are motivated to
cooperate with legal authority because it is the “quick and easy” answer that resolves the
situation (cf. Roets et al., 2015), and because they are more likely to hold social beliefs that
promote cooperation with legal authority (cf. Jost et al., 2003). In the next section, I start with the
first key concept of the legitimacy model, perceived legitimacy.
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Perceived Legitimacy
A number of studies demonstrate a positive and robust relationship between perceived
legitimacy and people’s willingness to cooperate with legal authorities (e.g., Jackson et al., 2012;
Kearns, 2016; Larson, 2015; Lee & Cho, 2020; Papp et al., 2019; Sergeant & Kochel, 2018;
Slocum & Wiley, 2018; Tankebe, 2009, 2013; Tankebe et al., 2016; Tolsma et al., 2011; Tyler &
Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Across these studies, as well as other studies examining
perceived legitimacy, many argue that the conceptualization and measurement of perceived
legitimacy is heterogeneous (cf. Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Gau, 2014; Tankebe, 2013; Nivette
et al., 2019). Indeed, there is less debate over if perceived legitimacy relates to cooperation, and
more debate over what perceived legitimacy “is” and how it should be measured. Before
examining how perceived legitimacy relates to bystanders’ willingness to cooperate, I first
examine the measurement structure of perceived legitimacy. The question of whether perceived
legitimacy is related to the willingness to cooperate has been answered by numerous empirical
studies, and thus one part of this study an additional robustness test to add to the literature. The
question of how many “dimensions” underlie perceived legitimacy, however, currently has a
number of different answers (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2018; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006). Thus,
another part of this study aims to answer that question.
There are two dominant theoretical models (see Jackson & Bradford, 2010, and Trinkner,
2019, for review) of perceived legitimacy. I draw on both of these theoretical models for this
study. Albeit a crude approach to some extent, I examine the measurement structure of perceived
legitimacy using a sizable set of indicators of perceived legitimacy largely adapted from both
theoretical models (and studies associated with both models). Prior to describing the
multidimensional models of perceived legitimacy proposed by two “camps” of scholarship (the
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“process” model and the “dialogical” model), I provide a theoretical background on the “roots”
of contemporary conceptualizations and assumptions of legitimacy models.
Theoretical Background
One theoretical root of contemporary legitimacy is Max Weber. Weber (1925/1978)
described three types of “legitimate domination”, with domination meaning the likelihood that a
group of people will obey commands. Each type was delineated by the grounds on which claims
to legitimacy are based. The relevant (and most dominant in modern society) type of legitimate
domination that informs contemporary conceptions of legitimacy is legal authority, which rests
“on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such
rules to issue commands” (p. 215). In this sense, perceived legitimacy is the extent to which a
person thinks law and legal authorities should be obeyed because the law is the law (law ipso
facto) and legal authorities have the right to exercise power. Contemporary legitimacy
scholarship conceptualizes perceived legitimacy similarly (e.g., Jackson & Bradford, 2010;
Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006). The other two types of legitimate domination described by Weber
(1925/1978) are traditional authority (which rests on “sanctity”) and charismatic authority
(which rests on devotion to extraordinary character).
Another related and broad root of legitimacy could generally be labeled “humanistic” or
Enlightenment ideals, the basic—albeit historically radical—idea that human lives have inherent
value and that people have “rights” (see Pinker, 2012, for review). Dimensions of perceived
legitimacy might be based in shared, normative values (Beetham, 1991; Bottoms & Tankebe,
2012; Jackson et al., 2012; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006). The notion of shared values can be
rooted in Durkheim’s (1893/1984) conception of the common (or collective) conscience as the
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sentiments and beliefs of average people in a society.2 In essence, shared beliefs and sentiments
“bind” individuals together in a society. In the U.S., Enlightenment and humanistic ideals are
embedded or justified in the law (e.g., “inalienable” or “natural” rights); Packer (1964) famously
described the “due process” model of the criminal justice system—the primary objective is
maintaining the rights and liberties of individuals. In democratic societies, legitimacy ultimately
stems from the people (cf. Foley v. Connelie, 1978; Rawls, 1971), so the extent to which citizens
see that those rights and liberties are acknowledged and protected by the law and legal authority
is a fundamental aspect of legitimacy (cf. Beetham, 1991; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Jackson et
al., 2012; Trinkner et al., 2018; Tyler, 2006). Notably, the contemporary conception of justice as
fairness is just that—contemporary (see Rawls, 1971).3
Another basis of legitimacy is the group value model and more generally the social
identity approach. The former proposes that people value being a part of social groups (cf.
Baumeister, & Leary, 1995),4 but have to balance the benefits of group membership with
potential drawbacks (e.g., exploitation, tempering self-interest; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006;
see also Mead, 1934/1962). The social identity approach more generally proposes that people’s
self-concepts are tied to the groups they feel they belong to, so people are motivated to bolster
and defend their group to increase/maintain self-esteem (Hogg & Abrams, 1998; Tajfel &

The Supreme Court, in assessing whether a given practice violates “standards of decency”, examines the
proportion of states that condone the practice, which can be understood as a metric of the “common conscience”.
For example, one basis for ruling that the execution of juvenile offenders is unconstitutional was that a minority of
states permitted juvenile executions and performed executions of juveniles, and therefore executing juveniles
violated contemporary standards of decency (Roper v. Simmons, 2005).
3
Rawls (1971) inspired research by Thibaut and Walker (1975) which in turn inspired research by Tyler (2006), as
described by Lind and Tyler (1988). I do not think it is unfair (pun intended) to describe Rawls’ (1971) theory of
justice as esoteric, but his ideas have nevertheless percolated through the walls of the Ivory Tower and into
contemporary discourse and perspectives (“Social Justice”). In 2015, the conservative think tank, The Heritage
Foundation, published an entire report blaming his theory’s “utopian spirit” for such societal ills as “antagonism
toward religion” (Foss, 2016).
4
Although I do not devote space to explicitly discussing it, another relevant theoretical perspective is the need to
belong (Baumeister, & Leary, 1995). As the name implies, the basic proposition is that people have a fundamental
motivation to form and maintain lasting interpersonal relationships.
2
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Turner, 1986). Thus, how legal authorities behave (e.g., whether they let people express their
“voice”) in interactions with civilians signals membership status and can thus motivate
compliance by increasing people’s identification with legal authority (e.g., “we’re on the same
team”; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Kyprianides et al., 2021; Tyler, 2006; see also Jackson et al., 2012).
The Process Model of Legitimacy
The process model is largely associated with the work of Tom Tyler (e.g., Tyler, 2003,
2006) and emphasizes three to four primary dimensions of legitimacy: Trust or trustworthiness,
the obligation to obey, procedural justice or fairness, and (to a lesser and inconsistent extent)
legal cynicism (e.g., see Gau, 2011, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2009; Tyler &
Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2006). Trust has been measured with items that emphasize the extent to which
legal authorities are honest, protect the rights of citizens, and generally “do what’s right” for the
community (Gau, 2011, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Trust
has some potential overlap with the procedural justice dimension (see Gau, 2011, 2014; Jackson
et al., 2012), which is often considered as consisting of treatment quality (e.g., respect, fair
procedures, permitting and allowing for people to express their “voice”) and decision quality
(e.g., basing decisions on facts, explain decisions; see Gau, 2011, 2014; Reisig et al., 2007;
Tyler, 2006). Procedurally just treatment by authorities in theory communicates shared group
identity and thereby alleviates possible conflict between self-interest and risks of group
membership (Jackson et al., 2012; Kyprianides et al., 2021; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006).
Tyler’s (2006) conception of procedural justice was influenced by Thibaut & Walker (1975; see
Lind & Tyler, 1988, for review). Beyond borrowing the term “procedural justice”, he also
considered “process control”, albeit from a normative perspective (Tyler, 2006). By “process
control”, he means that there are aspects of legal processes that people care about that make them
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feel like they have a sense of control over the process (e.g., legal authorities make efforts to be
fair). Such efforts, in turn, lead citizens to perceive the process as fair, independent of how
favorable they perceive the outcomes (Tyler, 2006).
Another important dimension of perceived legitimacy in the process model is the
obligation to obey. Indeed, Tyler’s (2006) definition of legitimacy largely revolves around the
normative obligation to obey the law and legal authority. To that end, studies have often
measured perceived legitimacy, at least in part, with measures of people’s perceived obligation
to obey (e.g., Gau, 2011; Kearns, 2016; Reisig & Loyd, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Trinkner
et al., 2018; Tyler & Huo, 2002).
Finally, one construct that has sometimes been considered as a dimension of perceived
legitimacy is legal cynicism (e.g., Tankebe, 2009; Tyler & Huo, 2002). More recently, however,
studies suggest it is distinct from perceived legitimacy (e.g., Gau, 2015). Legal cynicism is the
degree to which a person sees the law and norms as “binding” on their lives (Sampson &
Bartusch, 1998), which is conceptually different from the perception of legal authorities as
having the “right” to exercise power or the perception that law and legal authority should be
obeyed (see Jackson & Bradford, 2010). In recent studies, it is often included in models of legal
socialization (e.g., Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; Nivette et al., 2020); there is
some debate about whether legal cynicism emerges from experiences and interactions with
authorities (see Nivette et al., 2020; Trinkner et al., 2020). On the whole, legal cynicism might
not be a dimension of perceived legitimacy, but it could fit within an overarching perspective
which generally proposes that adult legal orientations emerge from experiences and interactions
with authorities in childhood and adolescence (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Kaiser & Reisig, 2019;
Nagin & Telep, 2020). Thus, in this study I include a measure of legal cynicism.

18

The Dialogical Model of Legitimacy
The dialogical model of legitimacy is mainly associated with the work of Justice Tankebe
(see Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Trinkner, 2019). Although coming from a slightly different
angle, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012; see also Tankebe, 2013) argue for a model of legitimacy that
is fairly similar to the process model. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) conceptualize legitimacy as a
Hegelian-esque dialectical processes between legal authorities and the public—legal authorities
make claims (“thesis”), the public responds (“anti-thesis”), and legal authorities adjust
(“synthesis”). More concretely, they argue for four dimensions of perceived legitimacy. One of
these is the same as a dimension of perceived legitimacy in the process model, and the rest tend
to reflect what the process model would generally consider as “sources” (as opposed to
“dimensions”) of perceived legitimacy (see Trinkner, 2019; Jackson & Bradford, 2010, have a
similar discussion). The dimension that is conceptually the same in both models of legitimacy is
procedural justice. In the dialogical model, however, it is often called procedural fairness (e.g.,
see Tankebe et al., 2016). The other dimensions are legality (or lawfulness), distributive justice
(or fairness), and effectiveness.
Legality is conceived as a fundamental dimension of perceived legitimacy (Beetham,
1991). This dimension captures the extent to which people view the administration of justice as
unbiased and reasonable (cf. Tamanaha, 2004; Trinkner et al., 2018). The key idea is that there
are limits or boundaries that constrain the administration of justice—namely, the rights and
liberties of individuals.5 Some extensions of the process model have referenced this idea as

5

A glance at the U.S. Constitution and how it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court reinforces this point. The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain due process clauses, the Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable”
searches and seizures, the Sixth Amendment contains the right to an “impartial jury”, and the Eighth Amendment
prohibits excessive, cruel or unusual punishments (which includes random punishment; see Goldberg & Dershowitz,
1970). Some examples of how they Supreme Court has drawn on these Amendments and discussed biased or
arbitrary decisions by legal authorities are Batson v. Kentucky (1985), Furman v. Georgia (1972), Hurtado v.
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“boundary concerns” (Trinkner et al., 2018) and “moral alignment” (Jackson et al., 2012).
Moreover, there is some conceptual overlap with the trust dimension I previously described (i.e.,
the extent to which the rights and liberties are well protected by legal authority) and the
procedural justice dimension (i.e., basing decisions on facts; Tyler, 2006). The
conceptualizations are not too dissimilar, and indicators of legality used by Tankebe (2013) and
others (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020; Papp et al., 2019; Tankebe et al., 2016) are strikingly similar if
not identical to indicators of “boundary concerns” (see Trinkner et al., 2018), “moral alignment”
(see Jackson et al., 2012), trust (see Gau, 2011; Tyler, 2006), and procedural justice (see Gau,
2014; Tyler, 2006). Given this, it is somewhat surprising scholars have not yet spent much time
empirically examining possible overlap (see, however, Reynolds et al., 2018).
Next, whereas procedural justice is focused on processes, the distributive justice or
fairness dimension is focused on outcomes—more specifically, perceived distributive justice is
the extent to which people think outcomes are fair, deserved, and equitably distributed (Tankebe,
2013; Walker et al., 1979; cf. Rawls, 1971). It has been measured somewhat inconsistently
across studies, with indicators emphasizing that people who break the law will be punished (Lee
& Cho, 2020), that people receive fair outcomes that they deserve (Tankebe, 2013), and that the
law is enforced consistently across groups of people (Tankebe et al., 2016). The dialogical model
is unique in that it considers distributive fairness as a dimension of perceived legitimacy (cf.
Walker et al., 1979).
Finally, the effectiveness dimension concerns the extent to which legal authorities are
competent and “get results” (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). Although effectiveness is often
understood in instrumental terms and as separate from legitimacy, Tankebe (2013) argues that it

California (1884), Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2016), McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), Terry v. Ohio (1968), United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), and Whren v. United States (1996), to name a few.
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is a normative criterion (see Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012, and also discussion of the normative v.
instrumental perspectives in Tyler, 2006; see also Jackson et al., 2012; Kochel, 2017; Kochel et
al., 2013). People invest authority in the State to sustain society’s well-being (Rawls, 1971), and
therefore law and legal authorities should ultimately serve the “best interests of society, which
requires that they are competent (or effective) in their tasks” (Tankebe, 2013, p. 112). Like the
legality dimension, effectiveness has been considered in extensions to the process model and
measured similarly (e.g., see Jackson et al., 2012, and Tankebe, 2013). However, one
questionable indicator that has been used is respondents’ agreement with the statement “I feel
safe walking in my neighborhood at night” (Tankebe et al., 2016). Such indicators are often used
as indicators of the fear of crime (Papp et al., 2019), and thus they might not load onto an
effectiveness dimensions of perceived legitimacy. Papp et al. (2019), for instance, found that
perceived effectiveness (as well as other dimensions of perceived legitimacy) and fear of crime
were weakly correlated.
Measuring Perceived Legitimacy in the Current Study
This study makes a unique contribution to current literature by examining a large set of
possible indicators of perceived legitimacy adapted or otherwise informed by legitimacy
scholarship over the past decades. Given some of the discussion above, there is reason to suspect
there might not be a handful of distinct dimensions of perceived legitimacy. Generally speaking,
one goal of social science is to identify the simplest explanation for what is observed, and the
measurement of perceived legitimacy has become quite complicated since Tyler’s (2006)
Chicago study. Despite varying conceptualizing and operationalization across studies, perceived
legitimacy is virtually always associated with the willingness to cooperate (e.g., Lee & Cho,
2020; Papp et al., 2019; Tankebe, 2009, 2013; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Ultimately, there might a
21

way to measure perceived legitimacy that is simple and feasible, yet still precise, valid, and
reliable.
Legal Socialization
An assumption of current legitimacy scholarship is that perceived legitimacy emerges
from experiences and social interactions, especially prior to adulthood (Fagan & Tyler, 2005;
Tyler & Trinkner, 2017). These experiences and interactions with authorities are generally
referred to as legal socialization (see Tyler & Trinkner, 2017, for review). Simply put, legal
socialization is the process by which people internalize norms (which underpin law) and develop
orientations towards law and legal authority (cf. Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Nagin & Telep, 2020;
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler & Trinkner, 2017). Theory and prior studies generally suggest the
dimensions of legal socialization parallel dimensions of perceived legitimacy, across both “legal”
and “extralegal” domains (i.e., household authorities and school authorities; Nivette et al., 2019;
Thomas et al., 2020; Trinkner et al., 2020; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler & Trinkner, 2017).
Thus, they might have direct and indirect relationships with the willingness to cooperate via legal
orientations (cf. Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; Thomas et al., 2020). Prior studies have also examined
factors like personal and vicarious contact with the criminal justice system (Nivette et al., 2020;
Trinkner et al., 2020). Although not always explicitly on legal socialization, other studies suggest
child adversity might be a dimension of legal socialization (cf. Yang & Perkins, 2020). I draw on
this literature to examine the measurement of legal socialization, how dimensions of legal
socialization relate to dimensions of perceived legitimacy, and how legal socialization directly
and indirectly relate to the willingness stop cooperate via perceived legitimacy. I start by
describing the three domains of legal socialization.
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The Three Domains of Legal Socialization
Durkheim (1895) described authorities in childhood such as parents and teachers as
“representatives and intermediaries” of the social milieu. Similarly, Tyler and Trinkner (2017)
identify three domains of legal socialization: The family, school, and justice system. Like Tyler
and colleagues’ work more generally, the emphasis is on the extent to which authorities in the
family (e.g., parents), school (e.g., teachers), and justice system (e.g., police) “wield their power
and authority” in a fair manner (p. 130). Thus, the basic idea is that if children and adolescents
perceive the procedures used by authorities in their experiences and interactions (or their
vicarious experiences and interactions) with authorities as fair, they will perceive legal
authorities as legitimate and be more likely to comply and cooperate with legal authorities in
adulthood. In the line with the group value model (see Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006; see also
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hogg & Abrams, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), fair procedures
essentially communicate to a person that they are an important part of the group, that will not be
exploited by the group, and that tempering self-interest and following the rules is beneficial in
the long-term (cf. Trinkner et al., 2019).
The dimensions of perceived legitimacy might have parallel, antecedent dimensions in
legal socialization across the three domains. One aim of this project is to identify how many
dimensions of legal socialization there might be. Just as there might be six dimensions of
perceived legitimacy, there might be six dimensions of legal socialization that would reflect the
dimensions of perceived legitimacy (e.g., see Thomas et al., 2020; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014). For
example, people might report an obligation to obey authorities in the family, school, and justice
system. Studies on legal socialization have largely focused on the procedural justice dimension
(e.g., Kaiser & Reisig, 2014; Thomas et al., 2020; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014).
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In contrast to perhaps most prior studies explicitly on legal socialization (e.g., Nivette et
al., 2019; Trinkner et al., 2020), in this study I examine how adults’ prior experiences with and
perceptions of authorities in childhood and adolescence relate to their current legal perceptions
and willingness to cooperate. This is similar to how survey studies examine how child adversity
relates to people’s life outcomes as adults (e.g., Felitti et al., 1998/2019). The retrospective
approach has limitations I discuss later, but outside of advantages like feasibility, in this study it
allows for examining legal socialization and perceived legitimacy simultaneously. Moreover,
some scholars emphasize the role of cumulative experiences, as opposed to more discrete
instances (e.g., a recent interaction with a legal authority; Tyler, 2006), in influencing perceived
legitimacy and compliance in adulthood (cf. Nagin & Telep, 2020). Asking adults about their
experiences and interactions with authorities prior to adulthood is certainly not the only way to
measure legal socialization, but it might be an efficient way of examining a diverse array of
experiences (e.g., different types of personal and direct contact with legal authorities) and
capturing the “subjective average” of cumulative experiences.
Childhood Adversity as a Dimension of Legal Socialization
Childhood adversity as a whole or in specific forms might influence how people engage
with and think about the social world, including how they perceive law and legal authority (e.g.,
see McLean & Wolfe, 2016; Yang & Perkins, 2020). In the foundational “Adverse Childhood
Experiences” (ACE) study (Felitti et al., 1998/2019), thousands of adults were asked questions
about whether they had experienced abuse, neglect, or household dysfunction in childhood; the
researchers found that these experiences were strongly related to a number of health risk factors
(e.g., heart disease, substance abuse). Since then, there have been numerous studies examining
the role of ACEs in a variety of social outcomes, including criminal justice involvement in
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adolescence and adulthood (e.g., Basto-Pereira et al., 2016; Derzon, 2010; Jolliffe et al., 2017;
Widom & Maxfield, 2001). It stands to reason that childhood adversity might be an important
and distinct dimension of legal socialization, or there might be indicators of childhood adversity
that overlap with other possible dimensions. For instance, parental neglect might be an indicator
of incompetence in maintaining well-being (effectiveness dimension).
ACEs are primarily focused on the family domain of legal socialization, but there is also
overlap with the justice system domain. In this study, I use or adapt some ACE items to use as
possible indicators of legal socialization (see Felitti et al., 1998/2019 and Appendix A),6
especially those that are not reasonably represented by indicators adapted from perceived
legitimacy items. There is conceptually some overlap between a possible “legality” dimension of
legal socialization—whether authorities and rules were unbiased and reasonable—and some
ACEs (e.g., forms of abuse are conceivably biased and arbitrary punishment), for instance. Some
ACEs like parental substance abuse (a form of “household dysfunction”), however, might be
conceptually distinct. Turning to overlap with the justice system domain, one ACE emphasizes
contact with the justice system—a household member going to prison—and studies of legal
socialization often include an indicator of contact with the criminal justice system like an arrest
(e.g., Nivette et al., 2020; Trinkner et al., 2019). In this study, I take a broad view and include
multiple types of personal or vicarious contact with the criminal justice system as possible
indicators of legal socialization (see Appendix A). Some recent work suggests certain legal
orientations might not be related to experiences and interactions with justice system authorities
(Nivette et al., 2020), but this could be due to the lack of holistic measures. When a single,

6

I do not use items measuring sexual abuse, however. ACEs tend to be interrelated (e.g., Yang & Perkins, 2020),
and I ultimately used numerous possible items to measure legal socialization. Thus, the risk of harming participants
by asking these questions did not seem to be outweighed by the benefit of a possibly more comprehensive
measurement model.
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manifest indicator is used, it is assumed that that indicator is a highly valid and reliable measure
of a construct (cf. Bollen, 1989). By using multiple indicators representing multiple types of
personal and vicarious contact (e.g., personal or vicarious arrest, incarceration or detention,
whether police came to a person’s home) with the criminal justice system and latent variable
modelling, this study addresses a limitation of some prior studies on legal socialization
scholarship (e.g., Nivette et al., 2020; Trinkner et al., 2019).

Figure 1. A conceptual diagram of the legitimacy model of cooperation
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Legal Socialization and Cooperation
As is generally assumed by legitimacy model of legal socialization (Fagan & Tyler, 2005;
Trinkner & Tyler, 2017), I expect that dimensions of legal socialization will generally have
indirect relationships with the willingness to cooperate with legal authorities (cf. Kaiser &
Reisig, 2019). That is, experiences and interactions with authorities in childhood and
adolescence will be related to legal orientations, which in turn will explain the willingness to
cooperate (see Figure 1). For example, there might be a perceived procedural fairness dimension
of legal socialization that is positively related to a perceived procedural fairness dimension of
perceived legitimacy, which in turn is positively related to the willingness to cooperate.
Empirical research generally supports both sets of paths separately (e.g., paths from legal
socialization to perceived legitimacy, Nivette et al., 2019, and from perceived legitimacy to
cooperation, Lee & Cho, 2020) with few studies formally testing indirect relationships (cf.
Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; Thomas et al., 2020).
I also examine direct relationships between dimensions of legal socialization and
cooperation. Insofar as dimensions of legal socialization parallel dimensions of perceived
legitimacy, I expect them to exhibit comparable relationships with the willingness to cooperate.
However, research broadly shows that experiences and interactions with authorities in childhood
and adolescence are related to legal compliance (e.g., Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Hoeve et al., 2009;
Jolliffe et al., 2017). Thus, although cooperation and compliance are conceptually distinct, they
are interrelated; prior studies offer a basis for why dimensions that might not perfectly
correspond to dimensions of perceived legitimacy (such as a childhood adversity dimension)
would be related to the willingness to cooperate. How parents discipline their children or
otherwise communicate sanctions for non-compliance, for instance, is related to compliance
27

(e.g., Hoeve et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2020; see also Durkheim, 1895/1966), and might be an
indicator of a childhood adversity dimension of legal socialization. Appendix A shows the full
list of possible indicators of legal socialization I examine in this study. Figure 1 shows a
conceptual diagram of the legitimacy model of the willingness to cooperate.
The Need for Certainty Model
This study expands on prior research on the willingness to cooperate by exploring a novel
application of some social psychological theories to understand bystanders’ willingness to
cooperate with legal authority. I refer to this as the “need for certainty” model of the willingness
to cooperate. The basic premise of the model is that the willingness to cooperate might be rooted
to some extent in the dispositional need for certainty. People with a greater need for certainty are
motivated to think about the world and act in ways that satisfy that need (see Jost et al., 2003;
Roets et al., 2015). They tend to rely on heuristics (Kemmelmeier, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel,
2011b), for example—the available and “easy” answer that facilitates a quick social judgment
(see Epstein, 2003; Kahneman, 2011; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). They also tend to hold beliefs
that offer a more “black and white” view of the social world (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Roets
& Van Hiel, 2011a, 2011b; Roets et al., 2015; Kemmelmeier, 2010; Van Assche et al., 2017;
Van Hiel et al., 2004)—that is, some people are simply superior to others, that people should
defer to established authorities and norms (see Altemeyer, 1981, 1996, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto,
1999; Pratto et al., 1994). The need to manage uncertainty might be directly related to
cooperation with legal authority because it is the “available and easy” answer that provides
resolution; it might also be indirectly related to cooperation due to its relationships with social
beliefs that promote cooperation with legal authority.
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I examine the need for certainty model separately from the legitimacy model, but I also
examine relationships between variables in both models. I do this to assess possible points of
theoretical integration between theories underlying the need for certainty model and legitimacy
model. Prior research has pointed to possible theoretical integration between these models (e.g.,
see van der Toorn et al., 2011), but to my knowledge no study has examined relationships
between variables in both models. Thus, this study will provide an empirical foundation for
future theoretical integration. In this section, I start by describing how the dispositional need for
certainty relates to social beliefs, then discuss how it might directly and indirectly relate to the
willingness to cooperate, and then explain why it and the social beliefs it is strongly related to
might be related to facets of legal socialization and perceived legitimacy.
The Need for Cognitive Closure and Beliefs
In this study, the dispositional need for certainty is operationalized as the need for
cognitive closure (NFCC). NFCC is an individual difference characterized by the preference for
order, structure, and predictability in one’s life and environment, discomfort with ambiguity,
closed-mindedness, and a desire to quickly make decisions (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a; Webster
& Kruglanski, 1994). In short, NFCC can be understood as “cognitive rigidity” (cf. Jost et al.,
2003). Although the antecedents of NFCC are not fully understood, it is typically seated within a
bio-evolutionary perspective. One of the main assumptions of that perspective is that humans
evolved over time and developed adaptions to survive and manage uncertainty and threats (cf.
Darrell, & Pyszczynski, 2016; Haidt & Graham, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; Jost et al.,
2003). Another assumption is that people inherit dispositions—needs, traits, and so forth—from
their biological parents (see, e.g., Bell et al., 2009; Dhont et al., 2013; Hatemi & McDermott,
2012; Kandler et al., 2012). There is empirical support for the notion that NFCC is
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intergenerationally transmitted (e.g., Dhont et al., 2013), but it seems likely that the environment
and socialization also play roles.
The need for cognitive closure is generally related to ideologies and orientations—or
“hierarchy-legitimizing myths” (Pratto et al., 1994)—that promote social hierarchy. One
overarching theory that is relevant here is system justification theory, which proposes a human
motive to “defend, bolster, and justify” the status quo (i.e., current social, economic, and political
arrangements) that is often implicit (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012; see generally Jost et al., 2009).
Notably, even people disadvantaged by the status quo can engage in system justification. One
reason that people justify the status quo is because it satisfies needs to manage “uncertainty,
threat, and social discord,” and in this way is a motivated social cognition. Thus, the need to
manage uncertainty is one need that motivates system justification.
One orientation the need for cognitive closure is positively related to is social dominance
orientation (SDO; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a; Van Assche et al., 2017), which is a general
preference for hierarchical (as opposed to equal) intergroup relations in society (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 1994). Specifically, support for group-based dominance and antiegalitarianism (Ho et al., 2012, 2015; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Kugler et al., 2010). In theory,
SDO provides “epistemic security” for people higher in NFCC (Roets et al., 2015; cf. Jost & van
der Toorn, 2012). SDO is often considered the “other” authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998) or the
economic dimension of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) that emphasizes a “dog eat dog”
world (cf. Van Assche et al., 2017).7 The fictional character Cersei Lanister perhaps expressed
this sentiment best: “When you play the game of thrones, you win or you die.” (Martin, 1996, p.

7

This characterization might be specific to the anti-egalitarianism dimension of SDO. As will become relevant later,
some work suggests NFCC is negatively related or unrelated to the anti-egalitarianism dimension, and antiegalitarianism is a stronger predictor of economic policy support compared to group-based dominance (Kugler et al.,
2010).
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488). In this way, SDO justifies a system of “winners and losers” and defends against its change
(cf. Jost & van der Toorn, 2012; Pratto et al., 1994)
The need for cognitive closure also has a strong, positive relationship with right-wing
authoritarianism (Kemmelmeier, 2010; Lyle & Grillo, 2020; Roets et al., 2012; Roets & Van
Hiel, 2011a; Van Assche et al., 2017), which is characterized by obedience to established
authorities and norms, negative reactions towards those that challenge authorities or violate
norms, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996, 1998; see also Duckitt et al., 2010; Funke,
2005). In contrast to social dominance orientation, it has been considered the social and cultural
facet of right-wing authoritarianism (Duckitt, 2001). Both SDO and RWA are thought to emerge
from socialization (cf. Altemeyer, 1998; however, see Hatemi & McDermott, 2012; Kleppestø et
al., 2019),8 and one similarity between people higher in RWA and in SDO is that their moral
concerns revolve around the well-being of collectives, as opposed to the well-being of
individuals (see Haidt et al., 2009; Graham et al. 2011; Kugler et al., 2014; McAdams et al.
2008; Milojev et al., 2014). Haidt and Graham (2009) have suggested that certain people might
“have a biological need to belong to tight groups with clear and widely-shared norms for
behavior” (p. 372; see also Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Gerber & Jackson, 2016).9
The Need for Certainty and Cooperation
To my knowledge, no study has examined the potential relationships between the need
for cognitive closure, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism and the

8

Other research worth briefly noting suggests brain damage in a region of the prefrontal cortex is associated with
increased authoritarianism (Asp et al., 2012). This same region was shown to be active when people watched a
simulation of Milgram’s (1974) experiment, which involved people being instructed to electrically shock another
person (i.e., the “obedience paradigm”; Cheetham et al., 2009).
9
More broadly, some argue that that, as a result of evolution, humans are predisposed toward hierarchical social
structures (Somit & Peterson, 2007).
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willingness to cooperate with legal authority. One hypothesis I make is that NFCC will be
positively and directly related to the willingness to cooperate. One reason NFCC might be
directly related to the willingness to cooperate is that cooperation is the “quick and easy” answer
(e.g., dial 9-1-1) that provides the much-desired resolution to the ambiguity introduced by the
problem. People high in NFCC desire order, structure, and predictability, and that desire could
lead to a greater willingness to cooperate, especially in crime scenarios which are instances of
disorder and deviance.
I also hypothesize that the relationship between the need for cognitive closure and the
willingness to cooperate will be mediated by right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation. I expect that RWA will be positively and strongly related to the willingness to
cooperate for three reasons: 1) it is characterized in part by obedience to established authorities
and norms, as well as supporting aggression towards those that challenge those authorities or
norms (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996, 1998), 2) it is associated with heuristic- and intuition-based
information processing (Kemmelmeier, 2010), and is associated with “binding” moral concerns
(e.g., Kugler et al., 2014). In general, RWA is one of few individual differences that consistently
predicts legal decision-making (e.g., Devine & Caughlin, 2014). I also expect that SDO will be
positively related to the willingness to cooperate (for some of the same reasons) but to a lesser
extent compared to RWA. Support for group-based dominance and opposition to social equality
is distinct from (albeit similar to) RWA, and SDO’s relationship with the willingness to
cooperate might be more variable across circumstances. For instance, high SDO people might
recognize cooperation as a mechanism by which to assert their dominance in some circumstances
whereas in other circumstances cooperation could result in their own group being dominated. In
other words, they might be legal cynics to some degree and cooperate primarily when it is
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perceived as beneficial to their or their group’s interest. Figure 2 displays a conceptual diagram
of the need for certainty model of the willingness to cooperate.

Figure 2. A conceptual diagram of the need for certainty model of cooperation
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The Need for Certainty, Perceived Legitimacy, and Legal Socialization
One aim of this project is to examine possible links between components of the “need for
certainty” model (need for cognitive closure, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance
orientation) and the “legitimacy” model (perceived legitimacy and legal socialization). I do not
make any specific predictions about their interrelations, but there are theoretical grounds for why
there would be relationships. By identifying empirical relationships, future work can use this
information to possibly develop and examine an integrated model of legal cooperation.
One shared theoretical assumption of both models is that orientations towards society and
authorities (i.e., RWA, SDO, and perceived legitimacy) are influenced by experiences and
interactions in the social world, especially in childhood and adolescence (Altemeyer, 1998;
Fagan & Tyler, 2005). Thus, dimensions of legal socialization might be related to RWA, SDO,
and dimensions of perceived legitimacy, and the latter variables might be interrelated.
Experiences and interactions with authorities in childhood and adolescence might not only shape
people’s perceptions of the law and legal authority, but also their more general orientations
towards authorities and norms. In turn, there might be numerous indirect effects of experiences
with authorities prior to adulthood on the willingness to cooperate. Beyond that, RWA and SDO
are both associated with prejudice and negative attitudes towards outgroups (e.g., Bassett, 2010;
Dhont et al., 2013; Roets et al., 2012; Van Assche et al., 2017). Policies, programs, or other
interventions that target children’s and youth’s experiences with authorities might be able to
increase public cooperation with legal authority in the long-term, but they might also be able to
increase inter-group cooperation in general.
It also seems possible that legal socialization could play a role in NFCC. It is speculative,
but people might have a stronger desire for certainty in their lives and environment if they grew
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up in chaotic environments where they experienced arbitrary or unfair treatment. In this way, it
would be akin in some sense to the notion of “learned helplessness” in its original conception;
that is, the idea that repeated exposure to adverse events outside of one’s control “teaches”
people that their actions are independent of their outcomes, and in turn they tacitly accept the
status quo (see Maier & Seligman, 2016). This is also somewhat similar to one finding of system
justification theory—that people are more likely to perceive authorities as legitimate if their
situational outcomes depend on authorities (van der Toorn et al., 2011). The current view on
learned helplessness is that people do not learn helplessness, they learn helpfulness (see Maier &
Seligman, 2016). Similarly, high NFCC might not be an outcome of experience per se, but rather
the passive “default” that can be changed with experience.
NFCC might be related to dimensions of perceived legitimacy because they might satisfy
the need to manage uncertainty. It seems like people high in NFCC would be particularly
motivated to see the law, legal authority, and perhaps the whole criminal justice system as
maintaining order, keeping people safe and secure, providing/being the “right” answer, etc. (cf.
Jost & van der Toorn, 2012; Roets et al., 2015). This picture is one of order, structure,
predictability, and conformity and would thus likely be desirable to people high in NFCC (cf.
Jost and van der Toorn, 2012). This also casts somewhat of a shadow on the optimism of
legitimacy scholarship—some people might perceive the law and legal authority as legitimate
because of dispositional needs, not necessarily because they have had experiences and
interactions with authorities that foster legitimacy.
There is also a basis for why RWA and SDO might be related to dimensions of perceived
legitimacy. In a preceding section, I noted that Tankebe (2013; also Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012)
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argues that dimensions of perceived legitimacy are rooted in shared values,10 and I described
how the notion of shared values aligns with Durkheim’s (1893/1964) conception of the common
or collective conscience. Intrinsic in Durkheim’s definition of the common conscience—the
sentiments and beliefs of the average person in a society—is the notion that there is a
distribution of, or variance in, sentiments and beliefs across people in society.11 It thus follows
that variance in beliefs might be related to dimensions of perceived legitimacy. More concretely,
one likely possibility is that RWA is related to dimensions like trust and obligation to obey (see
Kugler et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003; Terrizzi et al., 2013; Tyler, 2006).
Current Study: Overview and Research Questions
To examine the measurement issues and theoretical predictors of the willingness to
cooperate with legal authorities, a sample of 1,434 U.S. residents completed an online survey.
After affirming consent, participants reported social and demographic information and read three
vignettes describing a crime and reported their willingness to report the crime and provide a
statement to police. Across these vignettes (n = 4,305), there were three experimental
manipulations: relationship to the victim (3: stranger, friend, or family member), relationship to
the suspected perpetrator (3: stranger, friend, or family member), and crime severity (2: major
harm or minor harm). The participants then responded to sets of items that measured the need for
cognitive closure (NFCC), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation

10

Although they argue, in particular, that procedural fairness, distributive fairness, and effectiveness are rooted in
shared values, they adopt Beetham’s (1991) notion that legality is a fundamental dimension of perceived legitimacy.
Tankebe (2013) and Tankebe et al. (2016) use items to measure the legality dimension that emphasize the extent to
which the law and behavior of legal authorities aligns with people’s moral values (see also Jackson et al., 2012;
Trinkner et al., 2018).
11
Durkheim writes, “There cannot be a society in which the individuals do not differ more or less from the
collective type.” (p. 69-70).
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(SDO), dimensions of perceived legitimacy, dimensions of legal socialization, and the general
willingness to cooperate.
Data from this survey were used to answer the following research questions and test
related hypotheses. I organize these by the two overarching theoretical explanations for the
willingness to cooperate, and predicted effects of the experimental manipulations. The need for
certainty model proposes that people with a greater dispositional need for certainty are motivated
to cooperate with legal authority and hold certain beliefs about society to satisfy that need. The
legitimacy model proposes that people’s experiences and interactions with authorities in
childhood and adolescence relate to their perceptions of law and legal authority in adulthood,
which in turn explain people’s willingness to cooperate.

The Need for Certainty Model
Research Question 1: How do NFCC, RWA, and SDO relate to each other and the willingness
to cooperate?
Hypothesis 1: NFCC will be positively related to RWA
Hypothesis 2: NFCC will be positively related to SDO
Hypothesis 3: NFCC will be positively related to the willingness to cooperate
Hypothesis 4: RWA will be positively related to the willingness to cooperate
Hypothesis 5: SDO will be positively related to the willingness to cooperate
Hypothesis 6: RWA and SDO will be positively related.
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Hypothesis 7: The relationship between NFCC and the willingness to cooperate will be
mediated by SDO and RWA. These indirect relationships will be positive.
Research Question 2: Do the relationships between NFCC, RWA, and SDO vary depending on
situational characteristics?
The Legitimacy Model
Research Question 3: How many dimensions underlie perceived legitimacy?
Research Question 4: How many dimensions underlie legal socialization?
Research Question 5: How do dimensions of legal socialization relate to dimensions of
perceived legitimacy?
Research Question 6: How do dimensions of perceived legitimacy relate to the willingness to
cooperate?
Research Question 7: How do dimensions of legal socialization relate to the willingness to
cooperate?
Research Question 8: Do dimensions of perceived legitimacy mediate the relationships between
the dimensions of legal socialization and the willingness to cooperate?
Research Question 9: Do the relationships between dimensions of perceived legitimacy,
dimensions of legal socialization, and the willingness to cooperate vary depending on situational
characteristics?
Research Question 10: How do dimensions of perceived legitimacy and dimensions of legal
socialization relate to NFCC, RWA, and SDO?
38

Contextual Differences
Research Question 11: How do situational characteristics affect the willingness to cooperate?
Hypothesis 8: The willingness to report and provide a statement will be higher when the
victim is a friend compared to a stranger.
Hypothesis 9: The willingness to report and provide a statement will be higher when the
victim is a family member compared to a stranger.
Hypothesis 10: The willingness to report and provide a statement will be lower when the
suspected perpetrator is a friend compared to a stranger.
Hypothesis 11: The willingness to report and provide a statement will be lower when the
suspected perpetrator is a family member compared to a stranger.
Hypothesis 12: The willingness to report and provide a statement will be higher when
there is major harm.
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Chapter 3: Methods
Participants
The target population for this research is adults residing in the U.S.12 I aimed to recruit
sample of 1,500 participants 18 years of age or older residing in the U.S. via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to complete the survey on Qualtrics. MTurk is a system by which
researchers (and others; all recruiters are called “requesters” on the site) can recruit respondents
(called “workers” on the site) to participate in research studies or complete various tasks (e.g.,
copy editing), called “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs). Although MTurk samples are
convenience samples, they are generally more representative of the U.S. population and provide
higher quality data than other convenience samples (e.g., undergraduate samples and online
panels; see Buhrmester et al., 2018; Goodman et al., 2013; Heen et al., 2015; Paolacci &
Chandler, 2014; Peer et al., 2014). To be eligible for participation in the study, participants must
have had at least a 95% approval rating. When MTurk workers complete a HIT, the requester
approves or does not approve it (e.g., if the worker failed to complete the task). Thus, a 95%
approval rating means that the worker has, in almost all cases, successfully completed HITs and
been approved by prior requesters. Research shows that this is a sufficient condition for ensuring
high quality data (e.g., it is at least as effective as attention checks; Peer et al., 2014). Moreover,
to ameliorate the risk of non-naiveté (see Chandler et al., 2014), the number of HITs previously

12

Much of the prior, especially foundational, legitimacy scholarship used samples of U.S. residents (e.g., Sunshine
& Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006). What studies are currently evaluating is the extent to which findings of prior literature
generalize to other countries (e.g., Tankebe, 2009; Tankebe et al., 2016; Trinkner et al., 2019; see the 2019 special
issue, Debating Core Conceptual and Measurement Issues About Police Legitimacy, in the Asian Journal of
Criminology). It is currently unclear whether there is measurement or structural variance across cultures and
countries. Thus, I focus on the U.S. context. Furthermore, my conceptualization of the legality dimension of
perceived legitimacy, in particular, could be unique to the U.S. and other industrialized, liberal, and democratic
countries that enshrine individual rights and liberties.
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completed by participants in order to be eligible to participate was set to the minimum threshold
of 50. Respondents were remunerated $1.75 for participation. These criteria for participant
eligibility and the monetary incentive aligns with criteria for participant eligibility and the
monetary incentives in prior criminological studies using MTurk samples (e.g., Pogarsky et al.,
2017; Vaughan et al., 2019).
The sample of size of ~1,500 was chosen, in short, to maximize power and minimize
potential bias. As it currently stands, there is no universally agreed upon sample size requirement
for latent variables models such as those used in this paper (e.g., structural equation modeling).
Prior scholars have suggested heuristics to guide sample size, such as a minimum sample size of
100 or 200 (Boomsma, 1985) and a 10:1 ratio of sample size to parameters (Bentler & Chou,
1987). However, these suggestions are not model specific, and a variety of factors can affect
power, the degree of bias in estimates, and convergence, such as missing data, non-normality,
and factor loading effect sizes (see Deng et al., 2018; Moshagen & Musch, 2014; Wolf et al.,
2013). For example, a Monte Carlo simulation study by Moshagen and Musch (2014) suggests
that a sample size of 1,000 is needed when there are few indicators (i.e., 3 per factor), continuous
and categorical indicators, and weak factor loadings (i.e., factor loadings of .40). Thus, although
there was no clear-cut sample size recommendation that could be relied on, the decision to
recruit a sample of 1,500 participants was generally informed by prior recommendations and
studies and was based on the assumption that there may be departures from normality and
missing data, that continuous and categorical indicators would be used, and that effect sizes (e.g.,
factor loadings, path coefficients) may be small.
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Table 1. Participant demographics
Variable
Gender
Men
Women
Non-binary or
non-conforming
Race/Ethnicity
White/European American
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latinx
Asian American
Native American
Other
Age
Political Orientation
Prior Victimization
Yes
No
Not sure

M (SD) or Proportion

n
1,434

61.2%
38.7%
.1%
1,433
73.6%
11.3%
6.6%
4.5%
3.5%
.6%
38.52 (11.39)

1,419

3.81 (2.14)

1,434
1,427

50.5%
46.3%
3.2%

Note. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Participants in the “other” race/ethnicity category
mostly reported a multi-racial/ethnic identity. Political orientation ranged on a scale from 1(very liberal) to 7(very
conservative), with the midpoint, 4, being middle of the road.

A total of 1,434 participants ultimately completed the survey, with a median completion
time of ~13 minutes.13 Table 1 displays the participant demographics. Participants tended to be
men (~61%), White/European American (~74%), and approximately 39 years old (SD = ~11).
Just over half of participants reported that they had been a victim of a crime, and most

13

It is unclear how reliable and valid this measure of duration was, and thus it should be interpreted with caution.
The duration of the study for each participant was recorded by Qualtrics. Notably, some recorded durations were
impossible given that the overall study duration was limited to one hour. About 20 participants had a recorded
duration of over 75 minutes, with some of these durations reaching over 90 hours.
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participants reported their political orientation as “middle of the road”. I discuss missing data for
each analysis, but generally speaking there was very little missing data. Less than 10% of
participants had any missing data, and there was one percent or less missing data for each item.
Procedure
After providing consent, participants reported demographic information, then read and
responded to three scenarios describing a crime (fraud, burglary, assault) before completing
scales that theoretically measured NFCC, RWA, SDO, legal socialization, perceived legitimacy,
legal cynicism, and the general willingness to cooperate with criminal justice authorities.
Demographic questions were always presented first, but the order of the scenarios, as well as the
order of the scales, was randomized. Three factors were experimentally manipulated across
scenarios (“within-subjects”): relationship of the bystander to the suspect (3: family member,
friend, or stranger), relationship to victim (3: family member, friend, or stranger), and crime
severity (2: major harm or minor harm; see Appendix B). There were thus 18 conditions, with
about 240 vignettes per condition.
The specific crimes of fraud, burglary, and assault described in the vignettes were chosen
for a few reasons. First, I sought to include crimes that might avoid “ceiling” or “floor” effects in
the willingness to report. About half of burglaries are reported and about 40-50% of assaults are
reported (Morgan & Truman, 2020). There are few reliable estimates of how many frauds are
reported v. not reported, but it seems to be in the range of 15-30% (cf. Morgan & Truman, 2020;
DOJ, n.d.). Of course, those are all estimates of victim reporting, not bystander reporting, but
some work has found that the rate of reporting among victims and bystanders is comparable
(Larson, 2015). Second, I sought to include relatively common crimes. Burglary and assault rates
range from about 10 to 20 per thousand of the population (Morgan & Truman, 2020); again, it is
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difficult to identify the rate of fraud, but a survey by the Federal Trade Commission estimated
that about 16% of adults in the U.S. were victims of fraud in 2017 (Anderson, 2019). Third, prior
studies on the willingness to cooperate generally focus on “minor” crimes like suspicious activity
(e.g., Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tankebe, 2013), burglary and assault (e.g., Larson, 2015; Tolsma et
al., 2011). The fraud vignette involved the victim telling the bystander that the suspected
perpetrator had fraudulently solicited a donation for a local non-profit organization. The burglary
vignette involved the bystander seeing a person fleeing a residence, jumping into a car, and
swiftly driving away; they walk up to the residence and see property damage and items dropped
by the fleeing perpetrator. The assault vignette described an instance in which the bystander was
at a restaurant when the perpetrator got into a heated argument, the victim tried to intervene, and
the perpetrator physically assaulted the victim. Table 2 shows an example of each scenario. See
Appendix B for all vignettes.
The design of this study, wherein survey respondents read multiple hypothetical scenarios
with elements experimentally manipulated across scenarios, is generally referred to as factorial
survey design (see Dülmer, 2016; Rossi & Anderson, 1982; Wallander, 2009). Factorial surveys
are common in criminological studies (see Exum & Bouffard, 2010; Rorie et al., 2018), and have
been used specifically in the context of examining willingness to report (e.g., see Tolsma et al.,
2011). Factorial surveys combine survey methods with experimental methods. In this way, they
offer advantages of both surveys (e.g., reliability) and experimental methods (e.g., internal
validity; see generally Bachman & Schutt, 2016, and Shadish et al., 2002, for review).
Furthermore, one of the key advantages of a factorial survey design here is that it allows for
examination of the willingness to cooperate in specific contexts and across contexts, as opposed
to the general willingness to cooperate alone (cf. Dülmer, 2016; Wallander, 2009). Prior studies
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have largely focused on people’s general willingness to cooperate, measured with responses to
items such as “If I witnessed a crime, I would call the police to report the crime,” and “I would
provide information to police to help find a suspected criminal” (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020;
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Papp et al., 2019; Tankebe, 2013). Naturally, people’s general
willingness to cooperate is distinct from people’s willingness to cooperate in specific situations.
In this study, both the general willingness to cooperate and the willingness to cooperate in
specific situations are examined.

Table 2. Example vignettes in current study
Crime Type

Example Vignette
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. Another person walking
in your neighborhood stops and starts talking to you. They tell you that
people have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local
non-profit and asking for donations. You heard about people doing this
on the local news, but did not think much of it at the time.

Fraud
After giving a donation of $1,000, the person called the non-profit to
learn more about how their donation would be used. An employee at the
non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers to solicit donations
and that they were likely a victim of fraud. The person feels very upset
for being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
You are house sitting for a family member. As you arrive at your family
member’s residence one night, you see someone dash out of a residence
with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly drive away.
You do not recognize the car.

Burglary
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks
like someone broke the lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you
see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry and a computer power
cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.

Assault

You are at a restaurant one night. At a table near you, two people begin
arguing loudly and causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to
fight. A friend with you decides to intervene to try and defuse the
situation. One the people shoves the friend trying to defuse the situation
and leaves the restaurant.
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Measures
Dependent Variables
The willingness to cooperate is operationalized as three dependent variables. First, to
measure the general willingness to cooperate, participants responded to items adapted from
Tankebe (2013; also Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), rating their agreement with statements such as “I
would report suspicious activity near my residence to police” on 6-point Likert-scales from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree). Second, participants indicated their willingness to
report to police in each scenario by rating their agreement with the statement “I would call the
police in this situation” on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly
agree). Third, participants indicated their willingness to provide a statement to police in each
scenario by rating their agreement with the statement “I would be willing to provide a sworn
statement to the police detailing what I witnessed,” on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
Need for Certainty Models
The primary explanatory variable in the need for certainty models was NFCC.
Participants completed the NFCC scale developed by Roets & Van Hiel, (2011a; adapted from
Kruglanski et al., 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Participants responded to 15 statements
such as “I don't like situations that are uncertain” with 6-point Likert scales from 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree).
In the need for certainty model predicting the general willingness to cooperate,
RWA and SDO were examined as mediators of the relationship between NFCC and the
willingness to cooperate. In the models predicting the willingness to report and provide a
46

statement, NFCC, RWA, and SDO were independent variables. Participants completed 8-item
scales of RWA and SDO used by Sibley & Duckitt (2009; adapted from Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto
et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For RWA, participants responded to 8 statements like
“Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our
moral fiber and traditional beliefs” on a 7-point Likert-scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7
(Strongly agree). For SDO, participants rated 8 statements like “To get ahead in life, it is
sometimes necessary to step on other groups,” on 7-point scales from 1 (Very negative) to 7
(Very positive). See Appendix A for all items.
Legitimacy Models
The primary explanatory variables in the legitimacy models are the dimensions of legal
socialization. Participants responded to questions and items which aimed to measure legal
socialization in three domains: parents/guardians (household), school, and the justice system.
The questions and items generally reflected the different dimensions of legitimacy (e.g.,
procedural fairness; see Tyler & Trinkner, 2017), included questions and items adapted from the
ACE questionnaire (see Felitti et al., 1998/2019), and were otherwise informed by prior literature
(e.g., Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Durkheim, 1895/1966; Nivette et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2020;
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Trinkner et al., 2020). For the parents/guardians domain, participants
rated their agreement with 14 statements such as “My parents/guardians treated me with
dignity,” and “My parents/guardians would threaten me with physical punishment if they thought
I was doing something wrong,” on 5-point Likert-scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5
(Strongly agree). For the school domain, participants rated their agreement with 12 statements
such as “The rules at my school were fair to everyone,” and “I always tried to obey the rules at
school, even if I did not agree with them,” on 5-point Likert-scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to
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5 (Strongly agree). For the justice system domain, there were two parts. In the first part,
participants answered “yes” or “no” to six questions, such as “Did someone in your family or
household ever go to prison or jail?”. In the second part, participants rated their agreement with
10 statements, such as “People around me were often treated like criminals, just for doing things
many young people do,” on 5-point Likert-scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly
agree). See Appendix A for the full list of items.
Like RWA and SDO in the need for certainty models, the dimensions of perceived
legitimacy were mediators in the model predicting the general willingness to cooperate. The
majority of the items for dimensions of perceived legitimacy were adapted with no or minor
modifications from prior studies (see Gau, 2011, 2014; Jackson et al., 2012; Lee & Cho, 2020;
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe et al., 2016; Trinkner et al., 2018; Tyler,
2006).14 However, I did include a few “new” items as possible indicators of dimensions of
perceived legitimacy. These were primarily items that conceptually aligned with the
effectiveness dimension or distributive fairness dimension, but these items had not been
previously used as indicators of those dimensions. These dimensions, especially distributive
fairness, have been measured inconsistently across prior studies, sometimes not comprehensively
or (arguably) imprecisely given conceptualization. For instance, distributive fairness is
conceptualized as the extent to which legal outcomes are seen as fair, deserved, and equitable
(Tankebe, 2013; Walker et al., 1979; see also Rawls, 1971); Tankebe (2013) used only two
indicators emphasizing the extent to which legal outcomes are fair and deserved, and Lee and
Much of the scholarship since Tyler’s (2006) Chicago study has exclusively focused on the perceived legitimacy
of police. Tyler (2006) considered the perceived legitimacy of both police and courts, found that the items
measuring each were highly interrelated, and used a composite measure of perceived legitimacy that reflected both
domains. Similarly, the items I will use as potential indicators of perceived legitimacy reflect both domains (i.e.,
police and the courts). Some items adapted from prior work were modified accordingly. For example, the original
item, “Police officers treat everyone with dignity,” (see Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe et al.,
2016; Tyler, 2006) was modified to “Police officers and judges treat everyone with dignity”.
14
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Cho (2020) used three indicators emphasizing the extent to which people who break the law will
be certainly, sufficiently, and swiftly punished. Thus, one new item that I included that
conceptually aligned with the distributive fairness dimension was, “Some groups of people face
harsh punishment, while others get off easy.” The complete list of items, where they are drawn
from, and the specific dimensions they have been used as indicators of can be found in Appendix
A. Participants rated their agreement with 40 statements using 5-point Likert scales from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Some examples of the statements are: “People should
obey the law even if it goes against what they think is right,” “The police and courts use rules
and procedures that are fair to everyone,” “People usually receive the outcomes they deserve
under the law,” and “The police do a good job protecting the community and making people feel
safe.”
Experimental Manipulations and Other Measures
In both the legitimacy models and the need for certainty models predicting the
willingness to report and provide a statement to police, there were five variables representing the
experimental manipulations across scenarios. The experimental conditions were all dummy
coded for analysis. The reference conditions for both the bystander relationship with the
suspected perpetrator and relationship to victim were strangers. The reference condition for
crime severity was minor harm.
I also included a number of control variables. Participants reported their age in years,
ethnic/racial identity, gender identity, political orientation, and prior victimization. Respondent
ethnic/racial identify, gender identify, and prior victimization were categorical variables and
dummy coded for analysis. Political orientation ranged from “very liberal” to “very
conservative”. Prior research suggests these variables are related to the willingness to cooperate
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and other variables in the models such as perceived legitimacy (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020; Fagan &
Tyler, 2005; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Kearns, 2016; Nivette et al., 2019; Spencer & Kochel,
2018; Tyler, 2006; see also Kearns et al., 2020).
Finally, participants completed a 5-item measure of legal cynicism developed by
Sampson and Bartusch (1998) and adapted from Srole (1956). Legal cynicism is the degree to a
person sees the law and norms as “binding” on their lives (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). In prior
work, it has been used as measure of legal socialization (e.g., Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Nivette et al.,
2019; Nivette et al., 2020) or modeled as a dimension of perceived legitimacy (e.g., Tankebe,
2009; Tyler & Huo, 2002). I thus included a measure of legal cynicism to: 1) assess the validity
of the dimensions of perceived legitimacy and legal socialization supported by the analyses, and
2) potentially include as a control variable if it was distinct from dimensions of perceived
legitimacy and/or legal socialization. Participants rated their agreement with statements such as,
“Laws were made to be broken”, on 5-point Likert-scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5
(Strongly agree). As I note later, I ultimately merged a dimension of perceived legitimacy that,
on its face, seemed like a measure of legal cynicism with the prior measure of legal cynicism
because they were near perfectly correlated.
Analytical Strategies
Research Question 1
All analyses were conducted using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). To answer
research question 1, “How do NFCC, RWA, and SDO relate to each other and the willingness to
cooperate?” I used the two-step modelling approach consisting of a confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) and a SEM (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Prior to that, I first performed exploratory factor
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analyses (EFA) with maximum likelihood estimation and robust standard errors and geomin
rotation on the items to evaluate factor structure. I used this estimation routine to address
departures from normality and geomin rotation to achieve approximate simple structure(see
Browne, 2001).15 I conducted EFAs first because multidimensional measurement models of
RWA and SDO (and to a lesser extent NFCC) have been supported by prior by literature (e.g.,
Funke, 2005; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Kugler et al., 2010). Thus, I did not want to rule out that
possibility a priori. And indeed, as I note in the subsequent results section, there was clear
support for two-dimensional models of both RWA and SDO.
After the EFAs, I proceeded to the two-step modelling approach (Anderson & Gerbing,
1988). This involves reparametrizing the hypothesized SEM model as a CFA model, evaluating
the fit of the measurement model, estimating the SEM model (assuming the CFA model exhibits
acceptable fit), and performing a χ2 difference test to see if the SEM model results in a decrement
in fit relevant to the CFA model. In this instance, if RWA and SDO “fully” mediate the
relationship between NFCC and the willingness to cooperate, then the SEM model without a
direct relationship between NFCC and the willingness to cooperate specified will not result in a
significant decrement of fit relative to the CFA model, in which there is a direct association
specified. In general, I adopted a latent variable approach because studies demonstrate the
superiority of using latent variables in path modelling compared to using manifest variables.
Models using manifest variables assume that the variables are measured without error (Bollen,
1989).16 When this assumption is not met, a variety of problems emerge, such as over- or

The estimation routine yields a scaled chi-square test statistic equivalent to Yuan & Bentler’s (2002) T2* statistic.
A sandwich estimator is used to compute standard errors (see Freedman, 2006). In addition, although the items are
ordinal, they can be treated as continuous because they have 5 or more categories (Rhemtulla et al., 2012).
16
This is especially notable for other research questions, as measures of legitimacy and ACEs have exhibited low or
mediocre reliability in prior studies (e.g., Tyler, 2006; Yang & Perkins, 2020).
15
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underestimating coefficients, failing to reject invalid models, and changing substantive
conclusions (Cole & Preacher, 2014). These pitfalls can generally be avoided by using latent
variables in path models (i.e., SEM). I again used maximum likelihood estimation with robust
standard errors. Although the items are ordinal, when they have 5 or more categories they can be
treated as continuous (Rhemtulla et al., 2012). To achieve model identification, I used the fixedmean-referent-loading approach (see Little et al., 2006, for review and other options). Latent
variables do not have a “scale” with a mean and variance, so restrictions must be imposed. The
fixed-mean-referent-loading approach involves fixing each factor mean to zero and fixing one
indicator of each factor to one. I use this approach because my focus in this project is on
associations among latent variables, as opposed to, for instance, a substantive focus on latent
variable means (see Little et al., 2006). The path coefficients, the exogenous factor variances,
and the endogenous factor disturbances were all freely estimated. No disturbance covariances
were estimated. The χ2 difference test was used to test the nested models.
To evaluate model fit, I did not rely on the likelihood ratio (χ2) test primarily because it is
a test of exact fit. Models with high df are more likely to be rejected based on the likelihood ratio
test because of greater potential for misspecification (see Bentler, 2007). Critically, the
likelihood ratio test is not able to differentiate trivial misspecifications from theoretically
meaningful misspecifications (see Hancock & French, 2013). In turn, a model that provides a
reasonable approximation might be rejected due to trivial misspecifications (MacCallum et al.,
1996). Thus, I used other indices of model fit to guide evaluation of the model, specifically the
Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Standardized Root Mean Squared
Residual (SRMR), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). Of course,
relying on these indices—in particular, comparing these indices with a cutoff point—is not
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without issue. Kenny et al. (2015) and others (e.g., Chen et al., 2008; Millsap, 2007) have
generally discouraged comparing a fit statistic “with some arbitrary cutoff point” (p. 501). In line
with this recommendation, I examined fit statistics but aimed for a holistic approach and did not
strictly adhere to cutoff points posited in literature. For the RMSEA—a measure of absolute fit—
a value less than .05 is generally considered a good-to-excellent fit (Browne & Cudek, 1993; Hu
& Bentler, 1999; Kenny et al., 2015; MacCallum et al., 1996; Marsh et al., 2004), a value less
than .08 is considered a mediocre or reasonable fit (Browne & Cudek, 1993; Kenny et al., 2015;
MacCallum et al., 1996; Marsh et al., 2004), and a value less than .10 is considered a poor fit
(Kenny et al., 2015; MacCallum et al., 1996). For the CFI and TLI—indices of relative fit—a
value greater than or equal to .95 is considered a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and a value
greater than or equal to .90 is considered a reasonable fit (Bentler, 1990). Finally, for the SRMR,
a value less than .08 is considered a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Research Question 2
To answer research question 2, “Do the relationships between NFCC, RWA, SDO, and
the willingness to cooperate vary depending on situational characteristics?”, I employed
Multilevel Modelling (MLM) with maximum likelihood estimation and robust standard errors.
The dependent variables in these models were the willingness to report and the willingness to
provide a statement across the vignettes. Thus, MLMs were used to address the clustered nature
of the data (Hox et al., 1991). I specified random intercepts and random slopes.
Research Questions 3 through 11
To answer research question 3, “How many dimensions underlie perceived legitimacy?”
and research question 4, “How many dimensions underlie legal socialization?”, I again conduced
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EFAs using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and geomin rotation. I
planned to use the two step approach to answer research questions 5 through 8, but for reasons
discussed later, I did not estimate an SEM to test indirect relationships to answer research
question 8. I did estimate CFA models and regression models to answer research questions 5
through 7. In the models with dimensions of legal socialization, I used robust weighted least
squares estimation because some of the indicators were categorical (Muthén & Muthén, 19982017).17 This involves probit regression estimates for categorical indicators and linear regression
estimates for continuous indicators. To answer research question 9, “Do the relationships
between dimensions of perceived legitimacy, dimensions of legal socialization, and the
willingness to cooperate vary depending on situational characteristics?”, I used the same
approach as I did to answer research question 2. To answer research question 10, “How do
dimensions of perceived legitimacy and dimensions of legal socialization relate to NFCC, RWA,
and SDO?” I estimated a CFA model using robust weighted least squares estimation. Finally, I
answered research question 11, “How do situational characteristics effect the willingness to
cooperate?” in the MLMs I estimated to answer research question 9 and research question 2.
In addition, for the structural models, I examined relationships with and without control
variables included. That is, I added participants’ age, gender, race/ethnic identify, political
orientation, and prior victimization as predictors to see if this resulted in substantive changes to
the estimates. Furthermore, after the EFA of perceived legitimacy, I examined correlations
between those dimensions and a prior measure of legal cynicism.

17

This routine uses a diagonal weight matrix for standard errors and a full weight matrix for a mean and variance
adjusted chi-square statistic.
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Chapter 4: Results
Data analyses proceeded in multiple stages to answer research questions associated with
the need for certainty model of the willingness to cooperate and the legitimacy model of the
willingness to cooperate. First, EFAs were conducted to evaluate factor structure. Second, CFA
models were estimated (i.e., hypothesized SEM models reparameterized as CFA models). Third,
SEM models of the general willingness to cooperate were estimated and compared with the
corresponding CFA models. Fourth, control variables were added to the SEM models. Fifth,
MLMs of the willingness to report and provide a statement to police were estimated. Sixth,
control variables were added to the MLMs.
Need for Certainty Models of the Willingness to Cooperate
Before estimating and evaluating the hypothesized need for certainty models of the
willingness to cooperate, EFAs were first performed on the NFCC items, RWA items, and SDO
items to evaluate factor structure. Each EFA was estimated using maximum likelihood
estimation with robust standard errors to address departures from normality and missing data,
used geomin rotation. Of the sample of 1,434 participants, 1,432 had complete data. Two
participants did not respond to an NFCC item. Covariance coverage values were all at least .999.
The results of the EFA performed on the NFCC items indicated the one-factor model was a
generally mediocre fit to the data (χ2(90) = 968.103, p < .001, c = 1.438; RMSEA = .082; CFI =
.858; TLI = .834; SRMR = .062). I decided to drop items with the lowest factor loadings while
ensuring at least one item from each dimension of NFCC was represented. Four items were
dropped, specifically items 7 (decisiveness), 12 (order), 13 (order), and 14 (closemindedness)
from the 15-item NFCC scale (see Appendix A). After the items were dropped, the EFA
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indicated the one-factor model was a reasonable fit. Table 3 shows the EFA results and fit
indices. All of the factor loadings were generally strong and statistically significant; the latent
factor, NFCC, explained over 95% of the variance in the items.

Table 3. Results of exploratory factor analysis of need for cognitive closure (NFCC) items,
single-factor model
Item (n = 1,434)
NFCC 1
NFCC 2
NFCC 3
NFCC 4
NFCC 5
NFCC 6
NFCC 8
NFCC 9
NFCC 10
NFCC 11
NFCC 15
Fit Indices
2
χ (20) = 378.294***
c = 1.453
RMSEA = .073
CFI = .927
TLI = .909
SRMR = .045

λ
.691
.711
.560
.695
.614
.723
.592
.610
.719
.749
.697

h2
.973
.976
.974
.975
.975
.975
.972
.927
.977
.977
.973

Note. ***p < .001. All factor loadings were statistically significant.

Similar to the NFCC items, there was negligible missing data for the RWA items.
Specifically, one participant did not respond to two RWA items, and covariance coverage values
were all at least .999. The results of the EFA performed on the RWA items indicated the onefactor model was a terrible fit to the data (χ2(20) = 1,283.561, p < .001, c = 1.438; RMSEA =
.210; CFI = .644; TLI = .502). To some degree, this was not too surprising as past literature
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indicates multi-factor models of RWA exhibit better fit (e.g., Funke, 2005) and some argue that
RWA is not unidimensional (e.g., Duckitt et al., 2010). Only half of the RWA items exhibited
strong loadings onto the single factor; the other half of the items exhibited “trivial” loadings (i.e.,
factor loading < .300). All of this suggested that a multi-factor model of RWA would yield a
better fit. Thus, I estimated a two-factor model, and indeed, it exhibited an excellent fit to the
data as well as being a statistically significant improvement of fit relative to the single-factor
model. Table 4 shows the results of the two-factor, EFA model. I label the first factor,
submission/aggression, because the items reflect two facets of RWA: submission to authorities
and norms endorsed by authorities and aggression towards people who challenge authorities or
norms endorsed by authorities. I label the second factor, conventionalism, because the items
reflect the religious, traditionalism dimension of RWA.18 There was a small, positive correlation
between submission/aggression and conventionalism.
Turning to the SDO items, there was no missing data, and the trajectory was the same as
it was for the RWA items. That is, the single-factor EFA model exhibited a terrible fit (χ2(20) =
2,038.702, p < .001, c = 1.680; RMSEA = .265; CFI = .573; TLI = .403; SRMR = .251), whereas
a subsequent two-factor EFA model exhibited excellent, and statistically significant
improvement of, fit. Similar to RWA, multi-factor models of SDO are not uncommon and
scholars have argued for a two-factor model of SDO (Ho et al., 2012, 2015; Jost & Thompson,
2000; Kugler et al., 2010). Table 5 shows the results of the two-factor EFA model. I label the
first factor superiority because the items reflect the facet of SDO emphasizing that some groups
of people are inherently superior and dominate other groups (i.e., “group-based dominance”). I
label the second factor inequality because the items reflect the facet of SDO emphasizing that

18

In some sense, conventionalism reflects religious fundamentalism—there is one right way to live, characterized by
adherence to religious scripture and authority (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004).
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inequality between groups in society is positive (i.e., “anti-egalitarianism”). There was a small,
positive correlation between superiority and inequality.

Table 4. Results of exploratory factor analysis of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)
items, two-factor model
Item (n = 1,434)
RWA 1
RWA 2
RWA 3
RWA 4
RWA 5
RWA 6
RWA 7
RWA 8
Factor Correlations
Factor 1
Factor 2
Fit Indices
χ2(13) = 51.934***
c = 1.369
RMSEA = .046
CFI = .989
TLI = .976
SRMR = .014

Factor 1 (λ)
.797
.080
.869
.838
-.022
.791
.018
-.006

Factor 2 (λ)
-.066
.716
.029
.014
.734
-.176
.604
.717

1
.104**

1

h2
.629
.531
.761
.705
.536
.627
.367
.513

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01. The two-factor model was a statistically significant improvement of fit relative to the
single-factor model, χ2(7) = 1,231.130, p < .001.

To answer research question 1, I first examined how NFCC, RWA dimensions, and SDO
dimensions related to the general willingness to cooperate. I originally hypothesized that NFCC
would be positively related to SDO and RWA, and, in turn, SDO and RWA would be positively
related to the willingness to cooperate. Naturally, that hypothesized model needed to be revised
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to incorporate the two-factor measurement models of RWA and SDO. This revised model was
reparameterized as a CFA model, which exhibited a good fit to the data (χ2(419) = 1,747.627, p <
.001, c = 1.316; RMSEA = .047; CFI = .928; TLI = .920; SRMR = .061). Despite a good fit,
there was an indicator of potential collinearity when proceeding to the SEM model. Specifically,
the submission/aggression dimension of RWA was strongly correlated with the superiority
dimension of SDO (r = .812). Indeed, when the SEM model was estimated, the standardized
coefficient for the path between submission/aggression and the willingness to cooperate
exceeded one, and the coefficient for the path between superiority and the willingness to
cooperate was negative and large—despite the bivariate correlation between superiority and
willingness to cooperate being .063. To avoid multicollinearity issues, I decided to estimate two
separate models, one excluding the SDO dimensions and one excluding the RWA dimensions.
The SEM model with SDO dimensions excluded was reparameterized as a CFA model
and exhibited good fit. For this analysis, there was complete data for 1,431 participants. I noted
previously that two participants did not respond to one NFCC item each and that one participant
did not respond to two RWA items. The latter participant did not respond to one item of the
general willingness to cooperate scale as well. Covariance coverage values were all at least .999.
The SEM model was then estimated, but it resulted in a significant decrement of fit relative to
the CFA model. The difference between the SEM model and the CFA model was that the latter
did not specify a direct relationship between NFCC and the willingness to cooperate, only an
indirect relationship via the RWA dimensions. This meant that a direct relationship between
NFCC and the willingness to cooperate should be specified—but doing so also meant the CFA
and SEM models could not be compared because they were functionally equivalent. Table 6
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shows the coefficient estimates in the final SEM model. NFCC and the RWA dimensions
explained a little over 20% of the variance in the willingness to cooperate.

Table 5. Results of exploratory factor analysis of social dominance orientation (SDO) items,
two-factor model
Item (n = 1,434)
SDO 1
SDO 2
SDO 3
SDO 4
SDO 5
SDO 6
SDO 7
SDO 8
Factor Correlations
Factor 1
Factor 2
Fit Indices
2
χ (13) = 20.612**
c = 1.407
RMSEA = .020
CFI = .998
TLI = .997
SRMR = .006

Factor 1 (λ)
.890
.810
.903
.868
.032
-.022
.009
-.007

Factor 2 (λ)
-.013
.085
-.023
.062
.817
.854
.804
.834

1
.071*

1

h2
.791
.673
.812
.764
.672
.727
.647
.694

Note. **p < .01, *p < .05. The two-factor model was a statistically significant improvement of fit relative to the
single-factor model, χ2(7) = 465.519, p < .001.

NFCC had a large, positive relationship with the submission/aggression dimension of
RWA, offering some support for hypothesis 1. In contrast, NFCC had medium, negative
relationship with conventionalism, at odds with hypothesis 1. Similarly, submission/aggression
had a small-to-medium, positive relationship with the willingness to cooperate, in support of
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hypothesis 4; in contrast, conventionalism had small-to-medium, negative relationship with the
willingness to cooperate, at odds with hypothesis 4. All else constant, NFCC had a small-tomedium, positive relationship with the willingness to cooperate, supporting hypothesis 3. In
support of hypothesis 7, the indirect relationships between NFCC and the willingness to
cooperate via submission/aggression and conventionalism were both positive.19 Of course, one of
those indirect relationships was positive due to being a product of two negative path coefficients
that were not hypothesized.
When the control variables of age, gender, race/ethnicity, political orientation, and prior
victimization were added to the model, the previously noted relationships remained virtually the
same (see Table 8). The control variables explained approximately an additional 10% of the
variance in submission/aggression, 6% of the variance in conventionalism, but only about 1% of
the variance in the willingness to cooperate. This was primarily driven by political orientation.
People who more strongly identified as politically conservative were higher in both
submission/aggression and conventionalism compared to people who more strongly identified as
politically liberal. The other control variables were unrelated or exhibited small relationships
with submission/aggression, conventionalism, and/or the willingness to cooperate. For example,
women reported a slightly greater willingness to cooperate compared to men. Table 7 shows
relationships between the control variables and NFCC.

19

I also compared the indirect effect estimates with indirect effects estimated using bootstrapping. This procedure
involves random resampling of the data thousands of times (here, 5000 samples), estimating the indirect effects, and
using the distribution of estimates to construct a confidence interval (Hayes, 2009, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
The 95% CI for the indirect relationship from NFCC to the general willingness to cooperate via
submission/aggression was .070 - .145 and via conventionalism was .037 - .105.
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Table 6. Results of need for certainty SEM model of willingness to cooperate with
dimensions of SDO excluded
Predictor
Submission/
Aggression
Conventionalism
NFCC
R2
Indirect Effects
NFCC via
Submission/
Aggression
NFCC via
Conventionalism
Correlations
Submission/
Aggression
Conventionalism
Fit Indices
2
χ (224) =
1,183.003***
c = 1.314
RMSEA = .055
CFI = .913
TLI = .902
SRMR = .055

Submission/Aggression
β (SE)

Conventionalism
β (SE)

--

--

--

--

.452***
(.030)
.204***

-.322***
(.037)
.104***

Cooperation
β (SE)
.237***
(.040)
-.214***
(.045)
.209***
(.047)
.209***
.107***
(.019)
.069***
(.017)

-.285***

--

Note. **p < .01, *p < .05. n = 1,434. Coefficients are fully standardized.
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Table 7. NFCC regressed on control variables
Predictor (n = 1,419)
Age
Women
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latin American
Asian American
Native American
Other race/ethnicity
Political Conservatism
Prior Victimization
R2
Fit Indices
2
χ (134) = 604.672***
RMSEA = .050
CFI = .921
TLI = .909
SRMR = .035

NFCC
β (SE)
.098** (.029)
.071* (.028)
.066* (.027)
.069* (.029)
-.025 (.026)
.006 (.023)
-.006 (.023)
.036 (.028)
.105*** (.028)
.040***

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Coefficients are fully standardized

Just as the measurement models of RWA and SDO followed similar trajectories, so did
their respective SEM models. Again, there was no missing data for the SDO items, but two
participants did not respond an NFCC item and one did not respond to one item of the general
willingness to cooperate scale. Covariance coverage values were all at least .999. The SEM
model with RWA dimensions excluded was reparameterized as a CFA model and exhibited good
fit, although the subsequent SEM model was a significant decrement of fit relative to the CFA
model. Once again, this meant that a direct relationship between NFCC and the willingness to
cooperate should be specified (NFCC was thus not “fully” mediated by the RWA or SDO
dimensions), but doing so also meant the CFA and SEM models could not be compared because
they were functionally equivalent. Table 9 shows the coefficient estimates in the final SEM

63

model. NFCC and the SDO dimensions explained a little over 20% of the variance in the
willingness to cooperate.
NFCC had a medium, positive relationship with the superiority dimension of SDO, in
support of hypothesis 2. In contrast, NFCC had medium, negative relationship with inequality, at
odds with hypothesis 2. Superiority was unrelated to the willingness to cooperate and inequality
had a small-to-medium, negative relationship with the willingness to cooperate, at odds with
hypothesis 5. All else constant, NFCC had a medium, positive relationship with the willingness
to cooperate (again supporting hypothesis 3). In partial support of hypothesis 7, the indirect
relationship between NFCC and the willingness to cooperate via inequality was positive.
However, that was a product of two negative relationships and there was no indirect relationship
via superiority.20

20

I again compared the indirect effect estimates with indirect effects estimated via bootstrapping. The 95% CI for
the indirect relationship from NFCC to the general willingness to cooperate via superiority was -.045 - .009 and via
conventionalism was .038 - .092.
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Table 8. Results of need for certainty SEM model of willingness to cooperate with
dimensions of SDO excluded and control variables included
Predictor (n = 1,419)
Submission/
Aggression
Conventionalism
NFCC
Age
Women
Black/African
American
Hispanic/Latin
American
Asian American
Native American
Other race/ethnicity
Political Conservatism
Prior Victimization
R2
Indirect Effects
NFCC via
Submission/
Aggression
NFCC via
Conventionalism
Correlations
Submission/
Aggression
Conventionalism
Fit Indices
2
χ (404) =
1,614.757***
c = 1.154
RMSEA = .046
CFI = .907
TLI = .894
SRMR = .051

Submission/Aggression
β (SE)

Conventionalism
β (SE)

Cooperation
β (SE)

--

--

.230 (.043)***

-.422 (.030)***
.057 (.024)*
-.031 (.025)

--.329 (.030)***
.021 (.032)
.038 (.028)

-.237 (.046)***
.187 (.048)***
.108 (.029)***
.069 (.026)**

.107 (.024)***

.007 (.030)

-.023 (.028)

.024 (.023)

-.069 (.026)**

.027 (.024)

-.043 (.025)
.082 (.018)***
-.078 (.027)**
.286 (.023)***
.072 (.025)**
.304***

-.020 (.025)
-.019 (.022)
-.024 (.028)
.221 (.027)***
-.055 (.029)
.168***

.025 (.027)
-.035 (.020)
.014 (.025)
.058 (.027)*
-.035 (.028)
.220***

.097 (.019)***
.078 (.018)***

-.238***

--

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Coefficients are fully standardized.
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Table 9. Results of need for certainty SEM model of willingness to cooperate, with
dimensions of RWA excluded
Predictor

Superiority
β (SE)

Inequality
β (SE)

Superiority

--

--

Inequality

--

--

.381***
(.030)
.145***

-.264***
(.035)
.070***

NFCC
R2
Indirect Effects
NFCC via
Superiority
NFCC via
Inequality
Correlations
Superiority
Inequality
Fit Indices
χ2(224) =
1,087.586***
c = 1.348
RMSEA = .052
CFI = .932
TLI = .923
SRMR = .061

Cooperation
β (SE)
-.046
(.035)
-.238***
(.043)
.339***
(.041)
.206***
-.017
(.014)
.063***
(.014)

-.219***

--

Note. ***p < .001. n = 1,434. Coefficients are fully standardized.

When the control variables were added, relationships remained virtually the same.
Additional variance was again explained, primarily driven by political orientation, which was
positively related to both dimensions of SDO (see Table 10). There were also some other
relationships among the control variables and superiority, inequality, and the willingness to
cooperate. Interestingly, people who had been a victim of crime and people who identified as
Black/African American or Native American (compared to White/European American) were
slightly more likely to endorse the superiority dimension of SDO.
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Table 10. Results of need for certainty SEM model of willingness to cooperate with
dimensions of RWA excluded and control variables included
Predictor (n = 1,419)
Superiority
Inequality
NFCC
Age
Women
Black/African
American
Hispanic/Latin
American
Asian American
Native American
Other race/ethnicity
Political Conservatism
Prior Victimization
R2
Indirect Effects
NFCC via Superiority
NFCC via Inequality
Correlations
Submission/
Aggression
Conventionalism
Fit Indices
χ2(404) =
1,505.670***
c = 1.177
RMSEA = .044
CFI = .926
TLI = .916
SRMR = .055

Superiority
β (SE)
--.357 (.030)***
-.032 (.027)
-.060 (.025)*

Inequality
β (SE)
---.271 (.035)***
.003 (.028)
-.015 (.026)

Cooperation
β (SE)
-.065 (.036)
-.284 (.035)***
.308 (.042)***
.115 (.027)***
.046 (.026)

.079 (.024)**

-.042 (.025)

-.007 (.028)

.029 (.023)

-.050 (.021)*

.037 (.023)

-.031 (.024)
.100 (.017)***
-.048 (.020)**
.210 (.025)***
.160 (.025)**
.228***

-.013 (.028)
-.024 (.022)
.028 (.037)
.281(.023)***
-.015 (.026)
.157***

.014 (.027)
-.012 (.021)
.008 (.032)
.164 (.025)***
.009 (.027)
.232***
-.023 (.013)
.077 (.015)***

-.173***

--

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Coefficients are fully standardized.
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics of vignette items
Vignette x Condition
Assault
Victim
Stranger
Friend
Family Member
Perpetrator
Stranger
Friend
Family Member
Crime Severity
Major Harm
Minor Harm
Burglary
Victim
Stranger
Friend
Family Member
Perpetrator
Stranger
Friend
Family Member
Crime Severity
Major Harm
Minor Harm
Fraud
Victim
Stranger
Friend
Family Member
Perpetrator
Stranger
Friend
Family Member
Crime Severity
Major Harm
Minor Harm
Total

n
1,435

Report
M (SD)
3.321 (1.292)

Statement
M (SD)
3.694 (1.179)

474
476
485

3.319 (1.298)
3.273 (1.313)
3.367 (1.265)

3.745 (1.151)
3.597 (1.204)
3.740 (1.179)

463
481
491

3.389 (1.301)
3.252 (1.331)
3.326 (1.242)

3.678 (1.182)
3.686 (1.186)
3.717 (1.173)

714
721
1,435

3.340 (1.306)
3.302 (1.278)
4.264 (0.895)

3.692 (1.194)
3.696 (1.166)
3.882 (1.090)

472
478
485

4.333 (0.868)
4.232 (0.885)
4.229 (0.929)

3.881 (1.101)
3.852 (1.122)
3.913 (1.049)

467
480
488

4.287 (0.856)
4.248 (0.920)
4.258 (0.908)

3.872 (1.124)
3.827 (1.144)
3.947 (1.000)

714
721
1,435

4.298 (0.868)
4.230 (0.920)
3.754 (1.143)

3.913 (1.088)
3.852 (1.092)
4.220 (0.940)

484
465
486

3.719 (1.195)
3.811 (1.119)
3.735 (1.111)

4.246 (0.945)
4.183 (0.967)
4.228 (0.908)

469
478
488

3.836 (1.112)
3.690 (1.160)
3.738 (1.152)

4.199 (0.998)
4.232 (0.923)
4.236 (0.899)

724
711
4,305

3.905 (1.082)
3.601 (1.182)
3.780 (1.186)

4.235 (0.953)
4.204 (0.926)
3.932 (1.096)

Note. Report and statement had a medium, positive correlation, r = .348, p < .001.
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To answer research questions 1, 2, and 11, I estimated MLMs with random intercepts and
slopes. The Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for report was .184; the ICC for statement was .257.
The sample size at the within-level was 4,305 vignettes (i.e., scenarios nested within
individuals). Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for each vignette and experimental
condition. Similar to the previous analytical procedure, I estimated a series of models with
dimensions of SDO excluded and with dimensions of RWA excluded. Equations 1 through 3 are
the within-level and between-level equations for the MLMs with dimensions of SDO excluded.

Equation 1. Within-level equations in MLMs
𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒋 = 𝜷𝟎𝒋 + 𝜷𝟏𝒋 𝒇𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟐𝒋 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟑𝒋 𝒇𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒋
+ 𝜷𝟒𝒋 𝒇𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚 𝒎𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒋 + 𝜷𝟓𝒋 𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒋 + 𝒆𝒊𝒋
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑗 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑗 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽4𝑗 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑗 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗

𝛽0𝑗 = Intercept for report or statement for respondent j.
𝑒𝑖𝑗 = Residual for vignette i for respondent j.

Equation 2. Between-level intercept equation in MLMs with dimensions of SDO excluded
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛾03 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇0𝑗

𝛾00 = Intercept for report or statement.
𝜇0𝑗 = Random deviation of intercept for respondent j.
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Equation 3. Between-level slope equations in MLMs with dimensions of SDO excluded
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾12 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛾13 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇1𝑗
𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾22 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛾23 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇2𝑗
𝛽3𝑗 = 𝛾30 + 𝛾31 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾32 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛾33 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇3𝑗
𝛽4𝑗 = 𝛾40 + 𝛾41 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾42 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛾43 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇4𝑗
𝛽5𝑗 = 𝛾50 + 𝛾51 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾52 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛾53 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇5𝑗

𝛾10 = Effect of friend v. stranger victim.
𝜇1𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾20 = Effect of family member v. stranger victim.
𝜇2𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾30 = Effect of friend v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇3𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾40 = Effect of family member v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇4𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾50 = Effect of crime severity.
𝜇5𝑗 = Random deviation of crime severity effect for respondent j.

Table 10 shows the results of the MLMs for the willingness to report and the willingness
to provide a statement, in which dimensions of SDO and control variables were excluded. The
missing data patterns were similar as in the previous SEM model in which dimensions of SDO
and control variables were excluded (i.e., three participants, or “clusters”, with missing data on
NFCC and RWA), except there was no missing data on the dependent variables. Note that,
because the scenario-level manipulations were represented as dummy codes, the intercepts for
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report and statement should be interpreted as the average response in the reference conditions—
that is, when the victim was a stranger, when the perpetrator was a stranger, and when there was
minor harm—and when the individual difference measures are at their average values (the latent
factor means were fixed to 0). In turn, the “main effects” of the between-level variables should
be interpreted as the associations between the between-level variables and the average response
in the reference conditions. Another thing to briefly note is that the estimates are all
unstandardized.
Before turning to the hypothesized relationships and effects, two notable observations can
be made. First, the intercept estimates indicate that respondents generally reported a willingness
to report the crime and provide a statement to police when the victim was a stranger, the
perpetrator was a stranger, and when there was minor harm (all else constant). In turn, the small,
negative effects on (and relationships with) report and statement shown in Table 10 are perhaps
best interpreted as increasing uncertainty in people’s behavioral intentions, as opposed to being
interpreted as increasing opposition to reporting or providing a statement. Second, the betweenlevel residual variances of the intercepts were dramatically smaller than the within-level residual
variances, and in turn the residual ICC values were small. This indicates that the variance in the
willingness to report and provide a statement was largely explained at the individual-level.
Only two of the experimental manipulations had direct effects, and only on report. In
partial support of hypothesis 12, the willingness to report was higher across scenarios that
involved major harm compared to minor harm. In partial support of hypothesis 10, the
willingness to report was lower when the suspected perpetrator was a friend compared to a
stranger. There was thus no support for hypotheses 8, 9, and 11 in these models.
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The submission/aggression dimension of RWA was positively related to the willingness
to report and the willingness to provide a statement in the reference conditions. This parallels the
positive relationship with the general willingness to cooperate previously found, and thus offers
additional support for hypothesis 4. However, the relationships between submission/aggression
and the willingness to report and provide a statement were attenuated when the victim was a
family member. When the victim was a stranger, the coefficient for report on
submission/aggression was, b = 0.275, 95% CI (0.179, 0.370), and the coefficient for statement
on submission/aggression was, b = 0.114, 95% CI (0.012, 0.216); when the victim was a family
member, the coefficient for report on submission/aggression was, b = 0.143, 95% CI [0.042,
0.244], and the coefficient for statement on submission/aggression was, b = -0.035, 95% CI (0.130, 0.060). See Figure 3 and Figure 4. Examining the effect of family member v. stranger
victim at different levels of submission/aggression showed that the effect of family member v.
stranger victim on report was negative when submission/aggression was one SD above the mean,
b = -0.122, 95% CI (-0.229, -0.014), and positive (but not statistically significant) when
submission/aggression was one SD below the mean, b = 0.142, 95% CI (-0.010, 0.294). The
same pattern occurred for statement—a negative effect at one SD above the mean of
submission/aggression, b = -0.142, 95% CI (-0.258, -0.026), and a positive effect at one SD
below the mean, b = 0.155, 95% CI (0.008, 0.303). Thus, people higher in the
submission/aggression facet of RWA appear to be generally willing to cooperate and to turn to
legal authorities when they witness potential crimes, but are more hesitant when their family
members, compared to strangers, have been victimized. Moreover, the hypothesis that people
would be more likely to report and provide a statement when their family member was the victim
compared to when a stranger was the victim was partially supported, but only for people low in
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submission/aggression and only for the willingness to provide a statement. See Figure 5 and
Figure 6. Conventionalism was unrelated to the willingness to report and the willingness to
provide a statement, contrasting with the previous negative relationship with the general
willingness to cooperate. NFCC was only related to the willingness to provide a statement, and
only when the victim was a family member, b = 0.271, 95% CI (0.093, 0.449).

Figure 3. Submission/aggression moderated by relationship to victim on report
0.45
0.4

Coefficient CI
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0
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Family Member Vicim
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When control variables were added (not shown; available upon request), the
aforementioned estimates did not substantively change. Women were more willing to report (b =
0.103, SE = 0.038, p = .006), and more willing to provide a statement (b = 0.134, SE = 0.038, p <
.001), compared to men. People who reported being an “other” racial/ethnic identity were less
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likely to report compared to people who identified as White/European American (b = -0.581, SE
= 0.140, p < .001), but there were no other racial/ethnic differences in report or statement. Age
had a small, positive relationship with the willingness to provide a statement (b = 0.004, SE =
0.002, p = .036). There were no other statistically significant associations between the control
variables and report or statement.

Figure 4. Submission/aggression moderated by relationship to victim on statement
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Figure 5. Relationship to victim moderated by submission/aggression on report
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Figure 6. Relationship to victim moderated by submission/aggression on statement
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High

Table 12. MLM results of need for certainty model of the willingness to cooperate,
dimensions of SDO excluded
Parameter (n = 4,305)
Intercept
Residual Variance (within)
Residual Variance (between)

Report

Statement
Estimates
3.769*** (0.045)
3.922*** (0.049)
1.211*** (0.041)
0.914*** (0.033)
0.010 (0.058)
0.150** (0.058)

Contextual Differences
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

-0.003 (0.045)
0.010 (0.045)
-0.114* (0.044)
-0.072 (0.045)
0.140*** (0.036)

-0.079 (0.047)
0.007 (0.046)
-0.015 (0.047)
0.044 (0.047)
0.046 (0.037)

Individual Differences
Submission/Aggression
Conventionalism
NFCC

0.275*** (0.049)
-0.094 (0.060)
-0.002 (0.081)

0.114* (0.052)
-0.082 (0.061)
0.093 (0.088)

Submission/Aggression x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

-0.085 (0.046)
-0.132** (0.050)
0.076 (0.047)
0.046 (0.050)
-0.048 (0.039)

-0.060 (0.053)
-0.149** (0.061)
0.059 (0.049)
0.030 (0.052)
0.009 (0.039)

-0.096 (0.060)
-0.040 (0.061)
-0.056 (0.059)
-0.003 (0.059)
0.066 (0.050)

-0.054 (0.061)
-0.106 (0.060)
-0.028 (0.060)
0.066 (0.061)
0.004 (0.047)

0.081 (0.084)
0.137 (0.088)
-0.040 (0.083)
-0.060 (0.088)
0.053 (0.070)
.008
-49,978.212
1.235

0.138 (0.093)
0.178* (0.087)
-0.056 (0.088)
-0.100 (0.091)
-0.012 (0.069)
.141
-49,642.012
1.218

Conventionalism x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm
NFCC x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm
Residual ICC
-2*LLH0
c

Note. ***p < .01**p < .01, *p < .05. Estimates are unstandardized.
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Equation 4. Between-level intercept equation in MLMs with dimensions of RWA excluded
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾03 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇0𝑗

𝛾00 = Intercept for report or statement.
𝜇0𝑗 = Random deviation of intercept for respondent j.

Equation 5. Between-level slope equations in MLMs with dimensions of RWA excluded
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾12 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾13 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇1𝑗
𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾22 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾23 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇2𝑗
𝛽3𝑗 = 𝛾30 + 𝛾31 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾32 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾33 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇3𝑗
𝛽4𝑗 = 𝛾40 + 𝛾41 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾42 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾43 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇4𝑗
𝛽5𝑗 = 𝛾50 + 𝛾51 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝛾52 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾53 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇5𝑗

𝛾10 = Effect of friend v. stranger victim.
𝜇1𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾20 = Effect of family member v. stranger victim.
𝜇2𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾30 = Effect of friend v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇3𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾40 = Effect of family member v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇4𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾50 = Effect of crime severity.
𝜇5𝑗 = Random deviation of crime severity effect for respondent j.
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Equations 4 and 5 show the between-level equations in the MLMs with dimensions of
RWA excluded, and Table 13 shows the results of the MLMs when dimensions of RWA were
excluded. The only missing data was the two participants who did not respond to one NFCC item
each. The main effects of the contextual differences were the same.
The estimates for the superiority dimension of SDO were somewhat similar to the
estimates for submission/aggression. It was positively related to the willingness to report in the
reference conditions, supporting hypothesis 5, while the interaction term with family member v.
stranger victim was negative. When the victim was a stranger, the coefficient for report on
superiority was, b = 0.177, 95% CI (0.120, 0.234); when the victim was a family member, the
coefficient for report on superiority was, b = 0.084, 95% CI (0.021, 0.147). See Figure 7.
Examining the effect of family member v. stranger victim at different levels of superiority
showed that the effect of family member v. stranger victim on report was negative when
superiority was one SD above the mean, b = -0.095, 95% CI (-0.185, -0.005), and positive (but
not statistically significant) when superiority was one SD below the mean, b = 0.091, 95% CI (0.032, 0.214). See Figure 8. The same pattern of findings emerged for the willingness to provide
a statement, but none of the conditional coefficients were statistically significant.
Unlike submission/aggression, superiority also interacted with crime severity on report.
They generally attenuated each other (see Figure 9 and 10). When there was minor harm, the
coefficient for report on superiority was, b = 0.177, 95% CI (0.120, 0.234); when there was
major harm, the coefficient for report on superiority was, b = 0.106, 95% CI [0.054, 0.158]. The
effect of crime severity was larger when superiority was at one SD below the mean, b = 0.214,
95% CI [0.115, 0.313], compared to one SD above the mean b = 0.073, 95% CI [-0.002, 0.148].

78

Thus, although superiority was unrelated to the general willingness to cooperate, it was related
to the willingness to cooperate in particular circumstances.

Figure 7. Superiority moderated by relationship to victim on report
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The inequality dimension of SDO was negatively related to the willingness to report and
provide a statement in the reference conditions. It also interacted with relationship to the victim
on statement. See Figure 11 and Figure 12. When the victim was a stranger, the coefficient for
statement on inequality was, b = -0.107, 95% CI (-0.210, -0.005); when the victim was a friend,
the coefficient for statement on inequality was, b = -0.208, 95% CI (-0.315, -0.102); and when
the victim was a family member, the coefficient for statement on inequality was, b = -0.217, 95%
CI (-0.332, -0.101). As the relational distance between bystander and victim decreased, the
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magnitude of the negative relationship between superiority and the willingness to provide a
statement increased. When inequality was one SD above the mean, the effect of friend v. stranger
victim on statement was negative, b = -0.183, 95% CI [-0.326, -0.040]; it had positive (but not
statistically significant) effect when inequality was one SD below the mean. The pattern was
similar for family member v. stranger victim, but none of the conditional effects were statistically
significant. On the whole, people who are “anti-egalitarian” appear to be less willing to
cooperate and turn to legal authorities when they witness potential crimes, especially when they
know the victim. Finally, in these models, NFCC was unrelated to the willingness to report and
provide a statement. The estimates were approximately the same, however.

Figure 8. Relationship to victim moderated by superiority on report
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Figure 9. Superiority moderated by crime severity on report
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Figure 10. Crime severity moderated by superiority on report
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Figure 11. Inequality moderated by relationship to victim on statement
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Figure 12. Relationship to victim moderated by inequality on statement
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When control variables were added (not shown; available upon request), the estimates
shown in Table 13 did not substantively change. When dimensions of RWA were excluded, the
control variable estimates were largely similar to when dimensions of SDO were excluded, with
two exceptions. First, political conservatism was positively related to the willingness to report (b
= 0.035, SE = 0.009, p < .001) and the willingness to provide a statement (b = 0.022, SE = 0.009,
p = .011). Second, people who identified as Black or African American were more willing to
provide a statement compared to people who identified as White or European American (b =
0.123, SE = 0.060, p = .040).
Legitimacy Models of the Willingness to Cooperate
To answer research questions 3 and 4, I first performed EFAs on the perceived legitimacy
items and the legal socialization items. To evaluate the factor structure of the perceived
legitimacy items, 1-factor through 7-factor models were evaluated. The same estimation
procedure was used as in the previous EFAs. Five respondents did not respond to at least one
item (one participant did not respond to 3 items, which was the maximum). Covariance coverage
values were all at least .999. The 7-factor model had the best fit based on fit indices. However,
the sixth factor had only one “non-trivial” factor loading (i.e., factor loading > .300), and that
item loaded more strongly on a different factor. Similarly, in the 6-factor model, the fourth factor
was composed entirely of trivial factor loadings. In turn, the 5-factor was determined to be the
best fit. See Table 14 for factor loadings, factor correlations, and fit indices of the 5-factor
model. This served as preliminary evidence that there were five dimensions underlying perceived
legitimacy.
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Table 13. MLM results of need for certainty model of the willingness to cooperate,
dimensions of RWA excluded
Parameter (n = 4,305)
Intercept
Residual Variance (within)
Residual Variance (between)

Report

Statement
Estimates
3.769*** (0.047)
3.922*** (0.049)
1.210*** (0.041)
0.914*** (0.033)
0.022 (0.056)
0.146* (0.061)

Contextual Differences
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

-0.009 (0.045)
-0.002 (0.045)
-0.107* (0.044)
-0.069 (0.045)
0.144*** (0.037)

-0.082 (0.047)
0.001 (0.046)
-0.001 (0.047)
0.052 (0.047)
0.040 (0.037)

Individual Differences
Superiority
Inequality
NFCC

0.177*** (0.029)
-0.094a (0.048)
0.081 (0.070)

0.039 (0.030)
-0.107* (0.052)
0.145 (0.079)

Superiority x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

-0.042 (0.030)
-0.093** (0.031)
0.038 (0.030)
0.044 (0.031)
-0.071** (0.026)

-0.020 (0.032)
-0.085** (0.030)
0.029 (0.031)
-0.009 (0.032)
-0.004 (0.025)

Inequality x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

-0.084 (0.052)
-0.072 (0.049)
-0.027 (0.054)
0.001 (0.049)
0.023 (0.044)

-0.101a (0.052)
-0.109* (0.052)
0.045 (0.057)
0.098 (0.058)
-0.021 (0.042)

0.053 (0.076)
0.093 (0.075)
-0.007 (0.076)
-0.068 (0.074)
0.032 (0.062)
.018
-48,670.750
1.272

0.094 (0.081)
0.142 (0.076)
-0.008 (0.082)
-0.063 (0.082)
-0.030 (0.063)
.138
-48,322.114
1.267

NFCC x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm
Residual ICC
-2*LLH0
c
Note. ***p < .01**p < .01, *p < .05. ap = .05
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Table 14. Results of exploratory factor analysis of perceived legitimacy (PL) items, fivefactor model
Item
Factor 1 (λ)
Factor 2 (λ)
Factor 3 (λ)
Factor 4 (λ)
Factor 5 (λ)
h2
PL 1
-.078
.121
.061
.006
.493
.633
PL 2
-.052
-.016
.030
.052
.444
.653
PL 3
-.106
.132
-.012
.024
.314
.454
PL 5
.117
-.139
-.018
-.006
.728
.810
PL 6
.074
-.177
.080
.022
.658
.745
PL 7
.158
.072
-.211
-.016
.363
.495
PL 8
.146
.027
-.085
.267
.413
.415
PL 9
-.042
-.009
.065
.010
.612
.767
PL 10
.210
.005
.016
.065
.335
.401
PL 11
.144
-.039
.051
-.032
.610
.705
PL 12
.157
.028
.000
.117
.468
.515
PL 13
.131
-.013
.036
.155
.520
.528
PL 14
-.078
.215
.251
.021
.508
.629
PL 15
.085
-.030
.064
.015
.498
.630
PL 16
.048
-.071
.118
-.035
.641
.746
PL 17
.058
-.026
-.087
-.015
.435
.645
PL 18
.035
.085
-.048
.030
.516
.705
PL 19
-.027
-.138
.067
.082
.550
.641
PL 20
.008
-.194
.134
.033
.652
.681
PL 21
.001
.045
-.066
-.046
.625
.843
PL 22
.070
.080
-.128
.172
.388
.474
PL 23
.075
.102
.-105
.116
.464
.583
PL 24
-.051
.023
-.059
.034
.561
.766
PL 25
-.007
-.023
-.026
-.038
.601
.802
PL 26
-.011
.007
.007
-.001
.557
.752
PL 27
-.021
-.160
.163
.009
.669
.720
PL 28
.029
.021
.002
.030
.611
.785
PL 29
.083
.079
-.039
.021
.622
.794
PL 30
-.020
.224
.212
-.093
.560
.636
PL 31
-.129
.156
.320
.027
.276
.328
PL 32
.022
.043
.349
-.033
.503
.423
PL 33
-.030
-.062
.182
.018
.499
.589
PL 34
-.038
-.138
.208
.069
.466
.531
PL 35
.126
.040
.002
-.019
.522
.647
PL 36
-.011
-.008
.416
.043
.606
.441
PL 37
-.007
-.037
.007
.172
.491
.573
PL 38
-.104
-.081
-.005
-.287
.289
.365
PL 39
.205
.078
-.031
-.048
.456
.557
PL 40
.019
.040
-.230
.063
.145
.303
Factor
Correlations
Factor 1
1
Factor 2
.004
1
Factor 3
.467***
-.245***
1
Factor 4
-.190***
.129**
.227***
1
Factor 5
.467***
.113
.645***
-.034
1
Fit Indices
χ2(556) =
1,379.854***
RMSEA =
.032
CFI = .971
TLI = .962
SRMR = .018
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01. n = 1,434. The factor loadings bolded reflect each item’s strongest loading. The item, PL 4, is absent because it
was dropped due to an item wording error.
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The first factor was labeled obligation to obey because it was composed entirely of items
used by Tyler (2006) to measure the obligation to obey the law and legal authorities. The second
factor appeared to be legal cynicism on its face. The items with the strongest loadings on the
factor reflected the view that there is little reason to follow the law and that legal sanctions are
arbitrary. I examine the relationship between this factor and a prior measure of legal cynicism in
a subsequent analysis. The third factor was difficult to label, as it largely reflected items
previously used to measure legality, procedural justice, distributive justice, trustworthiness, and
effectiveness. However, the strongest loading items generally reflected trust, procedural fairness,
distributive fairness, and legality.21 This supports the notion that there is some conceptual
overlap among some purported dimensions of perceived legitimacy and runs contrary to the
notion that perceived distributive fairness is unrelated to perceived procedural fairness (cf.
Walker et al., 1979)—at least in terms of people’s general perceptions of law and legal authority
at one point in time. The items with the strongest loadings emphasized the perceptions that legal
authorities are honest, that legal authorities clearly explain their actions and base decisions on
facts, that people receive fair and deserved legal outcomes, and that the courts and police use
rules and procedures that are fair to everyone.
The fourth factor was labeled legal egalitarianism, which was an admittedly imperfect
label. The factor had three items with moderate-to-strong factor loadings. They were “new”
items that reflected the extent to which criminal justice outcomes (arrests, convictions, and
punishment) are seen as equally distributed across groups of people. I included these items as
possible indicators of a distributive fairness dimension of perceived legitimacy, but these results

21

Only two items that conceptually would load onto the effectiveness dimension loaded onto this third factor. One
was an indicator from Tankebe (2013) that I previously noted is arguably a measure of fear of crime, “I feel safe
walking in my neighborhood at night.” It exhibited a trivial loading. The other was a “new” item, “The police do a
good job protecting the community and making people feel safe.” It exhibited a moderate loading.
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suggest they might not be indicators of distributive fairness, or perhaps are indicators of a
specific form of distributive fairness. Based on a Rawlsian framework, inequality in legal
sanctions, generally speaking, would be unfair and unjust (Rawls, 1971). These items seem to
measure perceived (in)equality in legal sanctions. Finally, the fifth factor was labeled
effectiveness because most of the items with the strongest loadings had been previously used by
Tankebe (2013) to measure the effectiveness dimension of perceived legitimacy.
Insofar as factors represent dimensions of the same underlying concept, they should have
generally moderate to strong relationships. The obligation to obey had large, positive correlations
with the third factor (again, mostly trust, fairness, and legality) and with effectiveness, but had a
small-to-medium, negative correlation with legal egalitarianism and no association with legal
cynicism. The third factor had a small-to-medium, positive correlation with legal egalitarianism,
a large, positive correlation with effectiveness, and a small-to-medium, negative correlation with
legal cynicism. Effectiveness was unrelated to legal cynicism and legal egalitarianism. Legal
cynicism and legal egalitarianism had a small, positive correlation. On the whole, these patterns
support the idea that the obligation to obey, the third factor, and effectiveness are tapping into an
underlying concept of perceived legitimacy (cf. Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006). In turn, legal
cynicism and legal egalitarianism are associated with dimensions of perceived legitimacy but are
distinct from them.
Next, I performed an EFA on the legal socialization items and evaluated 1-factor through
7-factor models. In contrast to the previous EFAs, this one was performed using robust weighted
least squares estimation because there were some dichotomous indicators. There was also more
missing data compared to the previous sets of items. Specifically, about 8.5% (n = 122) of
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participants did not respond to at least one item.22 Covariance coverage values were all at least
.990. The robust weighted least squares routine used here generally performs well when there is
not “substantial” missing data (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010a).23 The 7-factor had the best fit
based on fit indices (see Table 12).
The first factor I labeled trust/fairness of parents/guardians. Some of the strongest
loading items were, “My parents/guardians made me feel safe,” “My parents/guardians treated
me with dignity,” and “My parents/guardians wanted what was best for me.” The second factor I
labeled legalityLS. Some of the strongest loading items were, “My experiences taught me there
was no ‘justice’ in the justice system for people like me,” “People around me were often treated
like criminals, just for doing things many young people do,” and “Teachers or administrators at
my school would often talk down to me and make me feel like I was worthless.” The third factor
I labeled trust/fairness of school authorities. Some of the strongest loading items were, “My
teachers treated me with dignity and respect,” “Overall, the teachers and administrators at my
school were honest,” and “I knew my teachers wanted what was best for me.” The fourth factor
was labeled experiences with the justice system because the items with the strongest loadings
reflected personal or vicarious experiences with the justice system (e.g., an ACE items asking,
“Did someone in your family or household ever go to prison or jail?”). The fifth factor I labeled
punishment risk because the two items that loaded most strongly onto it reflected whether the
respondent reported they would be punished by their parents/guardians for breaking laws in

22

Due to the sensitive nature of the legal socialization items, participants were told they could skip any questions
they felt uncomfortable responding too.
23
However, this is primarily when data are MCAR or MAR (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010a). One recommendation
is to use multiple imputation (MI; Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010b; see Rubin, 1987). EFAs cannot be conducted with
MI in Mplus, but exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM) can (see Asparouhov & Muthén, 2009;
Asparouhov et al. 2015; Marsh et al., 2014; Tóth-Király et al., 2017). I used MI to generate 5 datasets (Asparouhov
& Muthén, 2010b) and then conducted an ESEM using the 5 imputed datasets. Results were virtually identical to the
results of the EFA (available upon request), which suggests that estimates were not severely biased by the missing
data.
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childhood and adolescence: “If I hit someone else or got into a fight, my parents/guardians would
punish me,” and “If I used drugs or alcohol, my parents/guardians would punish me.” However,
the factor loadings were weak, and the former item exhibited some cross-loading. The sixth
factor was labeled trust/fairness in justice system authorities. Some of the strongest loading
items were, “I looked up to police officers as role models,” “The police treated young people
with dignity and respect,” and “I knew early on that the police were there to keep everyone safe.”
Finally, the seventh factor was labelled the obligation to obeyLS, with the three items that
emphasized the obligation to obey rules and authorities in the household, school, and justice
system loading most strongly onto it.
Trust/fairness of parents/guardians, trust/fairness of school authorities, trust/fairness of
justice system authorities, and obligation to obeyLS all exhibited medium-to-large correlations
with each other. These correlations offer support for the idea that perceived legitimacy
generalizes across socialization domains or that there is a shared factor across domains
underlying legitimacy. For example, a child who perceives their parents as legitimate might be
predisposed to perceive teachers at school as legitimate, or perhaps some gene-environment
interaction leads children to perceive authorities in general as legitimate. Trust/fairness of
parents/guardians was unrelated to legalityLS and experiences with the justice system, but had a
small, positive relationship with punishment risk. LegalityLS had a medium-to-large correlation
with experiences with the justice system, indicating that people who experience arbitrary and
biased treatment from authorities in childhood and adolescence also tended to report having
personal or vicarious experiences with the justice system in childhood and adolescence.
Interestingly, LegalityLS also had a small-to-medium correlation with trust/fairness of justice
system authorities, but in an unexpected direction. People who experienced arbitrary and biased
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treatment from authorities in childhood and adolescence also tended to report a greater degree of
perceived trustworthiness and fairness of justice system authorities. Finally, punishment risk had
a small, positive relationship with experiences with the justice system and a medium, positive
relationship with obligation to obeyLS.
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Table 15. Results of exploratory analysis of legal socialization items
Item
Factor 1 (λ)
Factor 2 (λ)
Factor 3 (λ)
Factor 4 (λ)
Factor 5 (λ)
Factor 6 (λ)
Factor 7 (λ)
LSH 1
-.005
.079
.017
.035
.041
-.042
.719
LSH 2
-.138
.030
-.036
-.141
.110
.076
.607
LSH 3
-.086
.099
-.060
.010
.086
-.008
.518
LSH 4
.109
.039
-.002
.147
-.005
-.022
.676
LSH 5
.198
-.081
.069
-.002
-.023
.025
.470
LSH 6
.060
.065
-.028
.098
-.003
.110
.614
LSH 7
.375
-.016
-.025
-.117
-.037
-.024
.677
LSH 8
.234
-.052
.162
.025
-.101
.030
.593
LSH 9
.329
-.027
.035
-.257
-.011
.036
.605
LSH 10
-.052
-.235
.042
-.030
.087
-.008
.442
LSH 11
.013
-.010
.004
.058
.007
.029
.738
LSH 12
.155
-.051
-.004
.007
.061
.044
.436
LSH 13
-.044
.033
.014
-.037
.067
.067
.719
LSH 14
.463
-.028
.070
-.041
-.074
-.039
.665
LSS 1
.009
-.039
.044
.062
-.019
.010
.691
LSS 2
.110
.033
.081
.154
-.018
-.010
.513
LSS 3
.056
.018
.015
.007
.012
.014
.649
LSS 4
.013
-.075
-.011
-.055
.090
.084
.538
LSS 5
.007
-.056
-.019
-.010
.125
.006
.636
LSS 6
.028
.019
-.006
.002
.034
.071
.658
LSS 7
.010
.035
-.009
.178
.000
.157
.496
LSS 8
.000
.130
-.051
.061
-.010
-.018
.789
LSS 9
-.002
.321
-.023
-.017
-.044
-.009
.793
LSS 10
.022
.294
-.024
-.177
.102
-.111
.543
LSS 11
-.037
.035
.054
-.013
-.017
-.023
.640
LSS 12
.020
.188
.004
.007
-.070
.040
.760
LSJ 1
.088
.221
-.072
.059
-.027
-.022
.787
LSJ 2
-.021
.000
.075
-.006
.007
.031
.839
LSJ 3
-.007
.205
.004
.032
-.022
.021
.765
LSJ 4
-.015
.115
.111
-.017
.217
-.084
.757
LSJ 5
-.008
-.105
-.054
-.100
.100
.033
.875
LSJ 6
-.009
-.069
.019
-.015
-.181
.001
.780
LSJ 7
-.022
.008
.050
.040
.165
.153
.828
LSJ 8
.034
-.126
.129
.006
-.023
.053
.625
LSJ 9
-.049
.043
.065
-.194
.443
-.106
.524
LSJ 10
.107
-.016
.081
.008
.111
.132
.551
LSJ 11
-.031
-.069
.000
.016
.463
-.010
.824
LSJ 12
.097
-.220
-.044
-.017
-.006
-.010
.683
LSJ 13
.119
.010
.060
-.014
.136
.093
.574
LSJ 14
-.012
-.014
-.015
.041
.299
.094
.830
LSJ 15
.070
.029
-.007
.015
.034
.085
.572
LSJ 16
-.067
-.004
-.004
-.014
.160
.006
.622
Factor
Correlations
Factor 1
1
Factor 2
-.006
1
Factor 3
.576***
-.050
1
Factor 4
.051
.406***
.011
1
Factor 5
.142**
-.032
.203***
-.126**
1
Factor 6
.292***
-.252***
.474***
.010
.094*
1
Factor 7
.405***
-.066*
.419***
-.038
.318***
.319***
1
Fit Indices
χ2(588) =
1,238.258***
RMSEA = .028
CFI = .949
TLI = .925
SRMR = .018
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. n = 1,434. The factor loadings bolded reflect each item’s strongest loading. LSH: Household domain.
LSS: School domain. LSJ: Justice system domain.
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In answering the other research questions associated with the legitimacy model, I
ultimately decided to conduct separate CFAs of the perceived legitimacy and legal socialization
items and then examine separate perceived legitimacy and legal socialization models of the
willingness to cooperate. I arrived at this decision for two reasons. First, after the EFAs, I
proceeded to estimating the re-parameterized CFA of the legitimacy model of the willingness to
cooperate. This model proposed that legal socialization dimensions would relate to perceived
legitimacy dimensions, which in turn would related to the willingness to cooperate. Some of the
model fit indices suggested a good fit (e.g., RMSEA = .044), while others suggested a poor fit
(e.g., CFI = .646). The necessary condition and sufficient condition for this type of “mismatch”
between fit indices were met (Lai & Green, 2016).24 Although this is not necessarily indicative
of misspecification or flawed data (Lai & Green, 2016)—it can be a product of the size of the
covariance matrix (cf. Moshagen, 2012)—it nevertheless could be. There were reasons to suspect
misspecification in the measurement model, particularly the legal socialization dimensions. For
example, the EFA results indicated weak factor loadings and cross-loadings, sometimes in
combination (see Table 15). Second, there were many strong correlations (i.e., r > .800) among
the perceived legitimacy and legal socialization dimensions, a potential collinearity issue.
Namely, the third factor of perceived legitimacy and effectiveness were both strongly and

24

The underlying reasons for discrepancies between fit indices are not yet fully understood, and many of the
proffered reasons (e.g., weak correlations among manifest indicators) are inaccurate (see Lai & Green, 2016, for
review). As a starting point, it is important to consider how these fit indices are calculated and what they aim to
measure. RMSEA and SRMR are “badness-of-fit” measures, whereas CFI and TLI are “goodness-of-fit” measures.
The former essentially quantify the differences between the model implied matrix and the observed matrix (e.g.,
SRMR is the discrepancy between model implied correlations and observed correlations); the latter quantify the
differences between the hypothesized model and a “baseline” (or “null”) model. The baseline model restricts
covariances to zero, and can generally be considered as the model with the worst possible fit assuming there are
covariances among variables (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980). Lai and Green (2016) identified the necessary and
sufficient conditions for disagreement between the RMSEA and CFI. First, they demonstrated a quadratic
relationship between the disagreement between RMSEA and CFI and the hypothesized model fit function. Simply
put, as the value of the hypothesized model fit function increases, disagreement increases to a point, and
subsequently decreases. Second, the identified one necessary condition for disagreement and one sufficient
condition for the disagreement found here (i.e., RMSEA < .05 and CFI < .90); both of these conditions are met here.

92

positively related to trust/fairness of school authorities and trust/fairness of justice system
authorities, the obligation to obey was strongly and positively related to obligation to obeyLS,
and the purported legal cynicism factor had a near perfect correlation with legalityLS.
It is worth briefly focusing on the theoretical significance of some of the correlations
between legal socialization and perceived legitimacy. One assumption of the legitimacy model is
that perceived legitimacy is an outcome of legal socialization (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Tyler &
Trinkner, 2017). The correlations offer support for this assumption. Simply put, people who
reported perceiving rules and authorities in childhood and adolescence as legitimate also reported
perceiving the law and legal authorities in adulthood as a legitimate. Furthermore, other
correlations support the broader view that people’s legal orientation is shaped by experiences and
interactions with authorities in childhood and adolescence (Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; cf. Nagin &
Telep, 2020). People who reported biased and arbitrary treatment from authorities in childhood
and adolescence were dramatically more likely to see the law and norms as unbinding on their
lives and less likely to see legal outcomes like arrests and convictions as equal across groups;
having direct or vicarious experience with justice system authorities was also positively related
to legal cynicism and negatively correlated with legal egalitarianism. The absence of meaningful
correlations was also notable. In essence, the two sets of interrelated variables I just noted were
generally unrelated or weakly related to each other. For example, having direct or vicarious
experience with justice system authorities was weakly (and negatively) related to the obligation
to obey the law and legal authorities and unrelated to the perceived effectiveness of the justice
system. There might be two pathways to two different ends: perceived legitimacy in childhood
and adolescence might explain perceived legitimacy in adulthood, and biased and arbitrary
treatment from authorities and experiences with criminal justice authorities in childhood and
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adolescence explain legal cynicism and “egalitarianism” in adulthood. Of course, the design of
this study inhibits drawing causal inferences, and I will discuss limitations in a later section.
Nonetheless, these correlations offer a preliminary answer to research question 5.
The Perceived Legitimacy Model
The results of the EFA of the perceived legitimacy items showed some weak factor
loadings and cross-loading, and one factor that appeared to be legal cynicism. In moving towards
the reparameterized CFA model, I first dropped items with weak factor loadings (i.e., < .400) and
non-trivial cross-loading (e.g., weak factor loadings on two factors). A total of four items were
dropped (items 31, 36, 38, and 40; see Appendix A). These were all new items, except for one
that Tankebe (2013) used as an indicator of effectiveness that has also been used as an indicator
of fear of crime (e.g., Papp et al., 2019). Next, to examine whether the factor that appeared to
measure legal cynicism was in fact measuring legal cynicism, I examined the correlation
between the factor and a prior measure of legal cynicism (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). There
was a near perfect correlation. Thus, I combined the items with Sampson and Bartusch’s (1998)
scale, specified them to load onto a single factor, and retained the label legal cynicism. Finally, I
decided to specify the third factor—which was primarily a composite of trust, procedural
fairness, distributive fairness, and legality—and the effectiveness factor to load onto a secondorder factor. I label this factor perceived legitimacy because it is similar to Tankebe’s (2013)
measure of perceived legitimacy as a higher order factor.25 The CFA model exhibited a
reasonable/good fit. The missing data patterns were the same as in the EFA.

25

I also examined a CFA model in which the third factor, effectiveness, and obligation to obey were specified to
load onto a higher-order factor and compared it to the 2-dimension perceived legitimacy CFA model. I did this
because obligation to obey was strongly correlated with the third factor and effectiveness, and because the model
approximated Tyler’s (2006) original legitimacy measure. The 3-dimension perceived legitimacy CFA model
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Table 16 and Table 17 shows the results and fit indices of the perceived legitimacy model
of the willingness to cooperate. The model explained over half the variance in the willingness to
cooperate. Perceived legitimacy was the strongest predictor, exhibiting a large positive
relationship with the willingness to cooperate.26 The obligation to obey had a small-to-medium,
positive association with the willingness to cooperate. Notably, the obligation to obey was the
weakest predictor of the willingness to cooperate.27 Legal egalitarianism and legal cynicism
were both negatively correlated with the willingness to cooperate. Adding control variables did
not explain additional variance in the willingness to cooperate, and they were all unrelated or
very weakly related to the willingness to cooperate (see Table 18).

resulted in a significant decrement of fit relative to the 2-dimension model (χ2(2) = 114.574, p < .001). Thus,
obligation to obey is strongly related to (but distinct from) effectiveness, fairness, and trust facets of legitimacy.
26
When obligation to obey was excluded from the model, the standardized coefficient was even larger, β = .799, SE
= .036.
27
However, when perceived legitimacy was excluded from the model, the standardized coefficient was much larger,
β = .647, SE = .033. In addition, legal egalitarianism and legal cynicism were unrelated to the general willingness to
cooperate when perceived legitimacy was excluded. This suggests that they are only related to the willingness to
cooperate when controlling for perceived legitimacy.
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Table 16. Results of perceived legitimacy model of the willingness to cooperate
Predictor (n = 1,434)
Obligation to Obey
Perceived Legitimacy
Legal Egalitarianism
Legal Cynicism
R2
Fit Indices
2
χ (934) = 3,308.571***
c = 1.283
RMSEA = .042
CFI = .912
TLI = .907
SRMR = .067

Cooperation
β (SE)
.239 (.077)**
.600 (.081)***
-.275 (.045)***
-.257 (.041)***
.550***

Note. ***p < .001**p < .01. Coefficients are fully standardized.

Table 17. Factor correlations in perceived legitimacy model of the willingness to cooperate
Factor (n = 1,434)
Obligation to Obey
Legitimacy
Legal Egalitarianism
Legal Cynicism

1
-.657***
-.116**
.055

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. n = 1434.
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2

3

4

-.240***
.296***

--.253***

--

Table 18. Results of perceived legitimacy model of willingness to cooperate with control
variables
Predictor (n = 1,419)
Obligation to Obey
Legitimacy
Legal Egalitarianism
Legal Cynicism
Age
Women
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latin American
Asian American
Native American
Other race/ethnicity
Political Conservatism
Prior Victimization
R2
Fit Indices
χ2(1,330) = 4299.649***
RMSEA = .040
CFI = .899
TLI = .894
SRMR = .071

Cooperation
β (SE)
.229 (.076)**
.608 (.081)***
-.264 (.044)***
-.265 (.037)***
.011 (.026)
.047 (.022)*
.004 (.023)
.059 (.017)*
-.019 (.025)
.005 (.016)
-.005 (.025)
-.021 (.022)
.027 (.024)
.550***

Note. ***p < .001**p < .01. Coefficients are fully standardized.
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Table 19. Perceived legitimacy dimensions regressed on control variables

Predictor
Age
Women
Black/African
American
Hispanic/Latin
American
Asian American
Native American
Other race/ethnicity
Political
Conservatism
Prior Victimization
R2
Fit Indices
2
χ (1,106) =
3536.718***
c = 1.189
RMSEA = .039
CFI = .911
TLI = .904
SRMR = .060

Obligation to
Obey
β (SE)
.162*** (.031)
.077** (.029)

Legitimacy
β (SE)
.151*** (.026)
-.024 (.026)

Legal
Egalitarianism
β (SE)
-.043 (.028)
-.076** (.028)

Legal
Cynicism
β (SE)
-.035 (.029)
-.044 (.027)

.073* (.029)

.030 (.026)

-.088** (.028)

.145*** (.024)

.022 (.036)

.025 (.029)

-.057* (.027)

.082** (.026)

.039 (.029)
-.027 (.030)
.041 (.032)

.007 (.027)
.025 (.020)
-.043 (.029)

-.021 (.028)
-.006 (.027)
-.012 (.040)

-.066* (.026)
.106*** (.021)
-.075*** (.021)

.109** (.031)

.272*** (.024)

.218*** (.027)

.110*** (.027)

.043 (.030)
.056***

.020 (.026)
.106***

-.143*** (.028)
.086***

.215*** (.026)
.119***

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. n = 1,419. Coefficients are fully standardized

The Legal Socialization Model
To a greater degree than the EFA results of the perceived legitimacy items, the results of
the EFA of the legal socialization items showed weak factor loadings and cross-loading (see
Table 15). Moving towards estimating the reparameterized CFA model, I dropped 16 items. This
included the two items that loaded strongest onto the factor I labeled punishment risk, and thus
that factor was dropped. About 6.5% of respondents did not respond to at least one of final items
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included in model. Covariance coverage values were all at least .990.28 In addition, because the
trust/fairness dimensions across the three domains and obligation to obeyLS were all strongly
interrelated, I specified them to load onto a second-order factor I labeled legitimacyLS. Thus, in
contrast to the perceived legitimacy model, legitimacyLS is people’s perceived obligation to obey,
trustworthiness, and fairness of rules and authorities in the household, school, and justice system
prior to adulthood. The CFA model exhibited a good/reasonable fit.29
Table 20 shows the results of the legal socialization model of the willingness to
cooperate. The dimensions of legal socialization explained almost 60% of the variance in the
willingness to cooperate, but only legitimacyLS was related to the willingness to cooperate.
LegitimacyLS exhibited a positive, large association with the willingness to cooperate.
Experiences with the justice system and legalityLS were unrelated to the willingness to cooperate.
It seems possible that experiences with the justice system are indirectly related to the willingness
to cooperate via legal cynicism and/or legal egalitarianism. The lack of a substantive relationship
between legalityLS and the willingness to cooperate is somewhat surprising given that it had a
near perfect correlation with legal cynicism. Adding control variables did not alter any of these
findings and explained less than 1% additional variance in the willingness to cooperate (see
Table 22).

28

I again compared the results to an analysis with MI (available upon request). The results were comparable, with
one difference. The p value corresponding to the coefficient for experiences with the justice system fell below the
traditional threshold of significance when MI was used to address the missing data, p = .049. In terms of substantive
significance, however, the coefficient was very small.
29
Notably, this CFA model is a more parsimonious model and not a statistically significant difference in fit relative
to the CFA model without the second-order factor, and a CFA model with the second order factor composed of only
the trust/fairness dimensions (i.e., obligation to obey excluded).
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Table 20. Results of legal socialization model of willingness to cooperate
Cooperation
β (SE)
.764 (.017)***
-.064 (.033)a
.015 (.028)
.589***

Predictor (n = 1,434)
LegitimacyLS
Experiences with Justice System
LegalityLS
R2
Fit Indices
χ2(395) = 1,351.770***
RMSEA = .041
CFI = .902
TLI = .892
SRMR = .042

Note. ***p < .001. ap = .054 without multiple imputation, p = .049 with multiple imputation. Coefficients are fully
standardized.

Table 21. Factor correlations in legal socialization model of willingness to cooperate
Factor (n = 1,434)
LegitimacyLS
Experiences with Justice System
Legality

1
--.016
.106**

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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2

3

--.499***

--

Table 22. Results of legal socialization model of the willingness to cooperate with control
variables
Cooperation
β (SE)
.743 (.017)***
.026 (.034)
.002 (.026)
.147 (.029)***
.075 (.029)*
.015 (.028)
.068 (.029)*
.011 (.032)
-.010 (.028)
-.033 (.031)
.083 (.028)**
.028 (.029)
.596***

Predictor (n = 1,434)
LegitimacyLS
Experiences with Justice System
LegalityLS
Age
Women
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latin American
Asian American
Native American
Other race/ethnicity
Political Conservatism
Prior Victimization
R2
Fit Indices
2
χ (656) = 2,328.634***
RMSEA = .042
CFI = .858
TLI = .848
SRMR = .096

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Coefficients are fully standardized

Table 23. Correlations between perceived legitimacy and legal socialization models
Perceived
Legitimacy Model
Perceived Legitimacy
Obligation to Obey
Legal Cynicism
Legal Egalitarianism

LegitimacyLS
.826***
.717***
.056*
-.008

Legal Socialization Model
Experiences with
Justice System
.072*
.097**
.449***
-.314***

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. n = 1,434
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LegalityLS
-.114***
-.039
-.930***
.346***

Table 24. Legal socialization dimensions regressed on control variables

Predictor (n = 1,419)
Age
Women
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latin American
Asian American
Native American
Other race/ethnicity
Political Conservatism
Prior Victimization
R2
Fit Indices
χ2(499) = 1,402.718***
RMSEA = .036
CFI = .909
TLI = .899
SRMR = .051

LegitimacyLS
β (SE)
.133*** (.030)
.012 (.029)
.086** (.030)
.047 (.028)
.017 (.029)
.009 (.031)
-.053 (.028)
.120*** (.029)
-.062* (.029)
.044***

Experiences with
Justice System
β (SE)
.126*** (.029)
-.058* (.029)
.109*** (.028)
.041 (.029)
-.012 (.028)
.019 (.030)
-.024 (.037)
-.056* (.028)
.465*** (.025)
.272***

LegalityLS
β (SE)
.090** (.028)
.027 (.027)
-.113*** (.027)
-.071** (.026)
.059* (.026)
-.130*** (.031)
.043 (.029)
-.075** (.028)
-.256*** (.026)
.123***

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Coefficients are fully standardized

Correlations between Legal Socialization and Legitimacy
Due to revising the measurement structure, I re-examined correlations between factors in
the legal socialization model and factors in the perceived legitimacy model (see Table 23).
LegitimacyLS exhibited strong, positive correlations with perceived legitimacy and obligation to
obey. This supports the notion that the perceived legitimacy of the law and legal authorities in
adulthood is strongly linked to the perceived legitimacy of the rules and authorities in childhood
and adolescence. People who saw rules and authorities in the household, school, and justice
system during childhood and adolescence as fair, felt they should be obeyed, and who saw
authorities as trustworthy, also tended to see the law and legal authorities as fair and effective,
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felt they should be obeyed, and see legal authorities as trustworthy. LegitimacyLS also had a
negligible-to-small, positive correlation with legal cynicism; it was unrelated to legal
egalitarianism. Experiences with justice system had a medium, negative correlation with legal
egalitarianism and a medium-to-large, positive correlation with legal cynicism. These
correlations would be expected if being personally or vicariously subjected to legal authority
(e.g., an arrest) in childhood and adolescence leads to a generally negative orientation towards
law and legal authority in adulthood. However, experiences with justice system was also
positively correlated, albeit to small degrees, with perceived legitimacy and obligation to obey.
In light of the previous regression models, experiences with justice system might have entirely
indirect relationships with the willingness to cooperate through legal egalitarianism, legal
cynicism, and dimensions of perceived legitimacy. LegalityLS again exhibited a near perfect
correlation with legal cynicism. People who experience biased and arbitrary treatment from
authorities in childhood and adolescence might expect the same of legal authorities in adulthood
and feel the law is less “binding” on their lives (cf. Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; McLean & Wolfe,
2016). LegalityLS had a medium, positive relationship with legal egalitarianism and a small,
negative correlation with perceived legitimacy; it was unrelated to obligation to obey.
MLMs of the Perceived Legitimacy Model of the Willingness to Cooperate
To answer research questions 6, I estimated MLMs with random intercepts and slopes. In
contrast to the previous models in which I modeled the obligation to obey and perceived
legitimacy separately, in the MLMs I specified the obligation to obey factor to load onto the
higher order perceived legitimacy factor. In the former, the strong relationship between
obligation to obey and perceived legitimacy seemed to suppress their coefficient estimates but
did not dramatically affect conclusions, but in the MLMs it was problematic.
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Equation 6. Between-level intercept equation in perceived legitimacy MLMs
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾03 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇0𝑗

𝛾00 = Intercept for report or statement.
𝜇0𝑗 = Random deviation of intercept for respondent j.

Equation 7. Between-level slope equations in perceived legitimacy MLMs
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾12 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾13 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇1𝑗
𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾22 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾23 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇2𝑗
𝛽3𝑗 = 𝛾30 + 𝛾31 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾32 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾33 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇3𝑗
𝛽4𝑗 = 𝛾40 + 𝛾41 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾42 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾43 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇4𝑗
𝛽5𝑗 = 𝛾50 + 𝛾51 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾52 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾53 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝜇5𝑗

𝛾10 = Effect of friend v. stranger victim.
𝜇1𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾20 = Effect of family member v. stranger victim.
𝜇2𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾30 = Effect of friend v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇3𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾40 = Effect of family member v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇4𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾50 = Effect of crime severity.
𝜇5𝑗 = Random deviation of crime severity effect for respondent j.
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Equations 6 and 7 display the between-level equations, and Table 25 shows the results of
the MLMs of the willingness to report and the willingness to provide a statement. Similar to the
need for certainty MLMs, the willingness to report was lower in scenarios in which the friend
was a perpetrator compared to a stranger, and higher when the scenario involved major harm
compared to minor harm. In contrast to those models, the willingness to report was lower in
scenarios in which the family member was a perpetrator compared to a stranger. There were no
other direct effects of the experimental manipulations on report, and no direct effects of the
experimental manipulations on statement.
Perceived legitimacy was positively related to the willingness to report and the
willingness to provide a statement. There were no cross-level interactions between perceived
legitimacy and the experimental manipulations. On the whole, the prior regression models and
these MLMs indicate perceived legitimacy is a robust predictor of the willingness to cooperate.
Legal cynicism interacted with the family member v. stranger victim variable on both report and
statement. It was only related to the willingness to report when the victim was a stranger, b =
0.196, 95% CI (0.100, 0.291), and the relationship was positive (see Figure 13). When legal
cynicism was one SD above the mean, the family member v. stranger victim effect was negative,
b = -0.169, 95% CI (-0.276, -0.063), but when legal cynicism was one SD below the mean, the
family member v. stranger victim effect was positive, b = 0.171, 95% CI (0.023, 0.320). See
Figure 14. Legal cynicism was negatively related to the willingness to provide a statement when
the victim was family member, b = -0.188, 95% CI (-0.288, -0.088), or a stranger, b = -0.089,
95% CI (-0.176, -0.002), but the relationship was stronger in the former (see Figure 15). When
legal cynicism was one SD above the mean, the family member v. stranger victim effect was
negative, b = -0.104, 95% CI (-0.219, 0.011) but when legal cynicism was one SD below the
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mean, the family member v. stranger victim effect was positive, b = 0.094, 95% CI (-0.039,
0.226); neither conditional effect was statistically significant, however.

Figure 13. Legal cynicism moderated by relationship to victim on report
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Figure 14. Relationship to victim moderated by legal cynicism on report
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Figure 15. Legal cynicism moderated by relationship to victim on statement
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Legal cynicism also interacted with crime severity on report, and with the friend v.
stranger perpetrator variable on statement. Legal cynicism was only related to the willingness to
report when there was minor harm, b = 0.196, 95% CI (0.100, 0.291), and crime severity only
had an effect when legal cynicism was one SD below the mean, b = 0.278, 95% CI (0.156,
0.397), or at its mean value, b = 0.136, 95% CI (0.066, 0.205). See Figure 16 and Figure 17.
Legal cynicism was negatively related to the willingness to provide a statement when the
suspected perpetrator was a stranger, b = -0.089, 95% CI (-0.176, -0.002), but was unrelated to
statement when the suspected perpetrator was a friend. The negative, friend v. stranger
perpetrator effect was exhibited only when legal cynicism was at one SD below the mean, b = 0.141, 95% CI (-0.281, -0.001). See Figure 18 and Figure 19. Overall, although people higher in
legal cynicism appear generally less willing to cooperate, and especially so when they know the
victim or perpetrator, it seems they are more willing to report crimes in some limited
circumstances. The pattern of findings was quite similar to the pattern of findings for the
superiority dimension of SDO.
Finally, legal egalitarianism was negatively related to the willingness to provide a
statement in the reference conditions, but it also interacted with the friend v. stranger victim
variable. It had a negative relationship with the willingness to provide a statement when the
victim was a stranger, b = -0.287, 95% CI (-0.418, -0.156), which was augmented when the
victim was a friend, b = -0.436, 95% CI (-0.598, -0.273). The effect of friend v. stranger victim
was negative, and only when legal egalitarianism was one SD above the mean, b = -0.211, 95%
CI (-0.372, -0.049). See Figure 20 and 21. People who generally reject the idea that there is
group inequality in legal sanctions are generally less willing to cooperate, and are specifically
less willing to provide a statement when they are bystander to a crime.
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Figure 16. Legal cynicism moderated by crime severity on report
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Figure 17. Crime severity moderated by legal cynicism on report
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Figure 18. Legal cynicism moderated by relationship to suspected perpetrator on statement
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Figure 19. Relationship to perpetrator moderated by legal cynicism on statement
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As with the need for certainty MLMs, when control variables were added there were no
substantive changes to the estimates without the control variables included (available upon
request). Furthermore, the estimates for the control variables were mostly similar to the estimates
in the need for certainty MLMs. Women were more willing to report and provide a statement
compared to men; people who identified as “other” were more willing to report compared to
people who identified as White/European American; and people who identified as Black/African
American were more willing to provide a statement compared to people who identified as
White/European American. There were some differences, though. People who more strongly
identified as politically conservative were slightly less willing to report (b = -0.018, SE = 0.009,
p = .043), but political orientation was unrelated to statement. Age was unrelated to report or
statement.

Figure 20. Legal egalitarianism moderated by relationship to victim on statement
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Figure 21. Relationship to victim moderated by legal egalitarianism on statement
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Table 25. MLM results of perceived legitimacy model of the willingness to cooperate
Report

Statement

Parameter (n = 4,305)
Intercept
Residual Variance (within)
Residual Variance (between)

Estimates
3.777*** (0.045)
3.941*** (0.046)
1.203*** (0.040)
0.914*** (0.033)
0.006 (0.058)
0.104 (0.058)

Contextual Differences
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

0.012 (0.043)
0.001 (0.044)
-0.122** (0.043)
-0.096* (0.044)
0.136*** (0.035)

-0.062 (0.045)
-0.005 (0.044)
-0.024 (0.044)
0.013 (0.044)
0.033 (0.036)

Individual Differences
Perceived Legitimacy
Legal Cynicism
Legal Egalitarianism

0.372** (0.109)
0.196*** (0.049)
-0.104 (0.070)

0.584*** (0.117)
-0.089* (0.044)
-0.287*** (0.067)

Perceived Legitimacy x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

0.086 (0.105)
0.137 (0.102)
0.099 (0.105)
0.036 (0.112)
0.153 (0.085)

0.085 (0.110)
0.044 (0.105)
-0.091 (0.109)
-0.048 (0.113)
0.097 (0.025)

-0.070 (0.050)
-0.170** (0.049)
0.061 (0.050)
0.076 (0.051)
-0.141** (0.041)

-0.023 (0.048)
-0.099* (0.045)
0.117* (0.049)
0.026 (0.049)
-0.058 (0.042)

-0.063 (0.072)
-0.126 (0.074)
-0.047 (0.076)
0.058 (0.075)
0.022 (0.060)
.005
-80,887.062
1.213

-0.148* (0.073)
-0.115 (0.068)
0.107 (0.075)
0.125 (0.074)
0.067 (0.058)
.102
-80,539.609
1.210

Legal Cynicism x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm
Legal Egalitarianism x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm
Residual ICC
-2*LLH0
c

Note. ***p < .01**p < .01, *p < .05. Estimates are unstandardized.
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MLMs of the Legal Socialization Model of the Willingness to Cooperate
To answer research questions 6, 7, and 9, I estimated MLMs with random intercepts and
slopes. Equations 8 and 9 display the between-level questions, and Table 26 shows the estimates,
which generally paralleled the perceived legitimacy estimates. The effects of the experimental
manipulations, or lack thereof, were the same. LegitimacyLS was positively related to the
willingness to report and provide a statement. LegalityLS exhibited a reverse pattern of findings
as legal cynicism, which makes sense given their near perfect, negative correlation. When the
victim was a stranger, legalityLS had a negative relationship with the willingness to report, b = 0.259, 95% CI (-0.368, -0.150), and that negative relationship was attenuated when the victim
was a family member, b = -0.150, 95% CI (-0.266, -0.035). See Figure 22. The family member v.
stranger victim effect was positive at one SD above the mean, and negative at one SD below the
mean, but neither conditional effect was statistically significant. Crime severity also attenuated
the negative relationship between legalityLS and the willingness to report. When there was major
harm, the relationship was smaller, b = -0.150, 95% CI (-0.244, -0.055), compared to when there
was minor harm, b = -0.259, 95% CI (-0.368, -0.150). See Figure 23. Furthermore, crime severity
only had an effect when legalityLS was one SD above the mean, b = 0.229, 95% CI (0.099,
0.359), or at its mean value, b = 0.120, 95% CI (0.050, 0.189). See Figure 24. People who were
more likely to report experiencing biased and arbitrary treatment prior to adulthood were actually
more likely to report the crimes they witnessed compared to people who were less likely to
report those experiences, similar to how people who felt the law and norms were less binding on
their lives were more likely to report in some instances. However, legalityLS was unrelated to the
willingness to provide a statement. Experiences with justice system was unrelated to report and
statement.
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As in the previous models, adding control variables did not substantively change the
estimates. The relationships between the control variables and report and statement were the
same as in the perceived legitimacy model, with two exceptions. People who had previously
been a victim of a crime were more willing to provide a statement compared to people who had
not (b = 0.098, SE = 0.040, p = .015), and there were no racial/ethnic differences in the
willingness to provide a statement.

Equation 8. Between-level intercept equation in legal socialization MLMs
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾02 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾03 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇0𝑗

𝛾00 = Intercept for report or statement.
𝜇0𝑗 = Random deviation of intercept for respondent j.

115

Equation 9. Between-level slope equations in legal socialization MLMs
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾12 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾13 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇1𝑗
𝛽2𝑗 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾22 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾23 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇2𝑗
𝛽3𝑗 = 𝛾30 + 𝛾31 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾32 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾33 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇3𝑗
𝛽4𝑗 = 𝛾40 + 𝛾41 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾42 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾43 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇4𝑗
𝛽5𝑗 = 𝛾50 + 𝛾51 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾52 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗 + 𝛾53 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝜇5𝑗

𝛾10 = Effect of friend v. stranger victim.
𝜇1𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾20 = Effect of family member v. stranger victim.
𝜇2𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger victim effect for respondent j.
𝛾30 = Effect of friend v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇3𝑗 = Random deviation of friend v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾40 = Effect of family member v. stranger perpetrator.
𝜇4𝑗 = Random deviation of family member v. stranger perpetrator effect for respondent j.
𝛾50 = Effect of crime severity.
𝜇5𝑗 = Random deviation of crime severity effect for respondent j.
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Figure 22. LegalityLS moderated by relationship to victim on report
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Figure 23. LegalityLS moderated by crime severity on report
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Figure 24. Crime severity moderated by legalityLS on report
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Table 26. MLM results of legal socialization model of the willingness to cooperate
Report

Statement

Parameter (n = 4,305)
Intercept
Residual Variance (within)
Residual Variance (between)

Estimates
3.795*** (0.045)
3.964*** (0.044)
1.192*** (0.040)
0.917*** (0.033)
0.017 (0.044)
0.108** (0.040)

Contextual Differences
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

-0.009 (0.043)
0.005 (0.043)
-0.135** (0.043)
-0.098* (0.044)
0.120** (0.035)

-0.017 (0.044)
0.023 (0.043)
-0.075 (0.044)
-0.064 (0.043)
0.019 (0.035)

Individual Differences
LegitimacyLS
Experiences with Justice System
LegalityLS

0.515*** (0.109)
0.030 (0.059)
-0.259*** (0.056)

0.588*** (0.103)
0.078 (0.061)
-0.035 (0.056)

LegitimacyLS x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

0.014 (0.095)
-0.021 (0.092)
0.064 (0.093)
0.102 (0.098)
0.100 (0.080)

0.033 (0.097)
-0.015 (0.095)
-0.027 (0.091)
0.069 (0.098)
0.140 (0.079)

Experiences with Justice System x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm

-0.041 (0.060)
-0.039 (0.062)
0.008 (0.062)
0.018 (0.057)
0.018 (0.049)

-0.039 (0.063)
-0.035 (0.062)
0.059 (0.066)
0.017 (0.065)
-0.095 (0.050)

LegalityLS x
Friend Victim
Family Member Victim
Friend Perpetrator
Family Member Perpetrator
Major Harm
Residual ICC
-2*LLH0
c

0.025 (0.054)
0.109* (0.055)
-0.094 (0.054)
-0.083 (0.057)
0.110* (0.047)
.014
-49,185.996
1.261

0.008 (0.057)
0.078 (0.054)
-0.053 (0.056)
-0.042 (0.058)
0.013 (0.045)
.105
-48,809.200
1.265

Note. ***p < .01**p < .01, *p < .05. Estimates are unstandardized.
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Need for Certainty, Legitimacy, and Legal Socialization
Finally, to answer research question 10, I examined correlations between variables in the
need for certainty model, legitimacy model, and legal socialization model. Table 27 and Table 28
display the correlations. One possibility is that people are motivated to see the law and legal
authorities in certain ways to manage the need for certainty. Indeed, NFCC exhibited medium-tolarge correlations with all of the variables in the perceived legitimacy model. Specifically, it was
positively related to the obligation to obey, perceived legitimacy, and legal cynicism, and
negatively related to legal egalitarianism.
The facets of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were also
related to many of the variables in the perceived legitimacy model. Submission/aggression was
related to each of the variables, except for legal egalitarianism. It was positively related to the
obligation to obey, perceived legitimacy, and legal cynicism. Somewhat similarly,
conventionalism was related to each of the perceived legitimacy model variables, except for
perceived legitimacy. It was negatively related to the obligation to obey and legal cynicism, and
positively related to legal egalitarianism. Turning to the SDO dimensions, superiority had an
extremely strong relationship with legal cynicism and a strong relationship with perceived
legitimacy. It also had a small, positive correlation with the obligation to obey and a small,
negative relationship with legal egalitarianism. Inequality had a strong, positive relationship
with legal egalitarianism, and negative relationships with obligation to obey and legal cynicism.
It was unrelated to perceived legitimacy.
The need for cognitive closure, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance
orientation were related to all of the dimensions of legal socialization. NFCC was negatively
related to legalityLS, and positively related to legitimacyLS, and experiences with the justice
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system. Submission/aggression exhibited a similar pattern of correlations. It was negatively
related to legalityLS, and positively related to legitimacyLS and experiences with the justice
system. Conventionalism exhibited the opposite patterns of correlations. It was positively related
to legalityLS, and negatively related to legitimacyLS and experiences with the justice system.
Superiority had a strong, negative correlation with legalityLS, and was positively correlated with
legitimacyLS and experiences with the justice system. Finally, inequality had small, positive
correlations with legalityLS and experiences with the justice system, and a medium, negative
relationship with legitimacyLS.

Table 27. Correlations between perceived legitimacy and need for certainty models
Need for
Certainty Model
NFCC
Submission/Aggression
Conventionalism
Superiority
Inequality

Perceived
Legitimacy
.386***
.675***
-.039
.453***
-.063

Perceived Legitimacy Model
Obligation
Legal
Legal
to Obey
Cynicism
Egalitarianism
.547***
.401***
-.292***
.354***
.719***
.067
-.236***
-.357***
.560***
.150***
.904***
-.102**
-.269***
-.072*
.438***

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. n = 1,434

Table 28. Correlations between legal socialization and need for certainty models
Need for
Certainty Model
NFCC
Submission/Aggression
Conventionalism
Superiority
Inequality

LegitimacyLS
.420***
.370***
-.211***
.130***
-.357***

Legal Socialization Model
Experiences with
Justice System
.328***
.285***
-.290***
.359***
.085*

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. n = 1,434
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LegalityLS
-.400***
-.583***
.366***
-.830***
.094***

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion
The primary purpose of this research project was to examine the role of individual and
situational differences in people’s willingness to cooperate with legal authorities. There is a
plethora of prior research on people’s willingness to cooperate with legal authorities, but this
study was unique for a variety of reasons. First, I operationalized the willingness to cooperate in
multiple ways. I used a prior measure of people’s willingness to cooperate (Sunshine & Tyler,
2003; Tankebe, 2013; cf. Lee & Cho, 2020; Papp et al., 2019; Sargeant & Kochel, 2018), which
included items like the willingness to testify at a trial, report suspicious activity, and provide
information to help apprehend a suspect. I also examined people’s willingness to report potential
crimes and provide a statement to police across hypothetical scenarios in which the people were
bystanders. Operationalizing the willingness to cooperate in these ways afforded meaningful
comparisons between people’s general behavioral intentions and people’s behavioral intentions
across specific situations, including their individual and situational antecedents. Second,
although there has been much scholarship on the willingness to cooperate drawing on theoretical
perspectives associated with legitimacy, this study contributed to that literature in some
important ways. Specifically, I drew on other theory and examined how individual differences
outside of those associated with legitimacy scholarship related to the willingness to cooperate, as
well as how those individual differences related to legal socialization and perceived legitimacy.
Third, this study used an experimental design to examine how certain situational factors affect
the willingness to cooperate, and by using multilevel modeling was able to examine how both
individual and situational differences related to the willingness to cooperate while accounting for
clustering. On the whole, the results of this study have many theoretical and practical
implications and offer directions for future research.
122

Theoretical Implications
Legitimacy and Legal Socialization
Broadly speaking, the current study was one of many demonstrating a positive
relationship between perceived legitimacy and the willingness to cooperate (e.g., Jackson et al.,
2012; Kearns, 2016; Larson, 2015; Lee & Cho, 2020; Papp et al., 2019; Sergeant & Kochel,
2018; Slocum & Wiley, 2018; Tankebe, 2009, 2013; Tankebe et al., 2016; Tyler & Fagan, 2008;
Tyler & Huo, 2002). Perceived legitimacy was strongly and positively related to the general
willingness to cooperate, the specific willingness to report crime, and the specific willingness to
provide a statement to police. The latter relationships also appeared invariant across situational
differences. Given the heterogeneity in the measurement of perceived legitimacy across studies,
it is notable how robust its relationship with the willingness to cooperate is across studies.
Although this study does not provide a clear-cut answer to the question of how legitimacy
should be conceptualized—an ongoing debate (e.g., see Trinkner, 2019)—it does lend support to
modeling perceived legitimacy as a multi-dimensional, higher-order construct (cf. Lee & Cho,
2020). Furthermore, though some argue the obligation to obey should not be included as a
measure of legitimacy (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013), a practical reason for
including it as a dimension of perceived legitimacy in models of the willingness to cooperate is
to address collinearity. That collinearity is itself meaningful, though. Tankebe (2013) suggested
that, because the obligation to obey and a multi-dimensional, higher-order legitimacy factor are
both related to the willingness to cooperate controlling for each other, they are “different issues”.
However, the obligation to obey has been conceptualized and measured as a part of legitimacy
(e.g., Gau, 2011; Reisig & Loyd, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo,
2002), it was strongly related to an alternative measure of legitimacy in this study, and it (as well
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as the alternative measure) exhibited virtually identical bivariate correlations with the general
willingness to cooperate in this study (cf. Tankebe, 2013). In developing a new measure,
researchers consider the content and structure of the measure, and typically examine how the
measure relates to alternative measures and predicts outcomes as theoretically expected (e.g., see
Reynolds et al., 2018). From that perspective, a multidimensional, higher-order model of
legitimacy with the obligation to obey as one dimension appears to have measurement validity.
One reason the EFA of the entire set of possible perceived legitimacy items was
important was because, to my knowledge, very few studies have adopted this approach (cf.
Reynolds et al., 2018). Prior work has proposed upwards of six distinct dimensions—legality,
procedural fairness, distributive fairness, effectiveness, obligation to obey, and trust. Conducting
an EFA on these items was valuable because in EFAs, indicators are free to covary. In CFAs,
indicator covariances are traditionally fixed to zero (achieving approximate “simple structure”;
see Tarka, 2018, for review), as they have been in prior measurement models of perceived
legitimacy (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020; Tankebe, 2013). Based on theory, those studies assumed a
priori that there were multiple, specific and distinct dimensions of perceived legitimacy. If there
are substantive correlations among indicators of different latent factors, one result is inflated
factor correlations (Asparouhov et al. 2015; Marsh et al., 2014). A four-dimensional, higher
order CFA model of legitimacy might exhibit a good fit (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020; Tankebe, 2013),
for instance, even if two or more of those dimensions actually tap into the same dimension.
Starting with the EFA ultimately led me to find support for a two- or three-dimensional model of
perceived legitimacy, composed of effectiveness, a “composite” dimension of the legality,
procedural fairness, distributive fairness, and trust dimensions, and/or the obligation to obey (cf.
Jackson et al., 2012; Reynolds et al., 2018; Spencer & Kochel, 2018; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003;
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Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe et al., 2016; Trinkner et al., 2018). Some longitudinal or experimental
studies might have good reasons to break the composite dimension into its constituents (e.g., to
examine how the perceived procedural fairness of a recent interaction with a legal authority
relates to the perceived trustworthiness to obey legal authorities; see Kaiser & Reisig, 2019;
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006), but this is probably unnecessary for most cross-sectional
studies. In the quest to find the “right” measure of perceived legitimacy, measuring legitimacy
has perhaps become unnecessarily complicated. The parsimonious explanation is that legality,
procedural fairness, distributive fairness, effectiveness, obligation to obey, trust and other
dimensions that conceptually overlap with these dimensions (e.g., “boundary concerns”;
Trinkner et al., 2018) all tap into one underlying construct (cf. Reynolds et al., 2018).
Turning to legal socialization, the findings of this study support the notion that people’s
perceptions of, and experiences and interactions with, authorities in childhood and adolescence
are strongly related to their perceptions of law and legal authority as adults (Kaiser & Reisig,
2019; Tyler & Trinkner, 2017; cf. Nagin & Telep, 2020). In some instances, people’s
recollections of their perceptions and experiences with authorities in childhood and adolescence
were strongly or nearly perfectly correlated with legal perceptions. Like the perceived legitimacy
of the law and legal authorities, there was support for a multidimensional, higher-order
legitimacy factor. People who perceived authorities and rules in childhood and adolescence as
legitimate also tended to perceive the law and legal authorities as legitimate. Reporting biased
and arbitrary treatment from authorities was nearly perfectly correlated with legal cynicism, was
moderately related to the perception of legal outcomes as unequal, and was negatively related to
perceived legitimacy (when obligation to obey was modeled separately). The other notable
correlations were with experiences with the justice system. Experiences with the justice system
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in childhood and adolescence was associated with both “positive” (e.g., perceived legitimacy)
and “negative” legal orientations (e.g., legal cynicism), but more of the associations were
stronger for the latter.
Some have suggested that legal cynicism may not “fit” within a legal socialization
framework or be tied to experiences with authorities (Nivette et al., 2020; Trinkner et al., 2020).
The strong relationships between experiencing arbitrary and biased treatment from authorities,
personal and vicarious experiences with the criminal justice system, and legal cynicism found in
this study are at odds with that proposition (prior victimization was also related to legal
cynicism). One possibility for the discrepancy between the findings of this study and those prior
studies is operationalization. I started with around 40 potential indicators, whereas some prior
studies use a single indicator, such as recent police contact due to individual wrongdoing
(Nivette et al., 2020; see also Trinkner et al., 2018). Legal socialization is conceptualized as
experiences and interactions with authorities, especially prior to adulthood (Fagan & Tyler,
2005; Trinkner & Tyler, 2017); thus, operationalizing legal socialization as one specific type of
recent experience with a specific legal authority might not be suitable for a robust test of the
theoretical proposition that legal socialization relates to legal cynicism. This study has its own
limitations, but its results suggest that there are multiple dimensions of legal socialization, that
these dimensions strongly relate to people’s orientations towards the law and legal authorities
(cf. Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; Nivette et al., 2019; Nivette et al., 2020), and that dimensions of legal
socialization have direct (and likely indirect) relationships with the willingness to cooperate.
Need for Certainty
The results of this study suggest that the dispositional need for certainty is related to
people’s beliefs about society and has a total, positive relationship with the willingness to
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cooperate with legal authorities. Aligning somewhat with hypotheses, the need for cognitive
closure was positively related to the submission/aggression facet of right-wing authoritarianism
and the superiority facet of social dominance orientation, which themselves were strongly and
positively correlated. However, it was negatively related to the conventionalism dimension of
right-wing authoritarianism and the inequality dimension of social dominance orientation (also
interrelated). A number of prior studies have found that the need for cognitive closure is
positively related to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (e.g., Dhont et
al., 2013; Kemmelmeier, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a; Van Hiel et al., 2004), but the results
of this study support two-factor models of right-wing authoritarianism (cf. Funke, 2005; Duckitt
et al., 2010) and social dominance orientation (see Jost & Thompson, 2000; Kugler et al., 2010;
Ho et al., 2012, 2015). This study also suggests that the need for cognitive closure is negatively
related to some facets of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (see
Kugler et al., 2010). In theory, people with a greater dispositional need for certainty are
motivated to think about the social world in ways to manage that need (Jost et al., 2003; Roets et
al., 2015). According to system justification theory, one reason people can be motivated to
justify the status quo is to manage the need for certainty (Jost & van derr Toorn, 2012). Through
this lens, some of the seemingly contradictory relationships might make sense in that the beliefs
of people higher in the need for cognitive closure might justify prevailing social, economic, and
political conditions in the U.S. They tend to think that people should obey established authorities
and norms, but they are not religious fundamentalists; they tend to support group-based
dominance in society, but they are not anti-egalitarian (see Kugler et al., 2010). As a whole, the
ideology is similar to what Worthen (2015) called “secular libertarianism”, a uniquely American
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ideology “that has opened the way for marriage equality, but privileges economic growth for the
few over socio-economic equity for the many” (para 2).30
The submission/aggression dimension of right-wing authoritarianism was a robust
predictor of the willingness to cooperate. The relationships were generally medium and positive,
but attenuated in scenarios where the victim was a family member. People who more strongly
hold the view that traditional authorities and norms should be obeyed and support aggression
towards those that challenge them are generally willing to cooperate with legal authorities, but
are less willing to cooperate when someone in their family (compared to a stranger) is
victimized. A possible explanation is that they when their family members are harmed, they
prefer to handle the matter informally, at least initially (cf. Black, 2010; Truman & Morgan,
2020). For example, right-wing authoritarianism is positively related to holding a “culture of
honor” attitude (Canto et al., 2014), a part of which emphasizes that violence in response to
offenses to one’s honor is justified. Thus, perhaps people higher in the submission/aggression
facet of right-wing authoritarianism would be more likely to “punish” the perpetrator via their
own actions when a family member is victimized—invoking legal authority might be
“dishonorable” in such instances. The other facet of right-wing authoritarianism,
conventionalism, was only related to the general willingness to cooperate, and the relationship
was negative. One possibility might be that people higher in conventionalism are oriented toward
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People who more strongly identified as politically conservative were more likely to endorse each dimension of
RWA and SDO compared to people who more strongly identified as political liberal. Ironically, although
conservative political rhetoric often emphasizes “law and order”, the relationships imply that political
conservativism has some negative indirect relationships with the willingness to cooperate with legal authority via
conventionalism and inequality in addition to positive indirect relationships via submission/aggression (and possibly
superiority). Of course, the relationships also imply that a political liberal identity has some positive indirect
relationships with the willingness to cooperate via conventionalism and inequality in addition to a negative indirect
relationship via submission/aggression (and possibly superiority). Thus, the relationship between political
orientation and willing cooperation with legal authority is not quite clear-cut, but appears to be explained by specific
social beliefs. Notably, political orientation was unrelated to NFCC.
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religious rules and authority—Weber’s (1925/1978) traditional authority, which rests “on an
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising
authority under them” (p. 215)—and would be more inclined to cooperate with religious
authorities over legal authority. Overall, the dimensions were distinct not only in measurement,
but also in their relationships.
Social dominance orientation has been called the “other” authoritarianism (Altemeyer,
1998), and the strong sets of correlations among the dimensions of right-wing authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation supports that label. The two dimensions of right-wing
authoritarianism were more strongly related to the two dimensions of social dominance
orientation than they were to each other (and vice versa). It appears as if there are two “classes”
of authoritarianism, one emphasizing obedience to traditional authorities and norms as well as
group-based dominance, and one emphasizing religious fundamentalism and anti-egalitarianism
(cf. Jost & Thompson, 2000; Kugler et al., 2010). Thus, right-wing authoritarianism and social
dominance might be more interrelated than previously thought, which is one notable implication
of this study.
Of the dimensions of social dominance orientation, the inequality dimension was perhaps
the most robust predictor of the willingness to cooperate. It was negatively associated with the
general willingness to cooperate, the willingness to report, and the willingness to provide a
statement (especially when they knew the victim). People who approve of inequality, “antiegalitarians”, are thus less willing to cooperate with legal authority in general and in situations
where they are a bystander. To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine and report such
findings, but the findings might coalesce with prior work indicating that opposition to equality is
related to attitudes emphasizing, for instance, individualism and the “natural” or “essential”
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order, structure, and law of society (Jost & Thompson, 2000). If anti-egalitarians think that crime
is a part of the natural order or attribute crime to people’s essential nature, that might be a reason
why they are less willing to cooperate with legal authorities to address crime and administer
justice.
The superiority dimension of social dominance orientation was unrelated to the general
willingness to cooperate, but the other relationships paralleled the relationships with
submission/aggression. People who more strongly endorsed group-based dominance were more
willing to report, but less willing to report when the victim was a family member. Their
willingness to report was also unaffected by crime severity. It is possible that endorsement of
group-based dominance, like right-wing authoritarianism, is associated with honor culture
attitudes (cf. Canto et al., 2014), which in turn might explain the similar findings for both the
submission/aggression dimension of right-wing authoritarianism and the group-based dominance
dimension of social dominance orientation. That is, they might support the use of extralegal
sanctions to protect the honor of one’s family, but support legal sanctions when the victim is a
stranger. It might also explain the null effect of crime severity—perhaps it is not the objective
harm caused by a perpetrator’s actions that matters so much to people high in group-based
dominance, but rather the perceived harm to honor (cf. Schein & Gray, 2018).
Possible Points on Theoretical Integration
The willingness to cooperate has largely been considered from legitimacy theoretical
perspectives, but other theoretical perspectives have utility and could be integrated (e.g., see van
der Toorn et al., 2011). Indeed, the variables in the need for certainty model exhibited many
medium-to-large correlations with variables in the legal socialization and perceived legitimacy
models. First, just as people with a greater need to manage uncertainty might be motivated to
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hold certain beliefs about society that satisfy that need, they might also be motivated to perceive
the law and legal authority in certain ways. The need for cognitive closure was positively related
to the obligation to obey and perceived legitimacy (when obligation to obey was measured
separately), but was also positively related to legal cynicism and negatively related to legal
egalitarianism. On the face, these findings seem contradictory, but system justification theory
(Jost & van der Toorn, 2012) can again offer helpful insights.
Remember that system justification theory generally proposes a human tendency to
“defend, bolster, and justify” the status quo (i.e., current social, economic, and political
arrangements) that is often implicit (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). Notably, even people
disadvantaged by the status quo can engage in system justification. Turning away from the need
for cognitive closure for moment, the results showed some support for this notion. For example,
Black/African Americans and Native Americans were more likely to endorse the groupdominance facet of social dominance orientation compared to White/European Americans (cf.
Jost & Thompson, 2000). One might think that racial/ethnic groups that have a history of
subjugation in the U.S. would be opposed to group-based dominance, not in support of it.31 One
proffered reason for these types of findings is that justifying the status quo satisfies needs to
manage “uncertainty, threat, and social discord,” and in this way is a motivated social cognition.
Thus, the proposition that people with a high need to manage uncertainty are more likely to
justify the status quo because it satisfies that need might explain the relationships between the
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In some studies, published two decades ago, White/European Americans reported higher group-based dominance
and anti-egalitarianism compared to Black/African Americans (Jost & Thompson, 2000). One possibility is change
over time. According to one recent poll, a majority of adults in the U.S. support the Black Lives Matter movement,
and the vast majority of people who identify as Black support the movement (Thomas & Horowitz, 2020). There
have also been recent movements to support Black-owned businesses. Thus, normative changes in general and/or
normative changes among specific racial/ethnic groups might explain the discrepancy in findings. For example,
perhaps endorsement of group-based dominance has decreased over time among White/European Americans. The
samples in those studies were also undergraduate students at the University of Maryland, so another possible
explanation is the different sampling strategies. There were also racial/ethnic differences in NFCC.
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need for cognitive closure, beliefs about society, and perceptions of law and legal authority.
Notably, people higher in the need for cognitive closure did not necessarily have entirely positive
experiences and interactions with authorities in childhood and adolescence. They tended to
report arbitrary punishment by school and justice system authorities, that the police came to their
homes, and that they or someone they knew had been arrested and incarcerated; as adults, they
see the law as arbitrary, biased, and unbinding on their lives. Yet, they perceived legal and nonlegal authorities and rules in childhood and adolescences as legitimate, perceived the law and
legal authorities as legitimate in adulthood, and directly and indirectly reported a willingness to
cooperate with legal authorities.
A unique idea of system justification theory is that people who are disadvantaged by the
status quo can be involved in the status quo’s legitimation and perpetuation (Jost & van der
Toorn, 2012). The group value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006), the basis of the
process model of legitimacy, notes the conflict between short-term self-interest and long-term
collective interest; system justification somewhat similarly notes a conflict between short-term
self-interest and long-term justification of the status quo. In the former, fairness leads to
legitimacy and a shared group identity thereby alleviating motivational conflict (Lind & Tyler,
1988; Tyler, 2006); in the latter, the conflict remains and one result is negative psychological
well-being (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). This conflict could be in part why the need for
cognitive closure is positively related to psychological distress (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). More
broadly, collaborative work between social justification theorists and Tom Tyler has shown that
procedural justice and outcome dependence (e.g., when the outcome of a situation is dependent
on some authority) have independent (and causal) effects on perceived legitimacy (van der Toorn
et al., 2011). An implication is that people who feel controlled by a system (e.g., criminal justice
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system) or its representatives (e.g., police officers) are motivated to legitimate the status quo (cf.
Kyprianides et al., 2021) and might experience psychological distress as a result. Indeed, people
who by definition have broken the law and are subject to legal authority can nevertheless
perceive the law and legal authority as legitimate (see Tyler, 2010)—and rates of various mental
disorders are also higher among criminal justice involved populations (e.g., see Fazel et al.,
2016). The notion that some people subject to law and legal authority might engage in “criminal
justice system justification” and experience psychological distress as a result is, of course, a
notion that would need empirical testing. Perhaps the larger point is that increasing perceived
legitimacy and willing cooperation and compliance with the law and legal authorities is often
explicitly or implicitly seen as a positive objective, but it could be a result of a process that
people living in democracies would likely deem unsavory, not the result of increasing fairness
and effectiveness in the justice system (cf. Chen & Tyler, 2001; Fox, 1999; Tyler & McGraw,
1986). Although it is a cliché beaten into the ground at this point, one can imagine a dystopian
society like Orwell’s Oceania wherein people perceive rules and authority as legitimate because
they are controlled to an extreme degree by the Party, in contrast to a utopian society wherein
people perceive rules and authority as legitimate because from childhood to adulthood they have
positive experiences and interactions with authorities.
I previously noted two “classes” of authoritarianism that had contrasting relationships
with the willingness to cooperate. Similarly, the submission/aggression dimension and the groupbased dominance dimension were both positively related with the obligation to obey, perceived
legitimacy, and legal cynicism, while being weakly related or unrelated to legal egalitarianism.
The conventionalism dimension and inequality dimension were negatively related to the
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obligation to obey and legal egalitarianism, but unrelated or weakly related to perceived
legitimacy and legal cynicism.
Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are explained to some
degree by genetics (Hatemi & McDermott, 2012; Kleppestø et al., 2019), but they have also been
conceived as products of socialization (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998); the relationships between
dimensions of legal socialization and dimensions of right-wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation lend some support to that view. The dimensions of the first “class” of
authoritarianism had medium to very strong correlations with experiencing biased and arbitrary
treatment from authorities, as well as personal and vicarious experiences with the criminal justice
system, though they also had small to medium, positive associations with the legitimacy
dimension of legal socialization. Perhaps this first class of authoritarianism is a partial product of
an early disposition to perceive authorities as legitimate in combination with “adverse”
experiences with authorities in childhood and adolescence. In the second “class”, the
conventionalism dimension had the opposite pattern of associations, and thus might be a partial
product of a more negative disposition towards authorities in combination with unbiased and
reasonable treatment from authorities, as well as a lack of more direct experiences with the
criminal justice system. The inequality dimension was also negatively related to the legitimacy
dimension, but only weakly related to the other dimensions of legal socialization.
In sum, there are a number of notable links between people’s need for cognitive closure,
dimensions of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, and dimensions of
legal socialization and perceived legitimacy. These links might be explained to some extent by
system justification theory (Jost & van der Toorn, 2012) and generally align with theoretical
assumptions about how people’s experiences and interactions in childhood and adolescence
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shape their orientations toward society, authorities, and formal and informal norms (Altemeyer,
1998; Durkheim, 1895/1966; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Kaiser & Reisig, 2019; Mead, 1934/1962;
Nagin & Telep, 2020; Thomas et al., 2020; Tyler & Trinkner, 2017). They also reinforce the
notion that drawing on other theories outside of legitimacy might be helpful for identifying other
“pathways” to and/or antecedents of perceived legitimacy and examining their implications (e.g.,
Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler & McGraw, 1986; van der Toorn et al., 2011). For instance,
subpopulations of people might perceive the law and authorities as legitimate while also
experiencing psychological distress due to conflicting motives, which could be temporary or
long lasting.
The Role of Contextual Differences
The results of this study show that contextual factors affect people’s willingness to
cooperate as bystanders. Scholars and studies have long pointed to the role of situational factors
(e.g., Larson, 2015; Latané & Darley, 1970; Tolsma et al., 2011; Truman & Morgan, 2020), and
this study reinforces the importance of considering situational factors in people’s willingness to
cooperate. More specifically, though, it suggests the importance of considering situational factors
in conjunction with individual factors. Each of the situational factors in this study interacted with
at least one individual difference measure. In addition, the situational factors played more of a
role in influencing people’s willingness to report crimes than in influencing people’s willingness
to provide a statement to police. This might imply that situational factors are more relevant to
some indicators of cooperation over others.
The most robust situational predictor of willingness to report was crime severity. As
predicted, when a crime involved major harm compared to minor harm, people indicated a
greater willingness to report the crime. However, the superiority dimension of social dominance
135

orientation, legal cynicism, and legality dimension of legal socialization—all of which were
interrelated—generally attenuated the effect of crime severity. That is, people who endorsed
group-based dominance, did not see law and norms as binding on their lives, and who had
experienced biased and arbitrary treatment from authorities in childhood and adolescence were
less willing to report the crime when there was major harm relative to their counterparts. People
generally deem offenders who have caused greater harm as more blameworthy and deserving of
punishment (e.g., Steffensmeier et al., 1998; West et al., 2020; cf. Schein & Gray, 2018;
Vaughan et al., 2019), which could explain why respondents in this study generally reported a
greater willingness to report a crime to police when major harm was caused. That might not be
true, however, for people who have had certain negative experiences with authority and have a
more cynical orientation toward society and the law. It is also notable that crime severity did not
affect the willingness to provide a statement.
The other relatively robust predictor of the willingness to report was bystander
relationship to the suspected perpetrator. Respondents were less willing to report when their
friend, compared to a stranger, was the suspected perpetrator. Respondents were also less willing
to provide a statement when the suspected perpetrator was a friend, but seemingly only among
people lower in legal cynicism. These findings generally align with prior studies (Larson, 2015;
Tolsma et al., 2011) and prior theory (e.g., Black, 2010) suggesting bystanders are less willing to
invoke law and cooperate with legal authority when they have intimate ties to the perpetrator.
Cooperating in such situations might be a form of “self-incrimination”, and thus bystanders
might be less likely to cooperate in order to distance themselves and avoid involvement.
Respondents were also less willing to report when the suspected perpetrator was a family
member compared to a stranger, but the effect was not statistically significant when the need for
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cognitive closure, dimensions of right-wing authoritarianism, and dimensions of social
dominance orientation were included in the model. Moreover, there was no difference in the
willingness to provide a statement. Notably, however, the effect size was similar in magnitude
(small) and direction (negative) in the need for certainty models and in the legitimacy models.
Thus, the difference in the willingness to report when the perpetrator is a stranger compared to a
family member might simply be small and not “practically significant”, though it could still be
an important moderating factor (e.g., relationship to perpetrator might interact with relationship
to victim).
Finally, the effects of the bystander relationship to the victim on the willingness to
cooperate appeared to depend on or condition individual differences. Respondents were more
willing to report a crime and provide a statement when the victim was a family member
compared to a stranger, but seemingly only among people low in the submission/aggression facet
of right-wing authoritarianism, the superiority and inequality dimensions of social dominance
orientation, and/or legal cynicism; the effect tended to be reversed at higher levels of these
variables. I previously noted a potential explanation for some of these findings rooted in honor
culture attitudes. One interesting possibility is that biased and arbitrary treatment from
authorities in childhood and adolescence is also associated with honor culture attitudes or related
attitudes that emphasize a preference for informal social control when family members are
victimized. Another possible and potentially compatible explanation is the “black sheep” effect,
in which people will show bias against in-group members (Marques et al., 1992; Marques &
Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques et al., 1988). By deeming an ingroup member as a “black sheep”, other
members are essentially saying “this person does not represent us” to bolster the group’s positive
identity—the group overall is “good”, it’s just this person that make the group look “bad”
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(Marques et al., 1988). This might be associated with victim blaming. People higher in the
group-based dominance dimension of social dominance orientation, for instance, see their group
as superior to other groups, so blaming an in-group member for being victimized might allow
them to maintain that view.
There were generally no substantive differences between the friend victim condition and
stranger victim condition. On the whole, it appears that the type of relationship between the
bystander, the victim, and the perpetrator is an important consideration in understanding people’s
willingness to cooperate across situations. A prior study not too dissimilar from this one, for
instance, manipulated whether respondents “personally knew” the perpetrator or not (Tolsma et
al., 2011). With such an approach, potentially important differences among personal
relationships cannot be examined.
Policy Implications
One of the broad implications of this work is that people’s experiences and interactions
with authorities in childhood and adolescence shape the way they think about society, the law,
and legal authority—their “sociolegal cognition”, for short—and in turn their willingness to
cooperate with legal authorities. One of the attractive qualities of both the process model of
legitimacy (Tyler, 2003, 2006) and the dialogical model (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe,
2013) is that both offer possible routes to increasing public compliance and willing cooperation
with the law and legal authority. That is, each suggests that legal authorities communicate with
the public via their behavior, so if legal authorities behave in certain ways, the public will
perceive them as legitimate and willingly comply and cooperate. Similarly, if how legal and nonlegal authorities behave in interactions with children and youth influences sociolegal cognition,
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then there might be ways to influence or regulate those behaviors and indirectly increase willing
compliance and cooperation in the long-term.
One broad view of how policies might be able to influence sociolegal cognition is
inspired by the criminologist Richard Quinney. It is hard not to sound flippant when reducing
some of the major propositions to a brief sentence, but a Buddhism-inspired, radical
transformation into a post-capitalist society might not be too dramatic of an oversimplification
(see Tifft, 2002, for review). On its face that perspective might seem radical, but some of the
main points associated with the literature inspired by Quinney are not radical. For example, if
employers are supportive of employees who are parents and permit work arrangements so that
those employees can meaningfully engage in their children’s lives, that will probably have
myriad social benefits (Tifft, 2002). There are a variety of potential policies that are not typically
considered as criminal justice policies that have ramifications for the criminal justice system
(e.g., education policy and practice; see Herman et al., 2020, for a recent example), and some of
these policies are currently implemented by other countries. Along the lines of the example just
noted, the U.S. ranks quite low in national “family-friendly policies (e.g., maternity/parental
leave and benefits) among comparable countries (UNICEF, 2019). My point is not to launch into
some sort of Marxist-inspired diatribe against the U.S. government and recommend political
revolution, but rather to emphasize that there are policies outside of the criminal justice system
that are currently and effectively implemented, that could be implemented in the U.S., and that
could influence childhood socialization and ultimately increase the effectiveness of the criminal
justice system.
Of course, there are also criminal justice policies and programs that might be able to
encourage positive experiences and perceptions of authorities among children and youth. About
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half or more of people incarcerated in the U.S. are parents (Murphey & Cooper, 2015;
Sentencing Project, 2016), and there are millions of children with an incarcerated parent in any
given year (Murphey & Cooper, 2015; Sentencing Project, 2016; Sykes & Petit, 2014). Adopting
and implementing family reunification programs and/or parenting classes (see McKay et al.,
2016; Mowen & Visher, 2016), for example, is another more-practical-than-societaltransformation route by which public willingness to comply and cooperate could be increased in
the long term. Personal or vicarious contact with the criminal justice system is often considered
an adverse childhood experience and is associated with a variety of negative outcomes (e.g.,
Felitti et al., 1998/2019), but there is some indication that positive childhood experiences (e.g.,
feeling safe and secure with family) might be able to “buffer” against some of the negative
effects of adverse childhood experiences (e.g., Bethell et al., 2019). The implication is that
policies or programs or interventions like family reunification might be able to support positive
childhood experiences and reduce negative effects. This coalesces to some extent with the
perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence (see Wexler, 1990; Winick & Wexler, 2003), which in
essence proposes that the justice system can produce “therapeutic” or “anti-therapeutic”
consequences for individuals, and the goal of the criminal justice system should be the former.
Aligning with the general thrust of legitimacy scholarship, although personally or vicariously
experiencing legal sanctions and/or becoming involved in the criminal justice system is
undesirable, legal authority can conduct itself in ways that lead to more “therapeutic”
consequences (see Kaiser & Holtfreter, 2016, for an integration of therapeutic jurisprudence and
procedural justice).
Turning to more direct and perhaps crude approaches to increasing cooperation, one
provocative policy to consider is mandating cooperation. Generally speaking, bystanders have no
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legal obligation to cooperate with legal authorities (e.g., report crimes or suspicious activity they
witness, serve as a witness in some capacity). Of course, that does not mean that bystanders can
take actions to obstruct or interfere with legal processes, and there are a number of other
qualifications and exceptions. For example, people in certain positions are mandated to report
suspected child abuse or neglect, and many states have criminal and civil penalties for failing to
report (see Children’s Bureau, 2019). The former is notable because it is an example of formal
regulation of the absence of cooperative action with formal authority. Albeit hyperbole and
might easily lead to false equivalence, an elementary school teacher has a greater legal obligation
to cooperate if a student mentions experiencing possible abuse compared to if they witness a
violent assault on the sidewalk on their drive home. Mandating general cooperation seems
extreme, unfeasible, and probably unconstitutional, but it is worth noting that there are other
possible, direct routes to increasing cooperation.
Beyond mandating cooperation, “Good Samaritan” laws have been enacted to encourage
people to assist others in emergency situations, and they exist in every state in the U.S. (Stewart
et al., 2013). These laws protect bystanders (in some states, only physicians, sometimes with
particular licensing) from civil lawsuits resulting from their actions (or omissions) when they
assist in an emergency situation (Stewart et al., 2013). As opposed to mandating cooperation,
Good Samaritan laws function on the premise of negative reinforcement. Similarly, if the risk of
negative consequences due to cooperation can be minimized or removed, people might be more
willing to cooperate with legal authorities. This might be especially applicable to people who
face a risk of legal sanctions if they provide a statement to police (e.g., a person possessing illicit
substances and under the influence) or “extralegal” sanctions (“stitches”).
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There have been some policies adopted based on the idea that it is possible to increase a
particular target behavior by making it the “default” behavioral option (e.g., see Benartzi &
Thaler, 2007). Simply put, if you make the “right” decision very simple and easy to make, people
will tend to make that decision. Psychologists and behavioral economists have argued (and
demonstrated with empirical studies) for decades that, generally speaking, much of day-to-day
decision-making occurs largely outside of conscious awareness (e.g., see Kahneman, 2011;
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Deliberate, logical information processing requires motivation, effort,
and/or cognitive resources (Epstein, 2003; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), and is thus the exception
to the rule. This might be one reason why the ease of the reporting process influences people’s
willingness to report (Tolsma et al., 2011). If the goal is to facilitate public cooperation with
legal authority, one of the best ways to achieve that goal might be to make cooperation
convenient to the extent possible. The form of this might be different and some methods,
programs, and policies might be better than others, but technology is available and there is
already movement in this direction (e.g., online crime reporting). For example, given that that an
increasingly large majority of adults in the U.S. use social media (Pew, 2019), social media
could be a helpful tool for facilitating cooperation. In a survey of law enforcement professionals
across the U.S., over 80% of respondents reported using social media for investigations and over
70% reported that social media can make solving crime more efficient (LexisNexis, 2014).
However, only about half of respondents reported that there was a formal process by which to
use social media as tool in their activities, and even fewer (10-20%) reported receiving any sort
of training on how to use social media for crime monitoring, prevention, and investigation
(LexisNexis, 2014). This might suggest that if a standardized reporting process via social media
was developed along with policies, standard operating procedures, and training for law

142

enforcement professionals, the reporting and provide helpful information to law enforcement
might increase among the public.
A clear problem with social media specifically as a mode of reporting, however, is that it
is social. For instance, there are confidentiality and anonymity concerns. Crime reporting
applications might be a viable alternative (e.g., Citizen, StopCrime), but there are still similar
(and additional) concerns (see, e.g., Murrell, 2020; Weir, 2021). The Citizen app, for instance,
collects a users’ location, contacts, usage, contact, and personal identifiers (sp0n, Inc., 2020). If
the main reason a bystander is hesitant to report is a fear of retaliation, reporting via social media
or other application does not offer a robust guarantee of confidentiality or anonymity. For other
potential bystanders, though, applications might be a helpful tool in encouraging willing
cooperation among the public.
Increasing cooperation by making it convenient is a goal but also a consequence—a
possible increased demand for service that strains agencies. Some work on the 311 nonemergency line offered in many jurisdictions suggests that it is possible to predict demand and
allocate resources appropriately (Xu et al., 2017). It also seems possible, though, that some
people might be willing to cooperate to some extent without “demanding” service, at least
initially. For instance, for various reasons, people might not want formal charges to be brought
against a perpetrator (again, at least initially), but would be willing to report and provide a
statement about what happened to formal authorities, especially if it were convenient. People are
willing to provide basic details of their crime victimization experience on surveys while
admitting they did not report the crime to legal authorities, as evidenced by the National Crime
Victimization Survey (Truman & Morgan, 2020). Like respondents in this study, bystanders on
average might be willing to cooperate with legal authority, but might not do so because of
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barriers like a lengthy, effortful, and confusing processes (cf. Tolsma et al., 2011); taking steps to
facilitate that willing cooperation might be as important an objective as objectives like fostering
legitimacy to increase the public’s willingness to cooperate with legal authority.
Finally, one larger policy goal would be to increase the collection, sharing, and compiling
of indicators of cooperation. This might this catalyze research on cooperation and provide an
empirical foundation for other policies. At the moment, there is a paucity of publicly accessible
data on indicators of cooperation (e.g., the NCVS; Truman & Morgan, 2020). High quality,
accessible, and “processed” data on indicators of cooperation would be of value to many
stakeholders beyond academic researchers aiming to test theories. A person in the U.S. can
answer, at least tentatively, basic questions about crime from year to year by going to an FBI
website, clicking on some links, and perhaps even downloading datasets. To my knowledge,
there is no publicly available dataset that could be used to sufficiently answer questions like
“how many U.S. citizens were called for jury service this year and what was the nature and
extent of that service?” and “is there variation in the number of witnesses on average in criminal
cases over time?”. It is not necessarily the case that such data are not collected, but rather that
they are not systematically recorded, shared, and compiled in a publicly accessible format. There
has been a general shift towards the goal of evidence-based criminal justice policy and efforts to
improve criminal justice data in various ways (e.g., transition to National Incidence-Based
Reporting System), so there are reasons to be optimistic.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study had a number of strengths, but there are also a number of important
limitations. Thankfully, future research can address the limitations of the study and extend it in
important ways. First, some recent work suggests that findings from Mturk samples might not
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generalize to populations of interest (Thompson & Pickett, 2019) and recommends that criminal
justice researchers using Mturk samples compare models with and without control variables (or
weighted or unweighted models) and compare results with studies using probability samples.
Regarding the former, controlling for social and demographic characteristics in this study never
substantively changed any of the model estimates; regarding the latter, there are limited
comparisons, but many of the effect sizes found in this study matched effect sizes found in prior
studies. For example, the relationship between perceived legitimacy and the general willingness
to cooperate matches prior studies using varying sampling strategies (e.g., Lee & Cho, 2020;
Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe et al., 2016; Tyler & Fagan, 2008), and that’s despite varying
conceptualization and operationalization of legitimacy. John Eck (2006) once posed the question
of when a bologna sandwich is better than sex. Mturk, at the very least, seems to be a really good
bologna sandwich when best practices are used (e.g., Peer et al., 2014) and when obtaining a
random sample may not be feasible. Nonetheless, future research can examine whether the
findings of the current study replicate in other samples, which is perhaps most important for the
novel findings in this study.
Second, the vignettes in this study were not representative of all types of crime, and
people’s behavioral intentions in response to written vignettes might be different than their realworld behavior in response to witnessing a potential crime. Future research should thus consider
different types of crime and could also consider using audio/visual stimuli (e.g., Barnum et al.,
2021). Future research might also be able to creatively use simulations or role-playing scenarios
(e.g., Hine et al., 2018), including virtual simulations (e.g., Gelder et al., 2017), for instance.
Third, this study was cross-sectional, and the measures of legal socialization were all
retrospective. There is thus some question of their reliability and validity. Human memory of
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even recent events is not always valid, reliable, or precise (e.g., Buckhout, 1980). The findings of
this study could be an outcome of legal socialization having causal effects or an outcome of
people retro-actively projecting current experiences and perceptions onto the past; the design of
this study inhibits testing these competing propositions. The study that arguably promulgated a
focus on adverse childhood experiences used a retrospective design (Felitti et al., 1998/2019),
and it is admittedly more feasible for many researchers to ask adult respondents about rather
sensitive prior experiences with authorities as opposed to children and adolescents, for obvious
reasons (the latter is general a vulnerable population). It could be a “bologna sandwich”
approach to measuring legal socialization and examining its associations, but when a
longitudinal panel study from childhood through adulthood is not feasible, there might still be
utility in a retrospective approach.
One possible direction for future research is to examine legal socialization in the context
of immigration. Currently, almost 14% of the U.S. population was born outside of the U.S.
(Budiman, 2020). Among this group, there is diversity in a range of sociodemographic like
country of origin (e.g., Mexico, China, India), ethnicity (e.g., Latinx, Han), education, state
residence, and legal status (Budiman, 2020). Future research could investigate the extent to
which measures of legal socialization are invariant across these groups and their subgroups, as
well as whether relationships between legal socialization and legal perceptions are variant.
Consider, for instance, refugees in particular, who by definition were having negative (to put it
lightly) experiences with formal authorities in their country—are those experiences and related
legal perceptions “imported” and/or adjusted over time? Consider also children of undocumented
immigrants—how are their experiences (or lack thereof) with legal authority different from
children born in the U.S.? Future research might be able to answer such questions. Although
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ACEs did not form the entirety of legal socialization’s measurement in this study, questions
about their measurement both within and outside of the U.S. are pertinent. Just as ACEs might
need to be modified in order to be sensitive to a particular cultural context (Quinn et al., 2018),
so might there be a need to modify measures of legal socialization in certain cases.
Outside of questions of legal socialization measurement, one potential avenue of future
research is examining how experiences and interactions relate to the need for cognitive closure.
In this study, the need for cognitive closure was most strongly correlated with biased and
arbitrary treatment from authorities prior to adulthood, but it was also related to every other
dimensions of legal socialization, such as personal or vicarious contact with the criminal justice
system. Prior research has shown intergenerational transmission of the need for cognitive closure
(Dhont et al., 2013) and other research generally shows genetic underpinnings of various
individual differences (e.g., Hatemi & McDermott, 2012; Kleppestø et al., 2019), but
experiences and interactions in childhood and adolescence might also play some role—a
biopsychosocial model. Experiences with the criminal justice system, for example, might be a
facet of larger construct like childhood adversity that has a causal influence on the dispositional
need for “certainty”. In turn, people might become motivated to think about, and behave in, the
social world in ways that provide certainty and closure, even if it bolsters a state of affairs that is
against their self-interest (Jost and van der Toorn, 2012).
Fourth, this study looked at a few situational factors, but there are many other possible
situational factors that play a role in the willingness to cooperate (e.g., see Tyler & Fagan, 2008),
and its indicators like the willingness to report. For example, the ease of the reporting process
(e.g., a short reporting process) is related to the willingness to report (Tolsma et al., 2011).
Further, there might be interactions between situational factors. The bystander relationship to the
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victim or suspected perpetrator, for instance, might interact with available methods of reporting,
the number of other bystanders, and/or the location of the event. Other situational factors might
also interact with individual differences. For instance, the need for cognitive closure and rightwing authoritarianism are linked to prejudice (e.g., Dhont et al., 2013), and other theories suggest
that situational factors can provide justification for prejudice (e.g., Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall
& Eshleman, 2003). In turn, among certain individuals and in certain situations, people might be
more willing to report a crime and generally cooperate with legal authority when the victim
and/or perpetrator have certain characteristics (e.g., an adult, male, undocumented immigrant
perpetrator and a young, female, native-born U.S. citizen). On the whole, there are number of
research questions future research can answer about the roles of situational characteristics.
Fifth and finally, one speculative possibility is that the results of this study were
influenced by external circumstances and events. At the start of data collection, there was an
insurrection at the U.S. capitol that was a focus of much social discourse, especially in the U.S.
(see NPR, 2021, for overview). It seems within the realm of possibility that responses to some
items, especially those in the need for certainty model, in this survey were influenced by that
event (cf. LaFree & Adamczyk, 2017), but I could only speculate about the degree and direction
of that influence. Consider the items: “The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead
is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the
troublemakers spreading bad ideas,” and “In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to
use force against other groups”. One can similarly wonder if the event, and more broadly the
COVID-19 pandemic, influenced the responses to the need for cognitive closure items. Amidst
the events of 2020 (and early 2021), it would not be shocking if needs to manage uncertainty
became salient for many, and in turn motivated views (cf. Jost et al., 2003; West & Yelderman,
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in press). In general, social scientists will likely be investigating the influence of recent events
for years to come (see Miller, in press).
The main goal if this research project was to better understand how individual differences
and situational differences—some “old” and some “new”—related to people’s willingness to
cooperate with legal authorities. Along the way to achieving that goal, I examined the
measurement of perceived legitimacy and legal socialization, the relationships between them,
and the relationships between both of them and the need for cognitive closure, right-wing
authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. On the whole, the results supported prior
theory and studies while also providing novel insights and implications. Future research can
address the limitations of the current study and potentially answer some of the questions evoked
by the findings of this study.
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Appendix A: Scale Items
Need for Cognitive Closure

Citation: Roets & Van Hiel (2011a); adapted from Kruglanski et al. (1993); Webster &
Kruglanski (1994)
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree
1) I don't like situations that are uncertain.
2) I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.
3) I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
4) I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in
my life.
5) I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group
believes.
6) I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
7) When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.
8) When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly.
9) I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a
problem immediately.
10) I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.
11) I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things.
12) I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
13) I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
14) I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
15) I dislike unpredictable situations.
Note. Items in bold were retained for analysis
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Right-Wing Authoritarianism
Citation: Sibley & Duckitt (2009); adapted from Altemeyer (1998).
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree
1) It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create
doubt in people’s minds. (s/a)
2) Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.* (con)
3) The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad
ideas. (s/a)
4) Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at
our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. (s/a)
5) Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government,
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.”*
(con)
6) It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines so that people
could not get their hands on trashy and disgusting material. (s/a)
7) There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.* (con)
8) People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old forms of religious
guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and
immoral.* (con)
Note. * = reverse coded. (s/a) = submission/aggression dimension. (con) = conventionalism.
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Social Dominance Orientation
Citation: Sibley & Duckitt (2009); adapted from Pratto et al. (1994) and Sidanius & Pratto
(1999)
(Scale: 1 = Very negative, 7 = Very positive)
1) In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
(super)
2) It is OK if some people have more of a chance in life than others. (super)
3) To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. (super)
4) Inferior groups should stay in their place. (super)
5) It would be good if groups could be equal.* (equal)
6) Group equality should be our ideal.* (equal)
7) We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.* (equal)
8) Increased social equality.* (equal)

Note. * = reverse coded. (super) = superiority (group-based dominance) dimension. (equal) =
inequality (anti-egalitarianism).
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Perceived Legitimacy

(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree)

Theoretical
Dimension (s)

Item

Statement

1

People should obey the
law even if it goes against
what they think is right.

Obligation to
Obey

2

I always try to obey the
law even if I think it is
wrong.

Obligation to
Obey

3
4

5

6

7

8

9

Disobeying the law is
seldom justified.
It is difficult to [break] the
law and keep one’s selfrespect.
There is little reason for a
person like me to obey the
law.
It is hard to blame a
person for breaking the
law if they can get away
with it.
If a person goes to court
because of a dispute with
another person, and the
judge orders them to pay
the other person money,
they should pay that
person money, even if
they think the judge is
wrong.
If a person is doing
something and a police
officer tells them to stop,
they should stop.
The chance a person will
be arrested, convicted,
and punished for a crime
is random.

Select Citations
Tyler (2006)
Sunshine & Tyler
(2003)
Tyler (2006)
Sunshine & Tyler
(2003)

Actual
Dimension
Obligation to
Obey

Obligation to
Obey

Obligation to
Obey

Tyler (2006)

Obligation to
Obey

Tyler (2006)

Obligation to
Obey

Tyler (2006)

Legal
Cynicism

Obligation to
Obey

Tyler (2006)

Legal
Cynicism

Obligation to
Obey

Tyler (2006)

Obligation to
Obey

Obligation to
Obey

Tyler (2006)

Obligation to
Obey

Distributive
Fairness

n/a

Legal
Cynicism
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Obligation to
Obey
(dropped due
to wording
error)

10

11

12

People like me receive the
same treatment from the
police and judges as the
average citizen.
The basic rights of
citizens are well protected
in the courts.
When police deal with
people in my
neighborhood, they
always behave according
to the law.

Distributive
Fairness
Procedural
Fairness
Trust
Legality

Tyler (2006)
Tankebe et al.
(2016)
Tyler (2006)
Trinkner et al.
(2018)
Tankebe (2013)

Legality

Trinkner et al.
(2018)

Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension
Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension
Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension

Tankebe (2013)

13

The law represents the
moral values of people
like me.

Legality

Trinkner et al.
(2018)
Jackson et al.
(2012)

14

15

It is common for innocent
people to be arrested and
punished for crimes they
did not commit.
Judges and juries base
their decisions on
evidence, not on factors
like a defendant’s race,
gender, or income.

Distributive
Fairness

Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension

Tyler (2006)

Legal
Cynicism

n/a

Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension

Legality
Procedural
Fairness
Legality
Tyler (2006)

16

The police and courts use
rules and procedures that
are fair to everyone.

Procedural
Fairness

17

The police and courts
provide opportunities for
unfair decisions to be
corrected.

Procedural
Fairness

18

The police and courts
make decisions based on
facts.

Procedural
Fairness
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Trust, fairness,
Sunshine & Tyler
and legality
composite
(2003)
dimension
Tankebe (2013)
Tyler (2006)
Trust, fairness,
Sunshine & Tyler
and legality
composite
(2003)
dimension
Tankebe (2013)
Trust, fairness,
Tyler (2006)
and legality
composite
dimension

Sunshine & Tyler
(2003)
Tankebe (2013)
Tyler (2006)
Trust
19

Police officers and judges
are polite and courteous.

20

Police officers and judges
treat everyone with
dignity.

21

On the whole, police
officers and judges are
honest.

22

23

People accused or
suspected of crimes have
the opportunity to share
their “side of the story.”
Police officers and judges
ultimately want what’s
best for their
communities.

Procedural
Fairness
Trust
Procedural
Fairness

Sunshine & Tyler
(2003)
Tankebe (2013)
Tyler (2006)
Tankebe et al.
(2016)
Tyler (2006)

Trust
Procedural
Fairness

Sunshine & Tyler
(2003)
Tankebe (2013)
Tyler (2006)

Procedural
Fairness

Trust

24

Police officers and judges
clearly explain the reasons
for their actions to people
they deal with.

Procedural
Fairness

25

People often receive fair
outcomes in the criminal
justice system.

Distributive
Fairness

26

People usually receive the
outcomes they deserve
under the law.

Distributive
Fairness

27

There is equal justice
under the law.

Distributive
Fairness
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Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension
Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension
Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension

Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
Sunshine & Tyler
dimension
(2003)
Trust, fairness,
and legality
Tyler (2006)
composite
dimension
Tyler (2006)
Trust, fairness,
Sunshine & Tyler
and legality
composite
(2003)
dimension
Tankebe (2013)
Trust, fairness,
and legality
Tankebe (2013)
composite
dimension
Tankebe (2013) Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
Tankebe et al.
dimension
(2016)
Trust, fairness,
and legality
n/a
composite
dimension

28

29

30

31

Some groups of people
are more likely to be
arrested than other people.
Some groups of people
are more likely to be
convicted of crimes than
other people
Some groups of people
face harsh punishment,
while others get off easy.
“Justice is blind” is a
myth

Distributive
Fairness

n/a

Legal
Egalitarianism

Distributive
Fairness

n/a

Legal
Egalitarianism

Distributive
Fairness

n/a

Legal
Egalitarianism

n/a

Legal
Cynicism

Distributive
Fairness
Legality

Tyler (2006)

32

The police help people
who call them.

Effectiveness

Kochel et al.
(2013)

Effectiveness

Jackson et al.
(2012)
Tankebe (2013)
33

The police solve crimes.

Effectiveness

34

The police prevent
crimes.

Effectiveness

35

36

37

38

Without the police, there
would be much more
crime and disorder.
The police do a good job
protecting the community
and making people feel
safe.
Judges and juries are
effective at identifying
who is guilty of crime and
who is innocent.
Too many dangerous
people are released from
prisons when they should
stay there.

Jackson et al.
(2012)
Tankebe (2013)
Jackson et al.
(2012)

Effectiveness

Effectiveness

Effectiveness

n/a

Effectiveness

Effectiveness

n/a

Effectiveness

Effectiveness

n/a

Trust, fairness,
and legality
composite
dimension

Effectiveness

n/a

Legal
Cynicism
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39

Society would be in chaos
if there was no criminal
justice system.

Effectiveness

n/a

Effectiveness

Trust, fairness,
and legality
40
Effectiveness
composite
dimension
Note. n/a = item informed from prior literature, but not directly drawn from previously used
items. Bolded item numbers were included in final analyses
I feel safe walking in my
neighborhood at night.

Tankebe et al.
(2016)
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Legal Socialization
(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree; or dichotomous yes or no)

Item
1
2

3
4
5
6

7

8

9

10
11
12
13
14
15

Statement
My parents/guardians treated me with
dignity.
When my parents/guardians thought I
did something wrong, they would
always listen to my side of the story.
When my parents/guardians punished
me for misbehaving, they would
explain why they were punishing me.
My parents/guardians wanted what
was best for me.
I always tried to obey my
parents/guardians, even if I didn’t
agree with their rules.
My parents/guardians taught me what
is right and what is wrong.
When my parents/guardians were
mad, they would often take it out on
me even if I did not do anything
wrong.
My parents/guardians had problems
abusing alcohol or drugs.
My parents/guardians would threaten
me with physical punishment if they
thought I was doing something
wrong.
If I hit someone else or got into a
fight, my parents/guardians would
punish me.
My parents/guardians made me feel
safe.
If I used drugs or alcohol, my
parents/ guardians would punish me.
My parents/guardians treated me
fairly.
I often felt neglected by my
parents/guardians.
My teachers treated me with dignity
and respect.
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Domain

Dimension

Household

Legitimacy

Household

Legitimacy

Household

Legitimacy

Household

Legitimacy

Household

Obligation to
Obey

Household

Legitimacy

Household

Legality

Household

Legality

Household

Legality

Household

Punishment Risk

Household

Legitimacy

Household

Punishment Risk

Household

Legitimacy

Household

Legality

School

Legitimacy

I felt safe at my school.
I knew my teachers wanted what was
best for me.
If I got in trouble at school, I would
be able to share my side of the story.
The rules at my school were fair to
everyone.
Overall, the teachers and
administrators at my school were
honest.
If I was going to be punished for
something I did at school, the reasons
for my punishment would be
explained to me.
Whether a student was punished at
my school or not seemed entirely
random.
Teachers or administrators at my
school would often talk down to me
and make me feel like I was
worthless.
I felt that some students at my school
were treated better than other
students.
I always tried to obey the rules at
school, even if I did not agree with
them.
The environment at my school often
felt chaotic.

School

Legitimacy

School

Legitimacy

School

Legitimacy

School

Legitimacy

School

Legitimacy

School

Legitimacy

School

Legality

School

Legality

School

Legality

School

Obligation to
Obey

School

Legality

27

Did someone in your family or
household ever go to prison or jail?

Justice
System

28

Did the police ever come to your
home?

Justice
System

29

Did you or someone you knew ever
go to juvenile detention?

Justice
System

30

Were you or someone you knew ever
treated unfairly by a police officer?

Justice
System

31

Were you or someone you knew ever
arrested?

Justice
System

16
17
18
19
20

21

22

23

24

25
26
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Experiences with
the Justice
System
Experiences with
the Justice
System
Experiences with
the Justice
System
Experiences with
the Justice
System
Experiences with
the Justice
System

32

Did you ever call the police to report
a crime?

Justice
System

People around me were often treated
Justice
like criminals, just for doing things
System
many young people do.
The police treated young people with
Justice
34
dignity and respect.
System
I felt nervous or anxious when I was
Justice
35
around a police officer, even when I
System
was not doing anything wrong.
I knew early on that the police were
Justice
36
there to keep everyone safe.
System
The way the police treated young
Justice
people taught me the police do not
37
System
deserve the power they have.
I looked up to police officers as role
Justice
38
models.
System
If reached out to the police, I knew
Justice
39
they would be there to help me.
System
My experiences taught me there was
Justice
40
no “justice” in the justice system for
System
people like me.
I always tried to obey the law, even
Justice
41
when I did not agree with it.
System
My experiences taught me that what I
thought was right and wrong, was not
Justice
42
the same as what society thought was
System
right and wrong.
Note. Bolded item numbers were included in final analyses.
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Experiences with
the Justice
System
Legality
Legitimacy
Legality
Legitimacy
Legality
Legitimacy
Legitimacy
Legality
Obligation to
Obey
Legality

The General Willingness to Cooperate
Citation: Tankebe (2013); cf. Lee & Cho (2020); Sunshine & Tyler (2003); Tyler & Fagan
(2008); Papp et al. (2019).
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree
1)
2)
3)
4)

I would report suspicious activity near my residence to police.
I would provide information to police to help find a suspected criminal.
If I witnessed a crime, I would call the police to report the crime.
I would be willing to testify at a trial if I were asked to provide testimony.

Legal Cynicism
Citation: Sampson & Bartusch (1993), adapted from Srole (1956)
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree
1) Laws were made to be broken.
2) It’s okay to do anything you want as long as you don’t hurt anyone.
3) To make money, there are no right or wrong ways anymore, only easy ways and hard
ways.
4) Fighting between friends or within families is nobody else’s business.
5) Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.
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Appendix B: Vignettes
Participants read and responded to three vignettes depicting a potential crime: fraud, assault, and
burglary. In each scenario, the relationship to victim (3: stranger, friend, or family member), the
relationship to suspect (3: stranger, friend, or family member), and the crime severity (2: major
or minor harm) will be experimentally manipulated. Thus, there are 18 possible versions of each
scenario. These 18 version are shown for each vignette below.
Fraud Vignette (117-126 words)
Vignette version #1: Stranger victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. Another person walking in your neighborhood
stops and starts talking to you. They tell you that people have been going door-to-door claiming
to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for donations. You heard about people doing this
on the local news, but did not think much of it at the time.
After giving a donation of $1,000, the person called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. The person feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #2: Stranger victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. Another person walking in your neighborhood
stops and starts talking to you. They tell you that people have been going door-to-door claiming
to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for donations. A friend recently made a joke
about doing something like this, and you start to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $1,000, the person called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. The person feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #3: Stranger victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. Another person walking in your neighborhood
stops and starts talking to you. They tell you that people have been going door-to-door claiming
to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for donations. A family member recently made a
joke about doing something like this, and you start to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $1,000, the person called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
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to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. The person feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #4: Stranger victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. Another person walking in your neighborhood
stops and starts talking to you. They tell you that people have been going door-to-door claiming
to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for donations. You heard about people doing this
on the local news, but did not think much of it at the time.
After giving a donation of $20, the person called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. The person feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #5: Stranger victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. Another person walking in your neighborhood
stops and starts talking to you. They tell you that people have been going door-to-door claiming
to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for donations. A friend recently made a joke
about doing something like this, and you start to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $20, the person called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. The person feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #6: Stranger victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. Another person walking in your neighborhood
stops and starts talking to you. They tell you that people have been going door-to-door claiming
to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for donations. A family member recently made a
joke about doing something like this, and you start to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $20, the person called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. The person feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #7: Friend victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A friend calls you. They tell you that people
have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for
donations. You heard about people doing this on the local news, but did not think much of it at
the time.
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After giving a donation of $1,000, your friend called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your friend feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #8: Friend victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A friend calls you. They tell you that another
friend has been going door-to-door claiming to be a volunteer at a local non-profit and asking for
donations. The friend recently made a joke about doing something like this, and you start to
suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $1,000, your friend called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your friend feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #9: Friend victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A friend calls you. They tell you that people
have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for
donations. A family member recently made a joke about doing something like this, and you start
to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $1,000, your friend called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your friend feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #10: Friend victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A friend calls you. They tell you that people
have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for
donations. You heard about people doing this on the local news, but did not think much of it at
the time.
After giving a donation of $20, your friend called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your friend feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #11: Friend victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A friend calls you. They tell you that another
friend has been going door-to-door claiming to be a volunteer at a local non-profit and asking for
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donations. The friend recently made a joke about doing something like this, and you start to
suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $20, your friend called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your friend feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #12: Friend victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A friend calls you. They tell you that people
have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking for
donations. A family member recently made a joke about doing something like this, and you start
to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $20, your friend called the non-profit to learn more about how their
donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct volunteers
to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your friend feels very upset for
being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #13: Family member victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A family member calls you. They tell you that
people have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking
for donations. You heard about people doing this on the local news, but did not think much of it
at the time.
After giving a donation of $1,000, your family member called the non-profit to learn more about
how their donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct
volunteers to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your family member
feels very upset for being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #14: Family member victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A family member calls you. They tell you that
people have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking
for donations. A friend recently made a joke about doing something like this, and you start to
suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $1,000, your family member called the non-profit to learn more about
how their donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct
volunteers to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your family member
feels very upset for being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #15: Family member victim, family member suspect, major harm
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You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A family member calls you. They tell you that
another family member has been going door-to-door claiming to be a volunteer at a local nonprofit and asking for donations. The family member recently made a joke about doing something
like this, and you start to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $1,000, your family member called the non-profit to learn more about
how their donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct
volunteers to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your family member
feels very upset for being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #16: Family member victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A family member calls you. They tell you that
people have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking
for donations. You heard about people doing this on the local news, but did not think much of it
at the time.
After giving a donation of $20, your family member called the non-profit to learn more about
how their donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct
volunteers to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your family member
feels very upset for being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #17: Family member victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A family member calls you. They tell you that
people have been going door-to-door claiming to be volunteers at a local non-profit and asking
for donations. A friend recently made a joke about doing something like this, and you start to
suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $20, your family member called the non-profit to learn more about
how their donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct
volunteers to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your family member
feels very upset for being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Vignette version #18: Family member victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are walking in your neighborhood one day. A family member calls you. They tell you that
another family member has been going door-to-door claiming to be a volunteer at a local nonprofit and asking for donations. The family member recently made a joke about doing something
like this, and you start to suspect they were not joking.
After giving a donation of $20, your family member called the non-profit to learn more about
how their donation would be used. An employee at the non-profit told them they did not instruct
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volunteers to solicit donations and that they were likely a victim of fraud. Your family member
feels very upset for being scammed and they do not know what they should do about it.
Assault Vignette (54-62 words)
Vignette version #1: Stranger victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. At a table near you, two people begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. An employee at the restaurant decides
to intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of the people punches the employee trying to
defuse the situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #2: Stranger victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two friends with you begin arguing loudly and causing a
disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. An employee at the restaurant decides to
intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of your friends punches the employee trying to
defuse the situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #3: Stranger victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two family members with you begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. An employee at the restaurant decides
to intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of your friends punches the employee trying to
defuse the situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #4: Stranger victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. At a table near you, two people begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. An employee at the restaurant decides
to intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of the people shoves the employee trying to
defuse the situation and leaves the restaurant.
Vignette version #5: Stranger victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two friends with you begin arguing loudly and causing a
disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. An employee at the restaurant decides to
intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of your friends shoves the employee trying to
defuse the situation and leaves the restaurant.
Vignette version #6: Stranger victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two family members with you begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. An employee at the restaurant decides
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to intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of your family members shoves the employee
trying to defuse the situation and leaves the restaurant.
Vignette version #7: Friend victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. At a table near you, two people begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A friend with you decides to intervene
to try and defuse the situation. One of the people punches your friend trying to defuse the
situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #8: Friend victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two friends with you begin arguing loudly and causing a
disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. Another friend with you decides to intervene to
try and defuse the situation. One of your friends punches the friend trying to defuse the situation
and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #9: Friend victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two family members with you begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A friend with you decides to intervene
to try and defuse the situation. One of your family members punches the friend trying to defuse
the situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #10: Friend victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. At a table near you, two people begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A friend with you decides to intervene
to try and defuse the situation. One the people shoves the friend trying to defuse the situation and
leaves the restaurant.
Vignette version #11: Friend victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two friends with you begin arguing loudly and causing a
disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. Another friend with you decides to intervene to
try and defuse the situation. One the friends shoves the friend trying to defuse the situation and
leaves the restaurant.
Vignette version #12: Friend victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two family members with you begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A friend with you decides to intervene
to try and defuse the situation. One your family members shoves the friend trying to defuse the
situation and leaves the restaurant.
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Vignette version #13: Family member victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. At a table near you, two people begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A family member with you decides to
intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of the people punches the family member trying to
defuse the situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #14: Family member victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two friends with you begin arguing loudly and causing a
disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A family member with you decides to intervene
to try and defuse the situation. One of the friends punches the family member trying to defuse the
situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #15: Family member victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two family members with you begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. Another family member with you
decides to intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of the family members punches the
family member trying to defuse the situation and knocks them to the ground.
Vignette version #16: Family member victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. At a table near you, two people begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A family member with you decides to
intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of the people shoves the family member trying to
defuse the situation and leaves the restaurant.
Vignette version #17: Family member victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two friends with you begin arguing loudly and causing a
disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. A family member with you decides to intervene
to try and defuse the situation. One of the friends shoves the family member trying to defuse the
situation and leaves the restaurant.
Vignette version #18: Family member victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are at a restaurant one night. Two family members with you begin arguing loudly and
causing a disturbance. It looks like they are about to fight. Another family member with you
decides to intervene to try and defuse the situation. One of the family members shoves the family
member trying to defuse the situation and leaves the restaurant.
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Burglary Vignette (91-103 words)
Vignette version #1: Stranger victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are coming home one night. As you arrive home, you see someone dash out of a residence
near you with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly drive away. You do not
recognize the car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #2: Stranger victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are coming home one night. As you arrive home, you see someone dash out of a residence
near you with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly drive away. The car looks
like a friend’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #3: Stranger victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are coming home one night. As you arrive home, you see someone dash out of a residence
near you with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly drive away. The car looks
like a family member’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #4: Stranger victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are coming home one night. As you arrive home, you see someone dash out of a residence
near you with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly drive away. You do not
recognize the car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #5: Stranger victim, friend suspect, minor harm
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You are coming home one night. As you arrive home, you see someone dash out of a residence
near you with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly drive away. The car looks
like a friend’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #6: Stranger victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are coming home one night. As you arrive home, you see someone dash out of a residence
near you with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly drive away. The car looks
like a family member’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #7: Friend victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are house sitting for a friend. As you arrive at your friend’s residence one night, you see
someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly
drive away. You do not recognize the car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #8: Friend victim, friend suspect, major harm
You are house sitting for a friend. As you arrive at your friend’s residence one night, you see
someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly
drive away. The car looks like another friend’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #9: Friend victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are house sitting for a friend. As you arrive at your friend’s residence one night, you see
someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly
drive away. The car looks like a family member’s car.
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You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #10: Friend victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are house sitting for a friend. As you arrive at your friend’s residence one night, you see
someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly
drive away. You do not recognize the car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #11: Friend victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are house sitting for a friend. As you arrive at your friend’s residence one night, you see
someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly
drive away. The car looks like another friend’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #12: Friend victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are house sitting for a friend. As you arrive at your friend’s residence one night, you see
someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car, and swiftly
drive away. The car looks like a family member’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #13: Family member victim, stranger suspect, major harm
You are house sitting for a family member. As you arrive at your family member’s residence one
night, you see someone dash out of a residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car,
and swiftly drive away. You do not recognize the car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #14: Family member victim, friend suspect, major harm
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You are house sitting for a family member. As you arrive at your family member’s residence one
night, you see someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car,
and swiftly drive away. The car looks like a friend’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #15: Family member victim, family member suspect, major harm
You are house sitting for a family member. As you arrive at your family member’s residence one
night, you see someone dash out of a residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car,
and swiftly drive away. The car looks like another family member’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like a piece of expensive jewelry
and a computer power cord laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #16: Family member victim, stranger suspect, minor harm
You are house sitting for a family member. As you arrive at your family member’s residence one
night, you see someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car,
and swiftly drive away. You do not recognize the car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #17: Family member victim, friend suspect, minor harm
You are house sitting for a family member. As you arrive at your family member’s residence one
night, you see someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car,
and swiftly drive away. The car looks like a friend’s car.
You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.
Vignette version #18: Family member victim, family member suspect, minor harm
You are house sitting for a family member. As you arrive at your family member’s residence one
night, you see someone dash out of the residence with a trash bag full of items, jump into a car,
and swiftly drive away. The car looks like another family member’s car.
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You walk over to the residence and see that the door is open. It looks like someone broke the
lock and kicked the door in. Near the door, you see what looks like some clothes and an old radio
laying on the ground. You suspect you just witnessed a burglary.

Vignette Items
After reading each of the three vignettes, participants responded to the two subsequent items.
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree
1. I would call the police in this situation.
2. I would be willing to provide a sworn statement to the police detailing what I witnessed.
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